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***Beyond Greed and Grievance in South Sudan – Analysis of
ethnically and politically motivated violence***



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Declaration on Oath

I declare on oath that I authored the following paper independently and without assistance and that I only used the resources indicated in the paper. All extracts that have been copied from publications analogously or literally are marked as such

Name, First Name: _____

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List of Abbreviations

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reconciliation
GDP	Gross Dynamic Product
GNI	Gross National Income
GoS	Government of Sudan
GoSS	Government of South Sudan
HDI	Human Development Index
HIK	Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research
ICC	International Criminal Court
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
LDC	Least Developed Countries
NGO	Non-governmental Organisations
NPPR	National Platform on Peacebuilding and Reconciliation
SPLA	Sudan's People Liberation Army
SPLM	Sudan's People Liberation Movement
SPLM-IO	Sudan's People Liberation Movement in Opposition
SSDF	South Sudan Defence Forces
SSLM	South Sudan Liberation Movement
UCPD	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

A. Introduction

The Republic of South Sudan emerged as an independent country on July 9, 2011, after a referendum earlier the same year. This referendum was based on the peace agreement that ended one of the most violent civil wars on the African continent, leaving approximately 2.2 million people dead, even more mutilated and many more displaced (ENOUGH 2014).

The hopes for a peaceful transition from civil war towards a functioning and stable state were high, and South Sudan but, while the situation between the Sudan and South Sudan was relatively peaceful, the situation in South Sudan's territory was still unstable. A power sharing government was implemented, with the commanders of two major former rebel groups being appointed president and vice-president.

During the course of 2013, the transition process first slowed down, and during a rapid development in the second half of the year South Sudan was thrown back into an armed conflict that flared up in December and – although only 17 days passed by – was already labelled a full scale civil war, by many conflict research institutes like UCDP, HIIK and others. This is to say that the fighting resulted in at least 1000 battle-related death (UCDP 2014) in those two and a half weeks.

During the first weeks of 2014, the fighting intensified and left the UN-mission in South Sudan unable to protect the civilian population, and even their camps, crowded with people desperately looking for refuge, were the target of some attacks themselves. Although the UNSC empowered the UNMISS mission mandate and stocked up the number of peacekeepers, the toll of civilian casualties was very high, and the fighting did not completely stop until now. Although several ceasefire agreements have been agreed upon, a lasting peace agreement has yet to be signed. ¹

This paper aims at analysing the current conflict situation in South Sudan, and to find reasons for the protracted armed conflict. To do so, it will follow an adapted conflict analysis framework, originally designed for peacebuilding planning. The analysis of the causes will be rooted in the greed and grievance theory, a model that takes into account, the economic circumstances that make a country prone to conflict, as well as societal resentments that can explain, why certain groups engage in violent rebellion.

¹ Actual state of affairs on 26.11.2014.

The paper will be structured as follows: Firstly, the theoretical framework of the greed and grievance model will be presented and elaborated. After implementing critical voices, a set of research hypotheses will be formulated, which point towards the causes behind the outbreak of violence, in December 2013, as well as the obstacles to the peace negotiations that are taking place right now.

In a second step, the analytical framework, which is used for the conflict analysis, will be presented. This part will describe the methods that will be applied to each of the three steps of the analysis itself: context, actors and causes.

In the two following parts of this paper, a conflict analysis will then offer information about the current conflict. Furthermore, the research hypotheses, which have been developed out of the greed and grievance theory, will be tested against the findings.

As a final chapter, the information gathered in the analysis will be summarised, and policy implications mapped. The limits of the applied theory, as well as the gathered data and their impacts on the research quality, will then be outlined, before possible and necessary future research has to be discussed. In the very end, a personal conclusion will be drawn, which includes the shortcomings of this research, and a general impression, of the use of greed and grievance theory in conflict analysis.

B. Theoretical background

The question: “What causes wars and violence?” is one that scholars of all ages of human civilisation, have tried to explain. One can find early explanatory approaches by Greek philosophers, such as Thucydides – “History of the Peloponnesian War” –, and various Roman statesmen. Carl von Clausewitz and Immanuel Kant are just two more of the famous names, on the extensive list of people, who tried to explain the phenomenon of war. In the 20th century, and after the experience of two world wars, the number of theories that tried to explain war surged. While some theories explain wars by using the big theories of International Relations, offer only limited insight into the black boxes of states and focussing on inter-state wars, others sought to explain the motives of intra-state wars and violent insurgencies, which outnumbered the inter-state wars very rapidly.

The theory used in this paper belongs, to the latter type, focussing rather on micro level of conflicts, which seek the causes of conflict in terms of individual motivations to engage in violence, and the large scale mobilisation, necessary to escalate a minor crisis into a full scale war.

One of the first works that coined the phrase “Greed and [or “versus”]Grievance Theory” was published by Paul Collier in his article “Doing well out of war” in the 1999 book “Greed & Grievance – Economic Agendas in Civil Wars”. Since that point of time, the model has been critically discussed and reformulated in various essays and articles, e.g. Collier & Hoeffler 2004 and 2009, Keen 2012, Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005 and Dixon 2009.

The essay elaborated Hoeffler and Collier’s 1998 article “On the economic causes of civil war”, which offered an extensive statistical analysis of war economies, economical motivation of rebel groups, and formulated the thesis that civil wars are foremost caused by the greed of rebel groups to make economic returns. Their later work, especially the 2004 article, offered two strings of argumentation, the economic causes, the greed based argument, and the socio-political causes, the grievance arguments.

Those two strings follow, as Collier points out, the two lines of thought, of the political scientists and economists. He argued that a rebellion is dependent on two variables: motive and opportunity. While political scientists would rather focus on the motives behind rebel action, economists would look into the opportunities for rebellion. (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, p.563) Going more into detail about the motives and opportunities for conflict, Collier claims that, from a political scientists’ point of view, conflict emerges when “grievances are sufficiently

acute that people want to engage in violent protest” (ibid. p.564), while an economist perspective argues that some rebellions – those with favourable opportunities for violent rebellion – can be seen as “an industry that generates profit by looting” (ibid.) This introduced a dichotomy scale for conflict motivation: greed vs. grievance.

The economic argument implicates that rebels, as rational actors, do a cost-benefit analysis, before engaging in violent behaviour, since they have to sustain their insurgency with returns from their actions. In their 1999 essay, Collier and Hoeffler present statistical formulae which can be used to explain the occurrence of greed rebellions. According to their arguments, an economically motivated rebellion can only emerge, when the looting or extortion of financial assets – usually primary commodities – would generate enough profit to risk the consequences of taking up arms against the government. Thus, rebels have to be sure to outfight the government forces on the short run, since these will aim to kill rebels and suppress the rebellion. (Collier 1998, p.6f.)

In their following articles, Collier and Hoeffler further elaborated their arguments and statistical testing methods, introducing different proxies for both, greed and grievances, and testing those variables in cross-country regression analyses. The 2004 and 2009 articles can be considered the most influential ones by these authors. The first one established their testing model of 5-year periods in 161 countries, and resulted in the argument that the economic greed hypothesis has more explanatory power (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, p.563). The second article adds the feasibility hypothesis and, according to the authors, is based on more reliable data (Collier et al. 2009, p.2) Hence, this paper will discuss the evolution of the greed and grievance theory in those two essays, and will further include critical voices from other authors, who claim that the theory still has considerable shortcomings.

1. The Greed versus Grievance Theory

In their 2004 article, Collier and Hoeffler present a set of proxies for favourable opportunities and for objective grievances, and test those for their relevance for the start of a war (the dependent variable), by using a regression analysis. Favourable opportunities can be summarised as those, which make violent rebellion attractive, hence, they consider 3 groups of proxies.

For the opportunity or greed hypothesis, they firstly investigate ways of financing rebellion – extortion of natural resources, subventions from the diaspora and/or governments hostile to the government of the country, which the rebellion is opposing against (ibid. p.565). The natural

resources are the most important variable in this group, since it can generate huge profits without being very depended on third actors. Collier and Hoeffler use the ratio of GDP and primary commodity exports, in order to measure the importance of natural resources, in financing a greed motivated rebellion.

Furthermore, they consider atypically low costs of conflict that can be measured by expenditures for fighters, who need to be paid in order to take up arms, instead of working in their regular jobs. As long as they fight for the insurgents, they have “foregone income”. Only if the fighters’ forgone income is low enough, so that their time spent as insurgents in a rebellion pays off as a means of making more money, than they would have made in their usual jobs, they will engage in combat. (ibid. p.569) This opportunity proxy can be investigated by looking into the mean income per capita, the growth rate of the economy and, since most rebel fighters are usually male, the level of education of males. Collier and Hoeffler consider the rate of male, who were enrolled in secondary schooling, because people with secondary schooling tend to have a higher potential foregone income, which has to be compensated by rebellion payoffs.

Collier and Hoeffler investigate three more proxies for opportunities: cheap conflict related material, favourable terrain and social cohesion. They measure the availability of cheap conflict material by looking for a recent conflict in the country, which might have left a stock of weapons easily accessible. Terrain is considered favourable, when it is hard to control by government forces, i.e. if the country is extraordinary big and dispersedly populated, has big areas of dense forests or mountain ranges. Social cohesion on the other hand, can be expressed by the level of fractionalisation in ethnic or religious terms. (ibid. p.569f.)

They find objective grievances hard to measure, thus, Collier and Hoeffler limit their measures of grievances to ethnic or political hatred, political repression, political exclusion and economic inequalities (ibid. p.570)

Based on the argument that religious and ethnic hatred are impossible to measure, and tensions between groups need a high degree of polarisation in order to lead to violence (ibid. p.571), Collier and Hoeffler check for polarisation between society groups.

Political repression can be easily observed, by looking into the different indices of democracy; the authors use Polity III and an index published by Freedom House. Political exclusion on the other hand can be found even in democratic states (ibid.). Thus, they argue in favour of a measurement that looks into the diversity of the population. If “ethnic dominance” is present –

a case, when the “largest ethnic group constitutes 45 to 90% of the population” (ibid. p.572) – this group might be able to exclude minorities from the democratic processes.

The inequality variable is checked by using the common Gini coefficient, a measure that shows the distribution of wealth in the society. Furthermore they check for inequalities in land distribution, using a modified Gini coefficient of land ownership.

Having constituted proxy variables for their two lines of argumentation, they test each of their hypotheses, and dismiss those proxies that are deemed not significant in their regression. In an attempt to create a model that is more reliable and has more explanatory power, than the single hypotheses, they later combine the significant variables of each model into one regression that constitutes the greed and grievance model.

This combined model consists of 8 independent variables, of which only one belongs to the grievance argument. Thus the 2004 Greed and Grievance model can explain the occurrence of civil war as the sum of the following:

According to Collier and Hoeffler’s 2004 analysis, it makes a country prone to conflict, if the share of primary commodity exports of the GDP is high (1). If the GDP of a country depends to one third on their export of primary commodities, they have a significantly higher risk of conflict, than a country, which is rather independent of those exports. (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p.580) They further offer a distinction between types of primary commodities, oil seems to pose additional risks, if the dependency on oil exports is high.

There seems to be a negative influence of school enrolment rates (2) on the risk of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler find that an increase of males enrolling in secondary education decreases the risk of conflict in a country. The effects are not substantial, they rather show that, if an additional 10% attend secondary schooling, the risk drops by 3 percentage points. (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, p.581)

Furthermore, the growth rate of the economy seems to have a negative relation with the conflict risk (3). They find that additional percentage points of growth, decreases the risk by about the same percentage points. (ibid.)

As a proxy for measuring atypically low cost of conflict related material, such as weapons, Collier and Hoeffler find that the amount of time since a prior war (4) and thus, the low costs have a high influence on the risk of restarting wars. They claim that directly after a war is over,

the probability of a re-start is about 30%, while this danger declines linearly over the next years, by about 1 percentage point per year. (ibid.)

According to their analysis, states with a high level of dispersion of their population (5) have a higher risk of conflict, while the risk is significantly lower, if the population is concentrated around few centres. (ibid.)

Their analysis finds that the level of heterogeneity of the society (6) is a positive indicator for the security of a country. The more fractionalised a society is, the safer it seems to be; Collier and Hoeffler claim that a maximally homogenous society is four times more prone to a war start, than a maximally heterogeneous society. (ibid)

On the other hand, there seems to be a contrary relation between the ethnic fractionalisation and conflict risk, at least when it comes to ethnic dominance (7). This is the only remaining argument of the grievance model and has formerly been defined, as the occurrence of a substantially large ethnic group, which thus, can exclude other groups from democratic processes. There seems to be an inversed U-shaped relation, between ethnic diversity and conflict risk. First, when fractionalisation is rising, the risk increases, since one group tends to achieve ethnic dominance. This stays that way, until one ethnicity cannot actually constitute a total majority, and ethnic dominance is unlikely. The risk then declines the more diverse a society becomes. (ibid.)

Their final conclusion is that the risk of conflict is dependent on the total size of the population (8). They find in their regression analysis that the larger the population, the higher is the risk of conflict. Thus, countries with an atypically large population, are more prone to the occurrence of civil war, than smaller countries. (ibid.) Collier and Hoeffler offer the explanation that the opportunities and grievances will increase with the size of population, since the population will most likely be more diverse (ibid. p.588), this however, contradicts their findings that heterogeneous societies are more likely to experience peace.

The 2009 revision of their statistical model included changes in the theoretical assumptions. While they argued before that the key ingredients for conflict are opportunity and motivation, they reform their point of view concerning the importance of the former greed or opportunity argument. According to a new feasibility hypothesis, a conflict has to be militarily and economically feasible; they postulate that if a “rebellion is [...] feasible it will occur”. (Collier et al. 2009, pp.1, 23)

In addition to their change in terms of conflict causes, they conduct a new cross-country analysis that results in certain changes in the proxies for each hypothesis.

Firstly, they revise the statement that rising population sizes, increase the risk of conflict, and find a contrary relation. Their new data led them to conclude that the overall effects of large populations are very small, what they interpret in economic terms. According to their argumentation, the security industry, including police and army, is an economy of scale. Hence, the risk of violent insurgencies increases with the number of countries within a region, if those countries do have small populations. They conclude that Africa, as a region with many small countries, naturally has more conflicts than South Asia, with its small amount of large countries. This argument results in a rejection of sectarian solutions to conflicts in large countries. (Collier et al. 2009, p.14)

Secondly, revising their statement on fractionalisation of society, the new analysis shows that any social fractionalisation, tends to increase the risk of conflict, thus, inverting the argument 6, in the above listed model. Homogeneous societies seem to be favourable, if one wants to create peaceful societies. Collier et al. argue that ethnically diverse countries, such as occur in Africa, are naturally more prone to conflict. (ibid. p.14f.) At the same time, they dismiss the argument of ethnic dominance because they assume a “simpler relationship” (ibid.).

Thirdly, Collier et al. include three more variables in the final greed and grievance model:

They add the formal colonial power – England or France –, which seem to have different effects. Former French colonies have a smaller risk of conflict, than former British colonies. They interpret this, as a result of French security guarantees to the post-colonial government (ibid. p.22), while it could be an indicator to the stability of post-colonial government structures as well. Further they include the proportion of the population consisting of young males, which they consider vital for the recruitment of rebel fighters, and the proportion of mountainous terrain. (Collier et al. 2009, pp.14ff.) Those three new independent variables have to be added to the 2004 list presented above.

On the other hand Collier et al. state that the variable of population dispersion has to be removed from the model, because it is no longer significant (ibid. p.16). Furthermore, it seems like Collier et al. do not consider the enrolment rates of people significant anymore, as they do not mention it. This might be, because of the common criticism of this variable, as a possible proxy for grievances instead of opportunity.

In the conclusion of their summary of independent variables, they point out that inequalities, and pretty much every other variable for grievances, are still insignificant as indicators for the onset of conflicts. (Collier et al. 2009, p.16) Given their revision of ethnic dominance, that in 2004 was the only grievance proxy left in their model, as subsidiary to general social fractionalisation, one can see that their new model is now entirely based upon economic thinking.

The reformation of the greed vs. grievance theory results in a new pair of competing explanations for rebellion: feasibility and motivation by opportunity on the one side, and motivation by grievances on the other side. Given the dismissal of any further grievance argument from the motivation hypothesis, one has to point out that their new model has shifted the focus away from any social “justice-seeking” explanation, towards the single explanation by economic terms.

Furthermore, Collier et al. dismiss the importance of motivation, for the occurrence of a war start. They claim that “where rebellion is feasible, it will occur without any special inducements in terms of motivation” (ibid. p.23). This is, as will be pointed out in the next section, a very strong point of criticism of the revised greed vs. grievance model that now is only based on greed.

II. Critics and Alterations to the Greed versus Grievance model

Collier et al.’s work has been cited and referred to in many academic papers, textbooks for students of conflict studies, as well as in newspaper articles. Especially the argument that certain types of resources make countries prone to conflict, has been discussed over and over again, usually resulting in the conclusion that easily lootable resources can be considered a resource curse for conflict ridden countries.

An often criticised problem of Collier et al.’s model, is the choice of proxy indicators, which are quite questionable in terms of whether the indicators actually proxy greed, or grievances. Regarding their 2004 article, the (low) level of schooling is seen as a proxy for atypically good opportunities, for engaging in violent rebellion – thus constituting a greed argument –, while it could at the same time be a good proxy for grievances. (Keen 2012, p.761f.) Furthermore, the limit on male secondary school enrolment rates, totally neglects half of the population of states. It has become obvious that women play an important part in civil wars, may it be in the peace process – as in the Liberian civil war –, as parts of the fighting insurgents, or as commanding officers of the later. In the light of the recent investigation by the ICC against Simone Gbagbo,

the former first lady of Cote D'Ivoire, the conviction of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, a former minister in Rwanda, for genocide in 2011², and the 2012 estimates that around 30% of FARC rebels are female (Phillips 2012), one has to reconsider the role women play in civil wars. It thus, has to be rejected, to only look into males' secondary enrolments if one wants to investigate forgone income of rebel fighters.

Since they did not use this variable in the 2009 model, this criticism does not apply anymore. However, it can be applied to their 2009 inclusion of male population, as an indicator for conflict proneness as well. The assumption that only male take part in violent conflict, is simply not substantial.

Another point of criticism is that Collier and Hoeffler only consider "objective grievances" (Collier and Hoeffler 2004, p.570). While this is a valid limitation from a positivist point of view, one has to acknowledge that social problems are not necessarily shown in raw quantitative data, but can rather be estimated by qualitative research. Especially Collier and Hoeffler's cross-country study approach can be seen as the very reason, why their grievance proxies do not show any significance. Murshed and Tadjoeeddin argue that the explanatory power of grievances is unlikely to surpass the power of greed arguments in cross-country examinations, simply because the methods for gathering and comparing data are not sophisticated enough (2009, p.108). They claim that while the greed argument is superior on a cross-country scale, the grievance argument would be dominating in every country-case study (ibid.).

Furthermore, the choice of proxies for grievances is not sufficient. Especially the limitation on the Gini coefficient, as a proxy for inequalities, seems short-sighted, since there has been criticism on this measure of inequality for quite a long time. One of these points of criticism is that the Gini coefficient seems to measure income inequality, rather than total inequality and limits inequalities to an economic aspect. Thus, one has to add different types of inequalities. David Keen argues that Collier and Hoeffler only look at vertical inequalities, as it might occur between individuals, but neglect horizontal inequalities that occur between communities or cultural groups within a country (2012, p.760).

By focussing on economic inequalities, ethnic dominance and polarisation, as well as on political exclusion and repression, Collier and Hoeffler tend to only follow two of the three

² Pauline Nyiramashuhuko was the former minister for family and women affairs. She was not the only woman convicted for crimes against humanity or war crimes, but the first women ever to be convicted for genocide by an international tribunal. For more information on her case see the New York Times article "Life Sentences in Rwanda Genocide Case" 24.06.2011, accessible under http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/world/africa/25rwanda.html?_r=1& (last checked 08.11.2014).

strings of grievance theory. According to Murshed and Tadjoeeddin grievances are all about “identity and group formation” (2009, p.96). They present three strings of overlapping grievance theories: relative deprivation – a term coined by Ted Gurr in his 1970 book “Why men rebel” –, which is defined as the: “actors’ perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities” (Gurr 1970, p.24), or as Murshed and Tadjoeeddin put it: “the disparity between aspirations and achievements” (2009, p.97); polarisation – a factor taken into consideration by Collier et al. –, which in some studies is found to be an important factor for civil war onset; and horizontal inequalities. (Murshed & Tadjoeeddin 2009, p.96ff.)

Horizontal inequalities are, one of the most influential models that explain grievances. As acknowledged by Murshed and Tadjoeeddin, they show certain similarities with Gurr’s relative deprivation approach, but in some ways the idea of horizontal inequalities is the enhancement of Gurr’s concept (ibid.). As Stewart argues in her 2000 article “Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities”, it is crucial for group mobilisation that a certain group identity is created by political leaders. This group identity is partly based on differences in the peoples’ situations, may it be issues concerning one’s culture, location or economic situation. Especially ethnicity is often used by elites in order to form a power base (Stewart 2000, p.247). According to her, it is common in the process of group mobilisation, that leader stress and often overemphasize the different political and economic situations of their peer group in order to justify violence. These differences are defined as horizontal inequalities, which can be differentiated in four groups: political participation, economic assets, employment and incomes, and social access and situation. (ibid. p.249)

Measuring the different strings of grievances proves to be difficult, since the terms itself overlap, resulting in measures that can be interpreted as belonging to any of the three strings. Especially the differentiation between relative deprivation and horizontal inequalities, is difficult. However, since both theories constitute the grievance argument, which apparently is the shortfall in Collier and Hoeffler’s model, this paper will use measures, that can be interpreted as relative deprivation, as well as horizontal inequalities³.

Keen argues that Collier et al. are too much in favour of military intervention, since Collier et al.’s feasibility hypothesis would always lead to the emergence of civil wars, if it is not made more difficult. More strikingly, Collier argues that addressing the underlying problems in a

³ For more information concerning the differences of relative deprivation and horizontal inequalities see Murshed & Tadjoeeddin 2009, p.96-100; Murshed & Gates 2005; Stewart 2005. As a very simplified distinction one can say that relative deprivation is more dependent on a groups’ feeling of being deprived from achieving their possibilities, while horizontal inequalities are more objectively measurable differences between groups.

country, does not discourage rebel from fighting if a rebellion is feasible in the first place (Collier as quoted in Keen 2012, p.768f.). This position has to be rejected, since it would give military intervention – as a means of making rebellion unfeasible – a higher priority, than actually addressing key causes of conflict. However, this assumption is congruent with Collier et al.’s interpretation of the significance of the former colonial power. They argue that former French colonies experience less conflicts, because the French offered security guarantees to the post-colonial governments, while the British did not (Collier et al. 2009, p.15f.). In accordance with this interpretation, this paper will therefore use an indicator that shows the deterrence by other military forces against rebellion.

Another general critic against the greed argument is that Collier and Hoeffler imply rationally acting factions, who perform a cost-benefit analysis before engaging in protest. On the other hand, Collier describes certain rebel leaders as “psychopathic” (Collier’s “*Wars, guns and votes*” as quoted in Keen 2012, p.770), which implicates irrational behaviour. Murshed and Tadjoeeddin claim that this assumption makes the whole greed argument unsatisfactory, since violent conflict is rarely a rational strategy (2009, p.96).

The reformulated greed and grievance theory is challenged by David Keen who provides another point of criticism. As becomes obvious in their work on war economies, reformulations of their original theory, and by adding the feasibility hypothesis, Collier and Hoeffler tend to dismiss the importance of grievances in general. They argue that grievances are not proved significant in their regression analyses, but rejecting their overall importance has to be considered a major flaw. Keen argues that by neglecting grievances and assuming greed as the foremost motivation of rebel groups may lead to not listening to rebels at all, because one already assumes to know the real reasons. Thus, one might actually tend to dismiss the legitimacy of protest in general (Keen 2012, p.768). Other authors, who work on the economic causes of conflict and war economies, have agreed that grievances are not to be dismissed, just because they are hard to measure. Ballentine and Nitzschke argue: “the outbreak of conflict tends to be triggered by the interaction of economic motives and opportunities with socio-cultural, political, and economic grievances” (2005, p.5).⁴

Another very important point of criticism against the motivation vs. feasibility dichotomy is put forward by Murshed and Tadjoeeddin: “the content of their previous “greed” hypothesis (now part of motivation) is almost identical with what they now re-phrase as “feasibility”. If

⁴ See Dixon 2009, Ballentine & Nitzschke 2005.

feasibility is about opportunity, greed is also about opportunity. The basic arguments and empirical evidence are much the same as before.” (2009, p.97) Considering the arguments Collier et al. use in order to explain, what makes a rebellion feasible, this criticism cannot easily be refuted. Collier et al. claim feasibility is dependent on “finance, military deterrence, and the availability of suitable recruits” (Collier et al. 2009, p.23) However, the finance argument is used as the primary economic motivation for rebellion, and the availability of suitable recruits was formerly, at least to some extent, proxied by low enrolment rates. Thus, the only difference from the greed motivation seems to be the deterrence by another power. This argument will have a significant impact on how the greed and grievance model is used in this paper.

As a final point of criticism, the greed versus grievances model assumes that grievances are not connected to greed, while the opposite has to be assumed. Greed can result in grievances, may it be that greedy rebels carry out atrocities, or by creating inequalities between groups. Grievances on the other hand, can result in greed rebellions, since they might aim at improving ones’ own situation in economic terms. Thus, David Keen argues in favour of a more dynamic model, which includes the idea that: “both ‘greed’ and ‘grievances’ may stem from other, perhaps more fundamental motivations, such as the desire for security, respect or even some measure of care.” (Keen 2012, p.771)

Summarising the greed versus grievance debate, one can come to the conclusion that Collier et al.’s model has to be adjusted, in order to include criticism and to create a testable model that can be used in the analytical part of this paper.

The most important points of criticism are the focus on economic argument, which indisputable bear significant explanatory power, and the neglect of grievances, because of troubles measuring them. Thus, one flaw of Collier et al.’s model, is the limitation of inequality measures to vertical inequalities, as the only significant proxy for grievances. Since the assumption that only vertical inequalities matter has to be rejected, this paper will include horizontal inequalities.

III. Research Hypotheses

Summing up the basic assumptions of the Greed vs. Grievance theory, a conflict can only occur if the motivations in terms of greed or grievances, are sufficient and/or the rebellion is militarily and economically feasible. If the latter is the case, according to Collier et al.’s feasibility hypothesis, rebellion will occur even without any further motivation. (Collier et al. 2009, p.23)

Having pointed out that Collier et al.'s feasibility hypothesis includes pretty much every opportunity argument, these will be tested in one step.

One can formulate the following research hypotheses that sum up the greed vs. grievance model for explaining the rebellion in South Sudan.

1. Greed-Hypothesis

The opportunities for the onset of civil war were favourable and economic motivation was sufficient.

The conditions for favourable opportunities are: High dependency on natural resources, low economic growth, low income, short peace duration, low population, and high social fractionalisation (Collier et al. 2009, p.14ff.).

2. Feasibility-Hypothesis

Furthermore, the faction engaging in armed rebellion against the government, must have had seen a favourable situation. There must have been a perceived window of vulnerability of the government, or a lack of deterring factors. Using Collier et al.'s arguments for a weak government, this analysis will check for: favourable terrain (1) – Collier et al. consider mountainous terrain as hard to control –; the proportion of young men (2), who they consider as easy to recruit into the rebel forces (Collier et al. 2009, p.22); and the deterrence by other military forces (3).

2. Grievance-Hypothesis

The justice-seeking motivations of the rebelling group to engage in a rebellion were sufficient.

This is to say that there has been a specific set of grievances and inequalities, as described above that could have been used to mobilise identity groups. Since Collier et al. tend to dismiss the importance of grievances, this hypothesis will be checked by looking into one of the three strings of grievances as presented by Murshed and Tadjoeeddin: Horizontal Inequalities

Each of those hypotheses might bear some explanatory power for the occurrence of South Sudan's newest war. If they can be confirmed, the Greed and Grievance theory can explain the war start. Furthermore, one can draw conclusions from the current status-quo in the armed conflict. If the conditions are still the same, or very similar to the onset of the rebellion, it is rather unlikely that the conflict will be stopped by a peace agreement.

C. Methodology

While one can find a huge variety of methods and structural frameworks for conflict analysis or conflict assessments, the very choice thereof, is a first determinant of the general outcome of the analysis. A lot third party actors in conflicts, international aid agencies or companies have their own frameworks, which often include presumptions of a conflict or conflict resolution, or have a special focus on certain key ingredients of conflict. It is important to acknowledge that the choice of the theoretical and structural guidelines will have its influence on the output of the final assessment, which is thus never really objective.

In general this paper follows the conflict assessment framework presented in Lisa Schirch's book *Conflict Assessment & Peacebuilding Planning – Toward a Participatory Approach to Human Security*. This framework offers guideline questions, which have to be answered for every analysis step. The framework is chosen, because it is designed to give policy implications for peacebuilding, which are based on a wide array of methods that are also explained in the framework. If one considers the peacebuilding process, as the most important one, in order to prevent future hostilities, it seems obvious that those implications are a benefit of the framework itself. Furthermore, Schirch's framework offers a set a questions that aim at the self-evaluation of actors that want to engage in the conflict resolution and peacebuilding activities. The proposal of complementing methods for field research and self-assessment are the key reasons, why Schirch's concept was chosen: the complementation can be done without the need for another framework.

As far as it comes to the theory used in Schirch's original framework, one has to acknowledge that she uses the human security approach, while this paper will be using the greed and grievance theory. This will have a certain effect on how the assessment is structured and focussed. The change in theoretical background will affect, which causes of the conflict will be highlighted. One could however, argue that both theories pay a lot of attention towards the living conditions of groups. Hence, as long as one considers this a major part of the human security approach, one can assume that by looking into social and economic inequalities, the grievance argument is quite close to Schirch's original approach.

Lisa Schirch's framework offers guidelines for conducting a thorough and structured analysis. Following that structure, the paper will answer questions regarding the location and context (where?), the actors and stakeholders to the conflict (who?), reasons and motives (why?), driving and mitigating factors to the conflict (what?), the means and sources of power of the factions (how?) and the timeline before and during the conflict (when?). (Schirch 2013, p.66ff.)

Whenever it seems suitable to take an additional lens into consideration, the paper will draw upon ideas from Adebayo Adedeji's framework for analysing African conflicts, which he presented in *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflicts* (1999, pp.341-361)

This paper will use Schirch's six questions and offer a 4 step analysis: In the first step, the paper will offer a short summary of the current crisis, in order to provide a basic understanding of the situation. Then, it will analyse the conflict context by answering the questions of where and when. Thereafter, it will present an assessment of the actors, and their means of power and sources thereof. In a final step, the analysis will investigate the causes of conflict by looking into the questions why and what.

In order to keep the analytical part as focussed on the conflict itself as possible, this chapter aims to provide information about the methods used to gain and interpret the pieces of information presented.

I. Where and When? – A Context analysis

The analysis of the conflict context is a very important part of the overarching framework. It is used to present information not only about the location and political system of the country, but furthermore seeks to give a clue about the "cultural, social, economic, justice and political context" (Schirch 2013, p.75) of the conflict. This context will be analysed in a nested model of conflict. Therefore, the paper will use a short analysis of the micro and macro context – going into detail about questions of regional dimensions and the impact of unsolved problems stemming from the recent independence of South Sudan.

Since Adebayo Adedeji expresses the importance of a holistic approach towards the context analysis the chapter will aim to present information related to "political, economic and ecological constraints" (Adedeji 1999, p.352), as well. Thus, it will explain the differences regarding the economic standing of different regions and communities, differences in the access to public goods and services, and the wealth distribution among the communities. Adedeji states that these factors, are the ones that are likely to motivate people to consider violence an option (ibid.). Since these motivating factors will also be taken into consideration in the chapter on motives in general, i.e. in conjunction with the greed and grievance approach, this chapter will only superficially deal with the general aspects of the constraints, while the causality chapter will investigate the explicit constraints more thoroughly.

Following Adedeji's research topics for African conflicts, the analysis will further include the historical layers of conflict. The historical dimensions of Sudan's and South Sudan's various

conflicts on different topics can fill books. Hence, in order to not go too much into detail, the paper will not include every important incident during the two civil wars, but rather present more recent incidents, or those that are referred to by the fighting factions during the recent conflict. This method is congruent with Schirch's suggestion to consider historical patterns of the conflict and future scenarios (Schirch 2013, p.155).

These events will be presented in a comparative timeline, as suggested by Schirch in order to present the different effects, certain events might have had on certain groups. What was a moment of glory for the one group, might constitute a trauma for others (ibid. p.156).

All in all the chapter aims at presenting a context analysis, which can be used to describe the situation in South Sudan shortly before the conflict erupted and during its course up till now.

II. Who and How – conflict actors, stakeholders and their sources of power

Since there are a lot of different groups involved in the different conflicts throughout South Sudan, this chapter will aim at presenting an overview on the most important actors, stakeholders and their peer groups. The bandwidth of actors investigated in this chapter, is not limited to the national level but includes international actors as well: regional organisations, neighbouring and international governments, UN-related actors and NGO.

The means of the different actors and their sources of power, are the second topic this chapter will deal with. Power in the conservative definition by Max Weber, is the ability to make happen what one wants to make happen, thus, controlling people or events. As Lisa Schirch defines it, power is “the ability to do – to change oneself, others, or the environment” (Schirch 2013, p. 142).

In accordance with Schirch's framework, the chapter will present the different sources of power in a power and means analysis. As Schirch points, out there are various kinds and types of power – military, economic, moral, or social capital – hence, the chapter will offer a broad summary of different power sources of the factions, rather than focussing on military power alone.

A specific topic in this chapter is the question, why certain insurgents are supported – in a dominating way – by certain ethnic groups. Therefore, the chapter will use the concept of *politicisation of identity*. In this case identity being specified as the ethnic identity.

Politicisation of identity means that individuals use group identities (e.g. ethnic, regional or religious identities), in order to fulfil their political goals. As Aquiline Tarimo (2010) argues,

ethnic groups can also be interpreted as interest groups, hence, their members have certain similar economic and political interests (p.303). Political leaders tend to use their ethnic background in order to mobilise support. This is usually done by providing better access to government positions, health and educational services, or general economic benefits to their own ethnic group. Since ethnicity is seen as some kind of extended family it “implies sharing among members” (Lamb, as cited in Tamiro 2010, p.300) Thus, making it an “obligation” and “good common sense” (ibid.) for political leaders to promote members of their own ethnicity.

However, the practice of relying on the support of ethnic groups – which stems from the economic benefits they get – instead of political results and overall economic benefits for the whole population, creates a mind-set that does not favour the common good, but the good of the few. It creates a competition between the ethnicities, who profit immensely when their own leaders are in control.⁵

The findings of this actor and power analysis will be presented in a table that can be found in the appendix.

III. Why and What – causes and drivers of conflict

A commonly accepted fact in conflict analysis is that the mere existence of causes for conflict, does not explain why a conflict actually erupts. For this to happen, it needs trigger events and people, who use the underlying causes and start a violent conflict. A single trigger condition seems unlikely to be the only reason for a conflict to turn violent; hence, this paper considers Collier et al.’s feasibility hypothesis that conflict will occur when it is feasible, problematic and insufficient. Nonetheless, in order to comply with the theoretical framework the feasibility hypothesis will be explicitly checked. This section will investigate a variety of possible conflict drivers and mitigating factors, which are often unique to the conflict that is investigated and naturally overlooked in Collier et al.’s cross-country analysis.

This analysis will follow a two-step approach to analyse these factors:

First, it will point out certain “dividers and connectors”. As Matthew Levinger explains in his 2013 book *Conflict Analysis*, dividers are considered “factors that may be exploited to provoke conflict within or between communities” (ibid. p.34), while connectors are all the aspects that can be used in order to “promote peace” (ibid). Levinger and Schirch offer extensive lists of strategic, political, socioeconomic, psychological and cultural dividers and connectors, which

⁵ Aquiline Tarimo presents a good summary of challenges and opportunities that are raised by politicisation of ethnic identities in his 2010 article..

will be used as a kind of checklist. As a consequence of the applied theory, a clear focus will be on the socioeconomic aspects, since they include most conflict causalities, used by the greed and grievance theory.

The pure existence of dividers and connectors cannot – except in Collier et al.’s feasibility-hypothesis – explain, why a conflict actually turns violent and stays that way. Rather, those factors have to be exploited by actors of the conflict and mitigating parties in order to start, prolong and end violent conflict. Dividers and connectors can be seen as “potential sources of polarization or social cohesion” (Levinger 2013, p.97). Therefore, the second part of this chapter will investigate how the warring parties use dividers, in order to mobilise their people to engage in violence.

IV. Hypotheses Test

After completing the conflict analysis with the framework, which has been elaborated in the previous sections, this paper aims to confirm or dismiss the hypotheses that have been formulated in the discussion of the theory.

The expected result are that each hypothesis bears some explanatory power and thus, if used as a merged theoretical argument “greed and grievance” can explain the civil war onset in a comprehensive way.

In order to check for the explanatory power, each hypotheses’ variables will be checked with the findings of the conflict analysis. While it might seem desirable, to use statistical methods to check for the validity, it has to be pointed out that most of the data is simply not available or too unreliable in order to allow a statistical test that could be considered meaningful.

Bearing this in mind, a word on the general quality of data:

As was pointed out in the previous chapter, the two sides of the theory have a different theoretical background. This has implications on the methods that can be used for each: while the greed-argument has its roots in economic theory and can easily be checked by looking into quantitative data, the grievance-argument is rooted in a more sociological background. Thus, quantitative data has only very limited explanatory power regarding this argument – the main reason why Collier et al. did not find any significance for their grievance variables.

Therefore, the analysis will use quantitative and qualitative arguments in order to provide reliable data for both arguments. This data is taken from second hand sources and have been aggregated. While this has negative implications on the overall validity of the results, the paper

aims at minimising negative effects, by considering only reliable and respectable data sources. Furthermore, it would be disproportionate to conduct own field research, in order to provide the necessary data on this level of academic work. Considering that it was impossible for the UNDP to gather the necessary data to calculate a HDI for South Sudan, there seem to be immense impediments for data collection.

Quantitative data will be drawn from the World Bank, the South Sudan Statistical Yearbook 2011, and the “Open Data for Africa” project by the African Development Bank Group. This data will be used, in order to check different arguments made by both greed and grievance theorists, and offer some insight in the objectively measurable living conditions in South Sudan. It has to be acknowledged that the data presented by all of the above mentioned sources is not entirely reliable. There are reports that even the 2010 census in South Sudan has been controversial and subject to strong criticism by independent observers and the South Sudan parliament.⁶

As there is still a severe lack of reliable data, this is already a point where future research can start.

⁶ See for example: Craze 2010.

D. Case Analysis – South Sudan

When South Sudan became independent in July, 2011, many trouble spots and minor conflicts between tribes, ethnic factions and other militias remained. While the SPLM/-A had managed to stay the only powerful Southern rebel group in the civil war, it was not very efficient in setting up an administration that would be able to deal with those smaller and local conflicts throughout the young nation. As the first chapter of the following analysis emphasises, South Sudan was not in a process of transition to a democratic and peaceful society, reconciliation and state building but, as some argued, already on its way towards becoming a failing state (Lyman 2013, pp.335f.).

If one looks into the 2014 Human Development Report it becomes apparent that South Sudan would belong to the very least developed countries if it had a value for the HDI which it has not. Still, if one compares the 2 variables that constitute part of the HDI and are available for South Sudan – life expectancy at birth and GNI per capita –, and compares them to LDC, South Sudan is significantly worse off (UNDP 2014, p.163).

The following analysis will present information about the conflict context, the actors and causalities according to the methodological framework outlined in the previous chapter. But first, a summary of the actual crisis that constitutes the subject of this investigation has to be presented.

I. A brief summary of the current crisis

As mentioned there are numerous other conflicts going on in South Sudan. There is a border dispute with Sudan, the oil rich region of Abyei being the main contentious issue here. The northern regions, mainly in Jonglei state, are plagued by a high intensity conflict with inter-ethnic violence. Dinka, Murle, Nuer and other ethnic groups and tribes are fighting against each other over different issues, mainly about cattle raids and retaliation attacks. However, the fighting is not only inter- but intra-ethnic as well. Other militias throughout South Sudan continued fighting over political influence or other incentives. While some joined the official military after an amnesty offered by President Kiir, others engaged in violent attacks or claimed control over regions using violent means. (HIK 2013, p.63ff.)

In the centre of this analysis is the violent political struggle between President Salva Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and the former Vice President Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer. Uppsala Conflict Data Programme (UCDP) lists the South Sudan conflict, as one of the most pressing ones in their recent release of conflict data for the year 2013. According to the UCDP definition, an

“armed conflict is a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (Themnér & Wallenstein 2014, p.553). In this case, with a registered number of over 1000 battle-related deaths, the conflict is one of the highest intensity: a war. More specifically, UCDP classifies the war as an intrastate conflict – civil war – that is about the control over the government (UCDP 2014).

A similar classification is done by the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK). While their definitions of conflict and the methods of categorisation differ from the UCDP approach, HIIK arrives at the same conclusion. The current conflict in South Sudan is one of the highest intensity, about control over government and of intrastate nature. (HIIK 2013, p.64)

The following paragraphs shall present a short summary of what happened in December 2013 when the conflict turned violent, what led to the events of December, and what course the conflict took in 2014.⁷

In July 2013, after having announced to challenge Kiir for the position of the party leader, and in the 2015 presidential election, Riek Machar was discharged as vice president by Salva Kiir. The entire cabinet of ministers was dismissed as well, leading to a restructuring of the government (Freedomhouse.org 2014). This was the result of a longer political struggle between the two former rebel leaders that can be summarised as follows:

Machar had accused Kiir of failing the country in terms of corruption, economy, security and tribalism in March 2013, when he made his intentions to run for party leadership public. In April, Salva Kiir issued an order stripping Machar of his duly delegated powers of the vice-presidency. While Kiir justified his actions with the new constitution and the rights not being necessary anymore, others have seen this move as sharp riposte against Machar’s earlier criticism. (Small Arms Survey 2014a, pp.1f.)

In early July, Riek Machar announced that he would not only run for party leadership in the party convention that was due in 2013, but that he planned on competing with Kiir for the Presidency of South Sudan in the upcoming 2015 elections. The repeated criticism against Kiir and increasing tensions between the two led to the Republican Decrees on July 23, relieving Machar of his position as vice president and dismissing the entire cabinet. (ibid. pp.2f.)

⁷ For an extensive timeline of the current crisis please see Small Arms Survey 2014a: This source offers a timeline dating back to June 2012 and covers the fighting until the end of May 2014.

During the December meeting of the SPLM, the party's intern conflict about leadership started a series of events that lead to a violent turn on December 15. Inter-ethnic fighting within the presidential guard and the allegations against Machar of a planning a Coup d'état against President Kiir sparked intense fighting in the capital. While the fighting spread throughout Juba, ethnically and politically motivated killings of Nuer men have been reported. They can be traced back to existing tensions between the two groups and towards the perception that if Machar staged a coup, Nuer must be a part of that (Craze 2014, p.3). The aftermath of the fighting in the capital, Juba, and the arrests following the accusations, resulted in intensifying fighting along ethnic lines. (HIIK 2014, p.64)

During the last 2 weeks of 2013, numerous skirmishes resulted in the deaths of more than a thousand people and the displacement of many more. Several thousand civilians had sought refuge within the UNMISS bases, while the targeted killings against ethnic Nuer⁸ in Juba ignited underlying tensions in other parts of South Sudan. (ENOUGH 2014)

The SPLA, the national army formed out of former rebel movements and other militia groups, split into different factions, some supporting their own causes and the two biggest parts aligning themselves with either the government of President Kiir or with Riek Machar, who headed the now open rebellion against the GoSS. (ibid.)

Over the course of the next months, numerous clashes have been reported throughout the central regions around Malakal and Baliet, as well as Jonglei and Upper Nile state. The situation in Upper Nile tends to become a multi-party conflict, since unselective and targeted killings of civilian population and ethnically motivated violence has invoked the formation of local militia groups and retaliation attacks. Thus, one can spot the inclusion of tribal and ethnic communities, and local militias into the conflict between the two SPLM factions. (Craze 2014 pp.6ff.) However, one has to note that ethnically motivated violence has been registered all over South Sudan well before the 2013 crisis. As Craze points out in his interview in May 2014, ethnic tensions have a longer history and were not the conflict starter (ibid. p.11). As will be noted in the context analysis, there has been constant violence between ethnic groups especially in Unity and Jonglei state.

There have been attempts for mediation between the SPLA and the SPLA-IO but the ceasefire agreement of January and the peace plan in May have not been implemented by either faction.

⁸E.g. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/23/south-sudan-state-that-fell-apart-in-a-week> accessed 17.11.2014.

The negotiations, mainly led by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a northeast African regional organisation, take place in Addis Ababa. Thus far, they have not been very successful. In June, the leaders of the two warring factions agreed upon ending the conflict within 60 days, and creating a transitional government. Not only did this period elapse without results, but it would furthermore only have resulted in a peace agreement within the elites, not addressing key causes of the violence within the civilian population. (Parrin 2014)

In recent time, civil society organisations, such as the National Platform for Peace and Reconciliation (NPPR), have tried to start a national reconciliation and peace process (ibid.). They might be more suitable than the IGAD, simply because they usually have a better insight in a conflict's complexities, work other angles than elite reconciliation, and have some legitimacy within the population. In the case of the NPPR, this legitimacy stems from the involvement of the churches in addition to the parliament's reconciliation committee. Throughout the years of civil wars, the church was one of the only stable organisations and thus, has a high level of influence and legitimacy all over South Sudan (ibid.).

Seeing that the latest peace talks and involvement of regional and international actors, such as the UN, with UNMISS and targeted sanctions, or the US secretary of state's attempts to mediate are unsuccessful until now (Graham 2014), the resolution of this conflict is not in sight. Considering the involvement of many militias, which are not under the total control of one faction, the country could very well descend into a third civil war.⁹

II. Context Analysis of the South Sudan

South Sudan is a very large country with a rather small population. It is about as big as France while having only about 8.3 million inhabitants who belong to a wide range of ethnic groups (World Bank 2013). The government consists of only one party paralysed by the different factions, who fought against each other in the second Sudanese civil war, which led to the independence. Weak institutions, corruption, bad economic performance and a torn social fabric are just some of the many problems South Sudan faces today.

This analysis of the conflict context aims at giving insight about the political, social and economic situation in South Sudan. The situation in neighbouring countries like Uganda and Sudan will be considered as well. The findings will then be presented in a table, grouped in political, social and economic constraints. As a second part of the context analysis, a short history of relevant events in South Sudan will be outlined and presented in a timeline.

⁹ UPDATE 17.11.2014: There have been reports about a new peace plan and a cease fire agreement.

1. Political, social and economic context

On paper, the Republic of South Sudan is a democratic state based on justice and equality where the diverse cultural and ethnic groups co-exist in peace (Art.1, I, II of the Transitional Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan). But there are many grim issues that prevent this idealistic picture presented in the constitution. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, these 2 sections of the constitution's first article are simply not reality in South Sudan.

South Sudan's political system has been dominated by the SPLM – the party that emerged victorious out of the 2010 elections, in the then autonomous southern region of Sudan, which is now South Sudan – and its' party leader and the first elected president of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, who got 92% of the votes. The SPLM has about 90% of the seats in South Sudan's parliamentary and 9 of 10 state governors are party members.

The party is not very tolerant towards the small opposition and with accusations of undemocratic processes inside the party, the corruption of many appointed ministers and governors, and the failure to provide the electoral process for the 2015 elections with sufficient funding the political situation cannot be described as democratic. As Lyman points out: “the SPLM is still largely a liberation army with a weak political wing” (Lyman 2013, p.335) lacks a political philosophy.

The 2013 and 2014 surveys of Freedom House rate South Sudan as “not free” with a rating of 5.5 and 6.0 out of 7 – 7 representing the worst possible rating (Freedomhouse.org 2013 and 2014). Other ratings of democracy come to a very similar conclusion. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index for instance, an index investigating the transitional progress of developing countries in terms of economic and democratic development, ranks South Sudan 119 out of 129 countries in their 2014 report (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2014, p.1). Additionally, the level of corruption in South Sudan is one of the worst in the world, ranking 173 of 177 in Transparency International's 2013 rating. This is no surprise given the amnesty offered by President Kiir in 2012 for the return of \$4 billion stolen by ca. 75 officials (Freedomhouse.org 2014).

All in all, the democratic institutions are weak and most of the power rests within the position of the president, who can dismiss the parliament, ministers and governors of the federal states. South Sudan's army consists of militias that were incorporated after the CPA was signed, it uses about 55% of the state's budget. The army is not bound by a national ethos – like the successful struggle for independence – but rather by the share of the nation's wealth. The single

units of the army are more often than not based on ethnic groups and loyal to their former commanders (ENOUGH 2014). The army was, as de Waal and Mohammed coined it: “a civil war in waiting” (2014).¹⁰

Taking these facts into consideration, South Sudan’s claim of being a democratic state is hardly substantial.

The society of the Republic of South Sudan is fractionalised in different ethnic, cultural and religious groups. According to numbers from the World Bank, South Sudan’s population consists of more than 200 different ethnic groups (World Bank 2013). The Dinka, as the biggest group, account for about 36% of the population, while the Nuer, as the second biggest, represent about 16% (Koos & Gutschke 2014, p.2). Political power is often based on tribalism and ethnic heritage (de Waal & Mohammed 2014; Graham 2014). This can be seen in the composition of the government and the new opposition. President Kiir, an ethnic Dinka, and then-vice president Machar, an ethnic Nuer, formed a power sharing alliance and the government was to represent most ethnic groups in order to have a broad supporter base and legitimacy.

Another pressing problem, next to the political institutions, are the economic shortcomings of South Sudan. The economy is based nearly entirely on oil production, with oil exports adding up to 80% of the GDP, making South Sudan the most oil dependent country in the world (World Bank 2013). Such a high degree of dependence leaves the country very vulnerable to changes in the oil prices, and the need to keep the extraction of the oil running. In 2012, when the oil extraction was suspended, the GDP per capita dropped from US-\$1,858 in 2011 to US-\$785. This constituted a drop of 49% of the countries’ GDP (ibid.). When oil production resumed in 2013, the growth rate was about 24%. Yet, the current fighting between the conflict parties will again have its effect on the oil production. Next to the oil industry, subsistence agriculture and pastoralism are the only other considerable fields of work for the general population, accounting for roughly 15% of the GDP (ibid.).

Unfortunately, the GoSS failed to develop infrastructure throughout the country. While there was “virtually no road or water infrastructure” when the CPA was signed (World Bank 2013), this situation remained very similar until now, although huge sums have been invested in the infrastructure programmes (ENOUGH 2014)

¹⁰ More information on South Sudan’s political and state institutions and their problems can be found in: de Waal & Mohammed, 2014; Lyman, 2013; Zambakari, 2013; Freedomhouse.org, 2013 and 2014; as well as Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014.

The population in general is young and poor. According to numbers by the World Bank, about 50% of the population lives below the poverty line and about the same amount is 18 years old or younger. In terms of literacy, South Sudan performs very poorly as well: only 27% of South Sudanese are able to read (World Bank 2013).

In the literacy and enrolment rates, the regional differences become particularly apparent: while the overall enrolment rates in secondary education for male Sudanese is 5.6% and for female 2.6%, there is a big difference between the more central regions, and other marginalised ones. In Jonglei state for instance – a state that experienced fierce fighting in the current crisis –, the enrolment rates are 0.6 and 0.1%, while in Central Equatoria they are 12.4 and 8.6% (NBS 2011, pp.35f.). According to a news report by IRINnews – a UN OCHA funded project, gathering and publishing news on humanitarian issues – the quality and quantity of schools differ strongly between the states. While Jonglei, Unity and Lakes state have bad schools, Equatorian schools are better equipped and have more teachers. (IRINnews 2012)

Similar problems can be found within the medical sector, as only 16% of the population have access to health care. Moreover the country holds a terrible record in terms of maternal mortality and the mortality rate of children (Wakabi 2011, p.2167). Not being able, or willing, to provide adequate funding for social services, the literacy programmes and other social issues have been “outsourced” (de Waal & Mohammed 2014) to international aid agencies and NGO.

Taking into account all those factors the failure of the GoSS to provide for the basic needs of their population is a sad fact.

2. Historical Context

The historical dimensions of a conflict usually offer some explanation for the behaviour of conflict actors. Thus, this section aims at providing information on crucial incidents that occurred between the parties before the crisis turned violent. Since the events in 2013 have already been discussed, the focus will be on 2 important cases in the second civil war – the SPLM split in 1991 and the following inter-ethnic violence that caused traumas for parties now involved in the violence.

During the civil war, it was part of the SPLM’s policy to suppress opposition outside the movement as well as inside. Other rebel movements that did not align themselves with the SPLM and got integrated in the process, were attacked. Internal dissent was countered by marginalisation of critical voices against the SPLM/-A leader, John Garang. This policy aimed

at prohibiting fractionalisation but was not designed to cope with the underlying contentious issues: “Dissenters were removed while the causes for dissent were not.” (Johnson 2011, p.91)

Since the founding convention in 1983, there had been no convention of the movement until the 1990s. The influence of civilian personal was very limited, and the Political-Military High Command was the only decision making body in the SPLM with some degree of influence on the groups’ policy. Garang’s behaviour was criticised as dictatorial by a variety of staff within the SPLA. (ibid. pp.91-93) Two commanders raised issues of accountability in the SPLA, Riek Machar and Lam Akol, the senior commanders of Upper Nile.

After voicing their concerns, they were both reassigned and stripped of political and military influence, resulting in them plotting a change in leadership of the SPLA. Preparing for their coup against Garang, they set up headquarter in Nasir and managed to get widespread support by local Nuer communities in the surrounding Gambela region, as well as support by authorities in Ethiopia. (ibid. pp.93f.)

In August 1991, they announced the removal of John Garang as the head of the SPLM/-A because of his dictatorial behaviour, demanding more democracy within the movement and a commitment towards human rights. By announcing this they hoped that the SPLM/-A would join their cause and defect from Garang’s leadership. A new agenda for the SPLM was introduced. Before, the rebellion had been aiming at overthrowing the regime in Khartoum, now, the struggle for independence should become the main objective. (ibid. p.97)

The following intra-SPLM fighting resulted in a situation that marginalised Machar and Akol even more. Instead of joining the SPLM Nasir faction en masse, as they had hoped, only small parts of the SPLA defected and large scale fighting erupted between the two groups.

In the following months, the fighting between SPLA and the SPLA-Nasir faction caused many civilian casualties as the forces of both factions targeted civilian population. Especially in the home areas of Garang and Machar, fighting resulted in atrocities against Dinka population committed by troops loyal to Riek Machar and Nuer civilians who took up arms and marched with them. (ibid. p.97f.)

A particularly important event is the massacre in Bor, which is a traumatic factor in Dinka communities until today. Carried out by Nuer militias, with the *White Army* or *jiech mabor* being involved, the incident left about 2000 dead, many more displaced and a destroyed livelihood for those who survived (Standley 2006).

After the reports of large scale human rights violations were made public, the little support for the Nasir faction faded away. The alliance to the government of Sudan for tactical reasons – e.g. to prevent an attack by the government while being focussed on the overthrow of John Garang¹¹ – did not do any good for the faction as well. The failed attempt to remove Garang from the leadership position resulted in complete marginalisation of Machar and his allies until the reconciliation with the SPLA in 2002 (Johnson 2011, pp. 98 and 109).

With the end of the second civil war in 2005 and the CPA, the SPLM/-A was considered the winner of the struggle within southern Sudan. Despite the SPLA's policy to prevent fractionalisation, there were scores of militias – local, ethnic, tribal – that were not included in the agreement. As Craze phrases it: “the second civil war was as much a battle within South Sudan, as it was a battle with the Sudanese government” (Craze 2014, p.8). Those militias were later incorporated into the SPLA but loyalties remained with their militia leaders (ibid.). With regards to this, the South Sudan Defence Forces deserve attention, since the integration of this former enemy of the SPLM/-A doubled the size of the movement (Small Arms Survey 2014b, p.1)

3. Regional context

As Adedeji points out, regional dimensions have their influence on the conflict atmosphere (Adedeji 1999, pp.359f.), thus a short overview of conflicts in the direct neighbourhood shall be presented. Additionally, one could point out the ties between neighbouring governments and the warring parties in South Sudan, but since this is done in the analysis of stakeholders this aspect will be neglected.

South Sudan is bordered by the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west, by Sudan in the north, by Ethiopia and Kenya in the east and Uganda in the south. 4 of those countries recently experienced situations that are currently investigated by the International Criminal Court for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

The CAR has recently experienced an international intervention due to an armed rebellion against the government and ferocious fighting between Christian and Muslim militias in 2013. Before this intervention, there had been armed conflicts between the government and other rebel groups, making the CAR one of the poorest and most unstable countries in the world.

¹¹ On the controversy of allying themselves with the Sudanese government while fighting for independence see Johnson 2011, pp.111-114.

Uganda has had struggles with an insurgent group called “Lord’s Resistance Army” for several years. This militia group has been criticised for using child soldiers and child-sex slavery, for which the group’s leader is warranted for arrest by the ICC (ICC 2014a, p.1).

Kenya has been the setting for post-electoral violence in 2007 and 2008. This situation is currently investigated by the ICC, which is charging President Uhuru Kenyatta with crimes against humanity in the post-election crisis (ICC 2014b, p.1).

The situation in Sudan has been equally bad, as in the case of most other neighbouring states: the Darfur conflict, referred to the ICC by the UN Security Council in 2005, border conflicts with South Sudan and insurgencies in its southern states. In the case of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, a rebel group in Darfur and Two States, one can see a direct connection between Sudan’s conflicts and South Sudan. The South Sudanese government has been accused of supporting this group. Since the SPLM was allied with the SRF, these accusations are quite possibly true. (Lyman 2013, pp.334, 336)

As one can easily notice, the region around South Sudan is characterised by violent conflict. The ties between different insurgent groups in different countries allow for a rather free flow of arms and ammunition in the region, making the process of rearming after DDR-programmes very cheap and easy.

III. Conflict Actors, Stakeholders and their Sources of Power

The main parties in the political conflict that turned violent in December 2013, are the government of South Sudan, represented by President Salva Kiir and the ruling SPLM, and the SPLM in opposition led by the former vice president Riek Machar. One could therefore describe the conflict as an escalated intra-party conflict, but this classification would hardly cover all its facets. Starting with the SPLM, this analysis will now turn towards the two main actors, their political background and their sources of power and will then look into other stakeholders, which are in some way part of the conflict. The sources of power that each of the warring parties possesses will be investigated within the individual sections.

1. The Government of South Sudan: SPLM and Salva Kiir

The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement was the most important rebel movement in the civil war against the Sudanese government. Led by John Garang, who died in a helicopter crash in 2005, the movement was inclusive in terms of ethnicity. Throughout the civil war, the movement followed a policy of suppressing fractionalisation of the rebel movements in southern Sudan, as well as inside the SPLM (Johnson 2011, p.91). However, this dominance

was rather achieved by force, than by diplomacy. After the CPA in 2005, the SPLM transformed from a rebel army into a political party, although its leaders stayed the same, and was tasked with the implementation of the peace agreement and the administration of Sudan's southern regions. After independence in 2011, the party, which was strongest in the 2010 elections took over as the government of the new nation and Salva Kiir, Garang's successor as the movement's leader, became the first president.

In the current conflict, the GoSS is reported to be in control over about 2/3, of the new SPLA, which consists of the former military wing of the SPLM and a wide variety of militias incorporated since the Juba Declaration in 2006. Thus, Salva Kiir is able to rely on about 25,000 SPLA soldiers, who constitute a formidable power base. (Small Arms Survey 2014b, p.6)

Representing the official and legitimate government of South Sudan, Kiir benefits of the support by some foreign governments in his struggle against the new rebellion. Especially the Ugandan government is supporting him in political and military means, there have been reports of Ugandan air strikes against Machar's forces (Koos & Gutschke 2014, p.2).

As has been acknowledged before, ethnic identities bear a significant importance in South Sudan's politics. Thus, Salva Kiir's own ethnic background as a Dinka has an influence on his power. This is because of potential mobilisation along ethnic lines, which has been recorded in the former Sudanese civil wars (Crisisgroup.org 2014, p.11), and in the current conflict as well. According to Tarimo, politicisation of ethnicity is a means of mobilising support by the referral to historic sentiments against another group, which is perceived as a competitor (2010, p.304)

In the immediate aftermath of the December coup-allegations against Riek Machar, President Kiir referred to the Bor massacre in 1991. This massacre against Dinka civilians was committed by Nuer militias under the command of Machar, during the split of the SPLM in the second civil war. Invoking this old grievance against the Nuer and Machar can be interpreted as an attempt to persuade Dinka militias to join forces with the government.

These militias had already formed as community defence forces during the unstable and violent years following the CPA. However, those militias did not align themselves with a particular political leader, as they were primarily designed to protect communities from immediate threats and demobilised when the threat was over. (Crisisgroup.org 2014, p.11) By alluding to old sentiments against Nuer, and portraying them as a threat to Dinka communities, a politicisation of ethnicity and mobilisation along ethnic lines was achieved. Two Dinka militias from Lakes

and Warrap state, the *gulweng* and the *titweng*, have joined Kiir's side and, as Craze argues: "constitute the president's private army" (Craze 2014, p.10).

It has to be pointed out, that not all Dinka communities responded well to Kiir's efforts to mobilise them in the current conflict. Especially Dinka communities in Jonglei bear a feeling of resentment against the ethnic dimension in the conflict, which they consider as an attempt to sustain Kiir's, presidency by the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal, Kiir's home area (Crisisgroup.org 2014, p.11). Additionally, there are a lot of Nuer that still side with the government and do not accept Machar as their leader, or feel bitter about the reoccurring ethnic dimension to the conflict (ibid. p.12).

The GoSS forces rely on economic and political benefits for their allies, which can be observed in the SSLM/-A, a predominantly Nuer rebel group in Unity state that accepted an amnesty offer in 2013. The brother of this groups' leader had been appointed governor of Unity state, after the former governor, now siding with Riek Machar, had been dismissed in July 2013. Since Unity is one of the oil producing states, the position of governor is influential and economically attractive. When the open rebellion started in December the SSLA joined the government side. (ibid. p.5) A matching situation happened in Jonglei, when the rebel movement of David Yau Yau, which had formerly engaged in armed rebellion against Kiir's government, was convinced not to join the opposition forces (ibid.).

As pointed out, the sources of power for the GoSS can be distinguished into three groups that affect one another: military strength, economic resources and identity.

On the one hand, its military power is rooted in the SPLA and its 25,000 remaining soldiers, on the other hand, it is based on international support, provided by the Ugandan military. As has been pointed out in the context analysis, the SPLA is not an army that is built on a national ethos, but rather bound together by financial benefits. Thus, the military strength is interconnected with economic resources, which primarily stem from oil exports that in turn are protected with military force.

The third source of power is the identity of the GoSS's leader and the mobilisation along politicised ethnic lines. This mobilisation has given Kiir a reliable military force, which is not primarily dependent on regular cash hand-outs, but is loyal to him due to the perceived threat that Machar seems to pose onto Dinka communities.

2. *The Opposition: SPLM-IO and Riek Machar*

The second party to the civil war in South Sudan, is led by former vice-president Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer, and former commander of SPLA forces in the second Sudanese civil war. As has been pointed out in the historical dimension, he has defected from the SPLM/-A in 1991 because of a feeling of marginalisation. This former defection and the failure to succeed in his goal to remove the former SPLM leader John Garang, made Machar even more marginalised, when his faction did not get much support from the population or from within the SPLM/-A.

During his 1991 defection, Machar relied heavily on Nuer militias that were located around his headquarters in Nasir. Furthermore, he was supported by the Sudanese government. This alliance with the GoS and the atrocities committed against mainly Dinka communities by Nuer militias called “White Army”, can be summarised as the main reasons for his failure back then.

In his recent insurgency against the GoSS, Machar does not only rely on support by Nuer militias. Dissatisfaction with Salva Kiir as the president, and his style of governing South Sudan have been widespread before the outbreak of violence in 2013. Many important figures within the SPLM had expressed their disaffection with Kiir in their statement on December, 6. Rebecca Nyandeng, the widow of John Garang, and Deng Alor Kuol, one of the most important Dinka leaders in Abyei, were among those. (Craze 2014, p.2)

As an analysis by the Small Arms Survey points out, the SPLM-IO can be subdivided into 5 groups.

The political opposition led by Riek Machar, is an incongruous group of South Sudanese politicians, who are involved in the negotiations in Addis Ababa and stem from different identity groups within the SPLM or opposition parties (1). A class of, mainly Nuer politicians – members of parliament or in other influential positions –, who have not openly challenged Salva Kiir’s leadership, but still identify with the opposition’s goals of Kiir’s removal and more democracy. Most of them have fled to neighbouring countries or found refuge in UNMISS camps (2). (Small Arms Survey 2014b, pp.4f.)

On the military side, one can find the defected SPLA commanders in the Greater Upper Nile region, who have announced their allegiance with Riek Machar. Most of those commanders belonged to the SSDF, prior to their incorporation into the SPLA (3). Their forces are predominantly Nuer (ibid. p.6).

Furthermore, the formation of Nuer community forces – *White Armies* – has contributed to the military force of the opposition (4). While they fight for similar reasons as the SPLM-IO in the

moment, one has to differentiate them from one another. A *White Army* is formed out of civilians in times of threat to Nuer communities, and is not a permanent force. When the threat is gone, it will disband again. The perceived threat in this particular case, are the targeted killings of Nuer, in December 2013, for which the *White Armies* are looking for retaliation. Supporting Machar in his efforts to remove Salva Kiir, is a means to achieve this goal. (Breidlid & Arensen 2014, pp.4-6)

The last group within the opposition are high-ranking SPLM members, who had been detained after the coup-allegations in December and have been released during the peace process and negotiations in Addis Ababa (5). However those important members of the SPLM do not wish to be seen as a part of the SPLM-IO but rather as a third party to the negotiations. They distanced themselves from the predominantly Nuer armed insurgency in Greater Upper Nile and thus, make Machar's formerly multi-ethnic opposition, a Nuer centred one. This makes it look like Machar is restarting his 1991 ethnic split of the SPLM/-A (Small Arms Survey 2014b, p.9). While this group could be considered a third party to the conflict, this paper will, because of the shared agenda of removing Kiir and their joint efforts until the violent turn in December, consider them part of, or at least aligned to, the opposition faction.

Looking into the sources of power for the opposition faction it is striking that military strength and identity are dominating again.

The oppositions' military strength is based on around 10,000 defected SPLA soldiers, who, are commanded by former SSDF leaders. Those forces concentrate around the northern states of Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile. (ibid. p.8)

The *White Armies* are the second base of military strength of the opposition. One can only estimate their numbers – there have been reports of “multiple tens of thousands” (Small Arms Survey 2014b, p.7) – but they are not permanently mobilised and can strongly vary in numbers. The control over the Nuer *White Armies* stems from Machar's ethnic background. Being a Nuer himself, and opposing against a perceived Dinka dominated government, he is supported by many Nuer leaders. This is, like in the case of Salva Kiir, due to politicised ethnicities. As a response to Kiir's reference to the Bor massacre, Machar used the atrocities committed against Nuer communities by SPLM forces, during the civil wars and the “Dinka domination” (Breidlid & Arensen 2014, p.3) in order to mobilise his ethnic peer group.

Furthermore, Riek Machar portrays himself as a leader, who has been foretold to defeat the Dinka in one of the most popular Nuer prophecies (ibid. p.8). Those prophecies are very

important in Nuer culture (ibid. p.7). Hence, by using the prophecies, relying on spiritual leaders and portraying himself as the prophesied leader Machar has a distinct spiritual and moral source of power.

The fifth group of the opposition does not rely on military strength and has distanced itself from the armed violence. They rather rely on identity and morale as their sources of power, since they represent a variety of ethnic groups, chose peaceful means in order to solve the conflict, and have been important figures in the independence struggle.

3. Stakeholders: International and Regional Actors, Involved Governments

This section will shortly look into the different third parties to the conflict: The UN peace keeping mission UNMISS, the main negotiation platform IGAD and those countries who have a particular interest in the stability or instability of South Sudan.

The United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has been deployed to South Sudan shortly after independence, in order to assist the GoSS with peace consolidation and security issues. The mission was not designed to stop a large scale armed insurgency. When the crisis turned violent in December, UNMISS faced thousands of civilians, who sought refuge in its camps. In the light of targeted killings of civilians, attacks on civilians inside UNMISS compounds and widespread violence, the mission mandate was changed in order to make the protection of civilians one of the core tasks, and to allow the use of force against those, who pose a threat towards civilians (UN.org 2014). Moreover, the number of military and police peacekeeping personal was increased from 7000 to 12.500. Currently there are 10,350 soldiers stationed in South Sudan. Considering the number of fighters of the warring parties in the civil war, UNMISS is not able to prevent fighting. Its camps have become the target of some attacks (Sudan Tribune 2014) and it is not able to protect the approximately 100.000 refugees in their camps from threats within the compounds (Green 2014).

The main platform for negotiations between the SPLM-IO and the GoSS, is the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which has brokered the cease fire agreement in January and the peace plans in May and June. In addition, the IGAD has implemented a monitoring and verification mechanism after the cease fire agreement in January. This mechanism aims at reporting any violations of the cease fire and to help with the mediation process by providing adequate data. (IGAD 2014)

One can identify 4 countries that have a particular stake in the current war in South Sudan: Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and China.

Uganda's interest in the conflict is due to its close economic ties to South Sudan and its shared border with the country. The conflict in the northern neighbour is geographically close to those regions in Uganda that struggle with armed conflict themselves. As has been pointed out in the section D. II. 3, the "Lord's Resistance Army" is active in northern Uganda. A conflict within the neighbouring area of this insurgent group, might destabilise the northern Ugandan territories even more. (Koos & Gutschke 2014, p.6)

Uganda's economic interest in the conflict is based on the fact that South Sudan is Uganda's largest customer. About 20% of Uganda's exports are going to South Sudan. On the other hand, there is a high number of Ugandan people, who work in South Sudan, making their remittances a key source of income for their families in Uganda. (ibid. p.5)

Kenya has a similar stake in the security situation in South Sudan, but unlike Uganda, it did not give military support the GoSS so far. About 27.000 Kenyans were employed in South Sudan until the violent turn of the crisis. By mid-2014, 20.000 of those had returned to Kenya, resulting in a loss of income for a lot of families. Furthermore, South Sudan has been an important trade partner for Kenya and the plans for a transportation corridor for oil, from the landlocked South Sudan to the Kenyan port in Lamu, would mean huge profits for Kenya's economy. (ibid. p.5)

Sudan on the other hand has ambiguous interests in South Sudan. While it is interested in the security of the oil fields in its southern regions, around the contested region of Abyei (ibid. p.6), it is at least partly responsible for the emergence of militia groups in South Sudan (Craze 2014, p.4) that now oppose the government.

China usually does not get involved in internal conflicts of other countries due to its non-interference doctrine. However, China is interested in South Sudan's oil exports, and there have been huge investments by Chinese companies in South Sudan's oil industry (Crisisgroup.org 2014, p.15f.). Sinopec and the China National Petroleum Corporation have lost significant investments because of the conflict and were forced to evacuate their staff. This interest in South Sudan is the key reason, why the Chinese minister of foreign affairs attended the peace talks in Addis Ababa. (Koos & Gutschke 2014, p.5f.)

IV. Causalities

Having elaborated the social, political, economic, historical and regional context as well as key actors and stakeholders in the current armed conflict in South Sudan, this paper will now investigate the conflict's causalities. A conflict is always based on a set of dividers and actions

by the conflict parties that trigger a violent turn. Contrastingly, the parties in a conflict can use connecting issues that can result in de-escalation.

As has been elaborated in the methodology, this section of the analysis will therefore firstly present dividing and connecting issues. Dividers which can be assigned to the two hypotheses that, according to the greed and grievance theory, are the foundation for rebellion will later be revisited in the hypotheses test.

The second step of this section is then to present how conflict actors used the dividing issues to mobilise their constituency in order to start the armed conflict.

1. Dividers

Dividers are defined as those issues that are potential sources of polarisation between groups. They can be used by conflict actors in order mobilise a constituency and then become drivers of a particular conflict (Levinger 2013, p.34).

There are various lists of dividers that can be used in conflict assessments, both Levinger and Schirch offer a list which will be used to demonstrate the issues that are a potential source of polarisation. This list will be presented in the appendix.

a) Political Dividers

Political dividers can be found in the political system of a country, the behaviour of political elites or within the justice system.

In the case of South Sudan, one can find a lot of issues within these systems that can be used in order to polarise people and communities.

Considering the political system and the behaviour of political elites, one can find a mentality of marginalisation of the opposition in the SPLM's dominance in politics since the CPA. Furthermore, it is striking that one finds a lack of accountability and immense corruption within the central government, the SPLM and the regional administrations (Transparency.org 2014)

As Freedom House and Bertelsmann Stiftung report, the justice system is very weak and not independent from influence of the government. The rule of law itself, seems to be absent in South Sudan as allegations of abuses of power, violations of human rights or other severe crimes have rarely been investigated or even persecuted (Dhala 2013).

Another issue is the dependence on ethnic and regional groups as a source of political power – the politicisation of identity, in terms of ethnic and regional identity have been observed.

The perceived dominance of Dinka in politics and Nuer in the army can and apparently has been used, to polarise even further.

The failure of the SPLM government to pursue the electoral process in post-2011 South Sudan, is another potential source of polarisation, especially for those, who are excluded from parliament or the government right now.

In general weak institutions like South Sudan's courts or even the parliament, which is considerably weaker than the president, can be considered more political dividers.

Having only looked into political dividers, one can thus already note several sources of potential polarisation.

b) Socio-Economic dividers

Socio-economic dividers can be found within the structure of a country's economy, its economic performance and the distribution of wealth or the access to work.

Looking into the structure of South Sudan's economy, the high dependence on primary resources is the first thing that comes to mind. The incredible amount of 80% of the country's GDP is dependent on the export of oil alone. Not only are the resources abundant, but the whole economy is structured around them – this divider is one of Collier et al.'s key arguments.

The bad performance of the economy itself is another divider. The low economic growth with its spikes up and down, low GNI per capita – ca. 70% of the average in LDC – and the unequal access to work, which is focussed around urban centres and oil fields, all have to be considered potential sources of polarisation.

Also, it has to be pointed out that the unequal access to social services – foremost in education – is another divider, especially when it forces people to migrate because they see no other option to increase their living standard. This has been observed in migration from Jonglei to Central Equatoria due to better access to schools (IRINnews 2012).

c) Other possible dividers

Other possible dividers can be found in issues of cultural and social well-being, psychology, history, safety or environment.

In terms of cultural aspects one can note the discrimination against ethnic Murle, by Dinka and Nuer (Laudati 2011, pp.20-23). If one includes historical events and cultural well-being, the

Bor massacre and atrocities against Nuer – which have been used in order to politicise ethnic identity – are to be considered.

Concerning safety, one must note the importance of the military in terms of budget – 55% of the GDP is used to sustain the SPLA – and terms of accountability – the SPLA is one of the accused prime perpetrators human rights violations.

Furthermore, the availability of arms and potential recruits might be considered dividers (Schirch 2013, p.93). The number of recruits might be high due to a lack of alternatives for people; and as one can see in South Sudan the level of unemployment is very high. Moreover, the availability is reportedly high as well (Deng & Duke 2014).

Furthermore South Sudan has seen distrust among group lines, especially concerning ethnic lines – see the reports of Dinka believing that Nuer soldiers have to be part of the attempted coup (Craze 2014, p.9) or the historic distrust against Murle communities.

Another divider is the use of “inflammatory rhetoric” by political leaders, again used against Murle (Laudati 2011, p.22f), but by the warring actors against each other.

The occurrence of sporadic acts of violence, e.g. cattle raids, murders or conventional armed robbery are considered dividers, and South Sudan has not just experienced occasional violence – it has been a constant experience. Cattle raids for instance do occur frequently (Leff 2012, p.2f.).

2. Connectors

Connectors on the other hand are defined as potential sources of cohesion (Levinger 2013, p.96) that are used in order to mitigate and facilitate peace. In a way connectors are the exact reversion of dividers, since there is often a dichotomy between issues that polarise, and those that unite groups over contentious topics.

Similar to possible dividers one can find extensive lists of connecting issues in different assessment frameworks, this assessment will base on connectors that can be found in Schirch’s framework and Levinger’s summary of connecting and dividing issues.

a) Political Connectors

There can be connectors within a political system, the behaviour of political elites and within the judicial system.

Starting with the political system, one can argue that the SPLM's policy towards being a multi-ethnic, inclusive political party is a connecting factor. The composition of the government, which was intended to result in power sharing between former competitors, can be seen as another. Especially, Salva Kiir's invitation to insurgent groups to accept an amnesty and join the civilian government and the SPLA in the Juba Declaration, is a factor that aimed at uniting South Sudan's people for the state-building agenda.

Looking into the behaviour of the political elite, one has to mention the newly launched initiative against corruption, which resulted in the dismissal of several high ranking government members and Salva Kiir's threat to release the names of a number of highly corrupt leaders.

Within the judicial system, one has to consider the mere existence of the South Sudan Human Rights Commission and its effort to monitor human rights violations in order to allow persecution of perpetrators. It has to be recognised as an effort to improve the overall situation.

b) Socio-Economic Connectors

Socio-economic connectors can predominantly be found in efforts to restructure the economy in order to improve the overall performance, in equal distribution of social services and employment, as well as in the effort to reduce income inequalities between social strata or identity groups.

It is particularly difficult to find those connectors in South Sudan. Although there have been efforts to diversify the economy with less focus on primary commodities, the effects are still hardly noticeable. Moreover, as was pointed out in the context analysis, the extension of the provision of social services and social welfare has not been a distinctive objective of the South Sudanese government.

c) Other possible connectors

Looking into the same issues that can produce dividing factors one can find issues that promote cohesion and prevent polarisation.

First of all, one can look into cultural issues and for increased respect or cooperation between cultural groups. There are examples of inter-ethnic marriages and inter-ethnic cooperation between Dinka and Nuer communities in Jonglei. These examples limit the likelihood of violence between those communities. It has been shown in the analysis that these communities did not side with different conflict parties (p.34 of this paper).

In terms of psychology and history, one can point out the joint efforts of groups in the struggle against the Sudanese government, and the overwhelming acceptance of the referendum that led to independence in 2011. However, this is only a connection factor between some groups because, as Craze has pointed out, a lot of the fighting in the second civil war has taken place between southerners (2014, p.8).

3. Turning Dividers into Conflict Drivers

All those dividers have to be used by conflict actors in order to start a violent conflict and to maintain it. As Levinger points out: “a source of social or political stress (such as poverty, [...] or ethnic divisions) becomes a source of conflict – or *driver of conflict* [...] – only when political actors mobilize around this issue.” (Levinger 2013, p.97)

Looking into political dividers, sources of conflict can easily be found – both leaders, Riek Machar and Salva Kiir, have used arguments based on the political situation in order to legitimatise their violent conflict behaviour.

It is one of Riek Machar’s primary objectives to remove President Kiir, and the perceived authoritarian style of government. Salva Kiir, on the other hand, accused Riek Machar of staging a coup against the legitimate government, which is displayed Machar’s undemocratic behaviour.

Likewise, the mobilisation along ethnic lines – especially by the SPLM-IO – draws upon perceived injustices that stem from socio-economic dividers. The perception of a Dinka dominated government that discriminates against Nuer population is fuelled and exploited by Machar’s opposition. Considering the attempted inclusion of *White Army* militias, which act in retaliation for the killings of Nuer in December, into his opposition forces (Breidlid & Arensen, 2014, p.6), this becomes particularly evident.

E. Hypotheses Test

The following chapter will now use the findings of the country study, in order to test the hypotheses that have been formulated in the discussion of the theory. While the first hypotheses could have been tested before looking into actors, their sources of power and other conflict causalities, the grievance hypothesis is not independent from these findings. Thus, the first test will draw upon the findings of the context analysis. The second test will be based on the findings presented in all of the analysis' chapters.

I. Test of the Opportunity- and Feasibility-Hypotheses in South Sudan

According to Collier et al.'s greed hypothesis, violent conflict is most likely, when a set of conditions produce favourable opportunities for engaging in conflict. Furthermore, if those conditions make a rebellion feasible, Collier et al. expect rebellion to occur without further motivation. The conditions can be divided into factors that make a rebellion easy to finance, easy to sustain or hard to counter with military means. However, the categories are not clear cut, and, as has been pointed out in the theoretical discussion, the proxies used by Collier et al. to statistically test their model are all but indisputable.

Thus, each independent variable of the greed/feasibility argument will be discussed in an individual section that points out its relevance and contentious issues concerning them.

1. High dependency on primary commodity exports

This variable has been used to look into the abundance of natural resources of countries that have experienced violent conflict. It is meant to proxy the possibilities to finance conflict in a country, and has been found as a significant driver of conflict. As Collier et al. have pointed out in their analysis, countries that rely heavily on the export of primary commodities are more prone to conflict, than those that are not. Furthermore, they have found that relying on certain resources, namely oil and diamonds, strengthens this negative influence on a countries security. (Collier & Hoeffler 2004, p.580)

As has been pointed out in the context analysis, South Sudan has indeed abundant reserves of crude oil. The share of oil exports in the GDP of South Sudan adds up to the tremendous amount of 80%, leaving it the most oil dependent country in the world. (World Bank 2013)

As one can see in the current conflict, one of the key objectives seems to be, to gain and defend the control over the oil fields in the northern states of South Sudan, since this is where much of the fighting took place.

2. Low GDP growth

Collier et al. use this variable to proxy atypically low opportunity costs for recruiting new rebel fighters. As they argue, higher growth rates would indicate a stronger economy and therefore, a stressed situation on the labour market (Collier et al. 2009, p.7). According to the greed-hypothesis a strong growth rate of the GDP would make a country less prone to conflict, and vice versa.

This variable is especially problematic in this analysis, since there is no longer period of time that could be observed in the case of South Sudan. Due to the long civil war, there is little reliable information about the growth rates of South Sudan's GDP. Thus, one can only investigate the years after the CPA was implemented in 2005. Furthermore, this rate has been extremely unstable in the investigated years. While the growth rates were positive for a number of years, the dependency on oil production has had a significant effect on the growth rate in 2012 and 2013. As has been shown in section II of the analysis, the GDP crashed with a negative 49% growth rate in 2012, when oil production was stopped. On the other hand, the restart of production in 2013 resulted in a high growth rate of 24%.

Using this proxy for the easy recruitment of rebels, one could therefore argue that the conditions for rebellion have been better in 2012, than they have been in 2013. Yet, the conditions were still favourable, because the 2013 situation was still way worse, than before the crash. Nonetheless, in terms of GDP growth one would have expected the rebellion in 2012.

3. Low income per capita

Collier et al. use the GDP per capita as an indicator for the foregone income of those, who join the rebellion. Since the fighters have to be compensated by the insurgent group for their engagement, it makes a rebellion more likely if the general income per capita is low.

As has been shown in the context analysis (D. II. 1), the average GDP per capita was only US-\$ 785 in 2012, while it has been more than twice this sum in 2011. Since one still has to consider inflation, one can notice that the foregone income has not been high enough, to prevent rebellion as a means of making one's living. Taking into consideration the importance of subsistence agricultural or pastoralist activities, as the only viable alternative to the oil sector, in terms of occupation, and the shutdown of oil production in 2012, the appeals of becoming a rebel, and looting cattle in this process, as is usual with militias in South Sudan (Breidlid & Arenssen 2014, p.9), become apparent.

4. Low population

Collier et al. consider the size of a country's population, as an indicator for the security industry, which as they claim, is an economy of scale.

In the case of South Sudan, this indicator is misleading, since the population itself is not very large – the numbers differ from 8.2 million in the official 2010 census, to about 11.5 million estimated in the CIA World Fact Book, or the 9 – 10 million estimated by the GoSS – but has a considerable amount of people employed in the security sector. On the other hand, one could point out that the SPLA is very ineffective, and in itself one part of the problem in South Sudan.

Given that Collier et al. consider the size of a country's population as an indicator for the effectiveness of the security sector, one could still agree that the small population for the relatively large country increases the risk of conflict.

5. Short peace duration

Used as an indicator for the availability of conflict related material, the use of it in a single-country analysis is not really sufficient. Instead, one can look at the actual availability of arms and other conflict related material, and at the effectiveness of DDR programmes.

At first, one can determine the peace duration as 8 years, if one considers the CPA as the end of the last war. Since the CPA did not end all hostilities¹² between all factions in South Sudan, this cannot be assumed.

If one uses reports on the availability of arms and effectiveness of DDR programmes instead, one can notice that the proliferation of arms was literally non-existent in South Sudan (Leff 2012, p.4; Deng & Duke 2014).

Taking the short duration of peace – depending on the interpretation: 8 years (CPA) or 0 (other conflicts) – and the other reports on the availability of weapons into consideration, one can conclude that the costs of conflict related material were indeed very low.

6. High degree of social fractionalisation

According to Collier et al. this indicator has a stronger influence on the occurrence of conflicts, than the formerly used ethnic dominance, or their measure for pure ethnic fractionalisation. However, this new measure is problematic in the case of South Sudan, where concrete and reliable data for social fractionalisation is not available.

¹² Compare the occurrence of other major conflicts in South Sudan, e.g. HIIK 2014, pp.63, 65; or in the UCDP database.

One can argue that, since this indicator includes ethnic fractionalisation, this can be considered as an alternative indicator. According to estimates by the World Bank, one can find about 200 ethnic groups in South Sudan. As it has been described in the context analysis, the Dinka and their subgroups represent about 36%, while the next largest group, the Nuer, accounts for about 15% of the total population. Considering that these two largest groups only make up 51%, the level of fractionalisation is apparently quite high. Furthermore, one has to point out that these numbers do only give a superficial impression of the groups, since the Dinka and Nuer groups are in turn very fractionalised by their home areas and do engage in violent conflict within their own ethnic group.¹³

In accordance with Collier et al.'s argument, one can say that South Sudan has a high risk of conflict, because of the high level of fractionalisation.

7. High proportion of young men

The young men aging 15 – 29, are interpreted as the group of people that are most suitable as recruits for rebel groups. According to the feasibility argument, a high proportion of this group in a population can make a rebellion feasible. The authors expect this group to be either generally ready to join a violent rebellion, because they have “an absolute advantage and a taste for violence” (p.16), or easily recruitable by force.

Looking into the proportion of young men in South Sudan, one can find 14% of the total population in this group (NBS 2011, p.11). This represents roughly 1.1 million potential fighters, out of an 8.2 million population. Since the 14% are a high proportion of the population, one can confirm the existence of a big pool of potential recruits for an armed insurgency.

Regarding the criticism of only considering males as potential fighters, one can point out that the female population within the same age, makes up 13.7%. Thus, one finds nearly 30% of the total population, in the age for potential recruits.

8. Favourable terrain

In their cross-country analysis Collier et al. use a variable for mountainous terrain and terrain covered by forests, as indicators for favourable terrain. This terrain is used in order to explain, how rebel forces can set up base, without having to fear constant government attacks.

Since South Sudan is neither largely covered by forests – although there are regions with rainforest in the south –, nor a significant amount of territory is mountainous – although one

¹³ E.g. the intra Nuer violence during the second Sudanese civil war as described in Johnson, 2011, pp.111 – 126.

can find mountain ranges – (CIA.gov 2014), one could deny the feasibility of rebellion. However, if one interprets these proxies as terrain that is not easily conquerable, one might come to a different conclusion.

Since South Sudan's infrastructure in terms of paved roads does hardly exist (World Bank 2013) and vast areas are not accessible in the rainy season, the terrain can be described as favourable for rebellion.

9. Absence of deterring forces

Collier et al. believe that the significance of French colonies having lower conflict onsets in their cross-country study, is due to the inclusion of those countries into the French security policies. Thus, they see the French guarantee of military support and intervention in favour of the government, as a deterring factor that makes rebellion less feasible.

Since South Sudan has been part of the former British colony of Sudan, the French guarantees are not a source of deterrence against rebellion.

Nevertheless, one might argue that the existence of a formidable UN peacekeeping operation could have a similar effect. The deployment of peacekeeping forces is, unlike French security guarantees, dependent on the UNSC's mandate, which also includes the competences of the peacekeeping mission. Before the rebellion turned violent in December, UNMISS was only charged with the assistance of the government in security issues, however, the small size of 7,500 personnel throughout all of South Sudan, was probably not as deterring, as a possible intervention by French military. As Craze argued in his 2014 interview, UN peacekeepers lack the motivation to engage openly in fights against rebel forces (p.13). They are hardly able to defend their own compounds. Hence, a strong deterring factor by UNMISS cannot be assumed.

10. Conclusion of the Greed- and Feasibility-Hypotheses

Having investigated every condition that makes the opportunities favourable for rebellion in the eyes of the Greed-argument presented by Collier et al., one can point out that South Sudan was indeed very prone to conflict in 2013, and that according to the feasibility-hypothesis conflict had to break out.

On the other hand, it is striking that, although all the feasibility conditions had been fulfilled before 2013, the rebellion did not occur earlier.

II. Test of the Grievance-Hypothesis

The existence of grievances within a given population is hard to measure by statistical means, thus, this test will focus on arguments that can point to possible grievances, rather than trying to calculate objective ones, like Collier et al. tried to do with their testing of the Gini coefficient.

In the discussion of the greed and grievance theory, 3 different strings of grievances were mentioned. One string were the horizontal inequalities that, unlike other indicators for grievances, could be calculated with specific formulae. Since the lack of data makes it impossible to calculate reliable statistical values, this will not be attempted. However, using the data of the 2010 census, that are presented in the 2011 Statistical Yearbook, an overview of possible horizontal inequalities will be presented. The used data will be visualised in charts and diagrams that can be found in the appendix.

Horizontal inequalities are inequalities between different groups in a country, groups that can be defined by ethnicity, race, gender or region. With the limited data that is available for South Sudan, one can only check for regional groups. Therefore, the differences between the states of South Sudan, will be investigated in order to look for horizontal inequalities.

There are some variables that can be considered potential sources of grievances caused by horizontal inequalities – those that have a strong effect on the livelihood of people, and might cause the perception of being deprived from a better living.¹⁴

This test will look into the employment and literacy rates and the enrolment rates in secondary education in order to check for economic inequalities. The percentage rates of people living under the poverty line, the households with access to improved sanitation and water, as well as the percentage of households, who own shoes, are used in order to check for general living conditions.

1. Economic inequalities

Looking into the levels of unemployment in South Sudan, one can find a rather high unemployment rate of 11.85%. There seem to be no differences between the rural and urban population, since they both have unemployment rates of 12%.

On the other hand, Jonglei and Upper Nile have unemployment rates of 20% and 16%, thus Upper Nile's rate is one standard deviation (4 percentage points) higher than the average, while Jonglei even surpasses 2 standard deviations. Furthermore, one can make out Eastern Equatoria

¹⁴ The 4 different types of horizontal inequalities have been discussed on p.11.

having a rate that differs by 2 standard deviations downwards, while Western Bahr el Ghazal is 1.5 deviations down.

If one focusses on the literacy rates, it is striking that there is a high difference between rural (22%) and urban (53%) areas as well as a very high standard deviation of 12 percentage points.

Again, Jonglei is one of the states that is at the bottom of the list (16%), while Upper Nile has the highest literacy rate in South Sudan (45%). The second best state in terms of literacy, is Central Equatoria (44%), which had a lower than average unemployment rate as well.

Considering the gross enrolment rates in secondary education, one finds an extremely low total rate of 4.13%. There are 5 states that differ significantly from this mean: Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal – both around 10% - and Unity, Warrap as well as Jonglei state (1.07%, 1.6% and 0.37%).

Summing up this short analysis, one can find severe inequalities between Jonglei on the one hand, and Central Equatoria and Western Bahr el Ghazal on the other.

2. Living conditions

Considering the share of households in South Sudan that live below the poverty line, one can find that half the population is affected by these living conditions. Furthermore, it is remarkable that while the rural population does not differ significantly from the mean, the urban population only has 25% of the households living in extreme poverty.

While Northern Bahr el Ghazal and Unity state have the highest percentage (75% and 68%), Upper Nile is significantly better (25%). Jonglei is not noticeable different from the mean, unlike we have seen in the former section.

Only 56% of South Sudanese households own a pair of shoes, one of the most basic goods of everyday use. Again, one can note a significant difference between urban (79%) and rural areas (52%). Furthermore, one can point out that Warrap state, which has had a high percentage of people living in extreme poverty (64%), has the lowest rate of households that own a pair of shoes (18%). Upper Nile is again performing way better than the mean, with a rate of 87%.

Considering the access to improved water sources, the differences between urban and rural population are not significant: 73% of the urban population has access to improved water, while 67% of the rural population do, the mean being 68%. One can make out Western Bahr el Ghazal, as the state with the worst rate (52%) and Eastern Equatoria and Lakes state the best performing states (84% and 92%).

Excluding those two outliers from the equation, one can see that the shares do still vary quite a lot within a range of 25 percentage points.

If one looks at the percentage of households with access to improved sanitation, that is the basic access to something that can be considered a toilet, one finds a most dire statistic. A mean of only 7.4% of the South Sudanese population, has this access, with a maximum of 22% in Western Equatoria – nearly 3 standard deviations up –and a minimum in Warrap (1%) and Northern Bahr el Ghazal (1.5%). Furthermore, one can note a difference of 10 percentage points between rural and urban households.

All in all, one can, once again, find severe inequalities between the regions in South Sudan. Northern Bahr el Ghazal is performing significantly worse in two of the four indicators, than the rest of South Sudan, while being within a close difference to the mean in the other two.

If one takes data for more variables, one can surely find more differences, than in the 4 cases outlined in this short summary.

3. Conclusion to the Grievance-Hypothesis

Having analysed only 7 variables that affect the daily life and the living standards in a severe way, some distinct inequalities between those regional groups were spotted. Some regions seem to be significantly better off (the Equatorias), while others often perform worse (Jonglei, Northern Bahr el Ghazal).

It would be interesting to know the exact ethnic composition of those states, in order to determine horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups as well as regional groups, but the data for this analysis is not available.

All in all, one can definitely see horizontal inequalities that might be producing grievances, and can be used to mobilise along group lines. This analysis cannot explain the mobilisation along ethnic lines, but it might explain, why the opposition has a stronghold in Jonglei and other northern states. They tend to be significantly less developed and worse off than others.

III. Summary of the Greed and Grievance Test

As one can see, all the hypotheses can be confirmed by looking into the context of South Sudan.

The opportunity and feasibility model can explain the onset of the current civil war in full: First of all, conflict was definitely a feasible option, there have been a lot of potential recruits – 14% of the total population in South Sudan are young male in the age of 15 – 29; secondly, while there is not a huge share of mountainous terrain, the country has large swamp areas and a low

developed infrastructure that can pose similar difficulties for government control; thirdly, there was no deterring third power that would have made the conflict militarily infeasible.

With all the military variables for the feasibility hypothesis favourable, the main economic factors had to be confirmed as well. As has been pointed out, the abundance of, easily lootable, natural resources, the bad performance of the economy and atypically low conflict costs can all be found within South Sudan. Hence, the feasibility and greed argument can explain the conflict.

On the other hand, it has been shown that one can find justice-seeking motivation as well. A set of potential sources for grievances have been illustrated by using the concept of horizontal inequalities between different regions of South Sudan. It has been shown that certain areas have a worse situation in terms of living conditions and economy than other regions. Jonglei and Unity state have severely underperforming indicators – except in the case of Unity’s literacy rate – and if one looks on a map, where most clashes took place in the current conflict¹⁵, it is obvious that a lot did take place in those states, or in short distance to its borders. Especially in the border region of Jonglei and Upper Nile (Upper Nile being better off in some of the livelihood indicators), there have been a lot of clashes.

On the other hand, there are some states – Warrap and Northern Bahr el Ghazal – that do underperform significantly, but still did not experience severe fighting. If one looks at a map with the approximate distribution of ethnic groups in South Sudan¹⁶, one can find that Warrap is the border region between predominantly Dinka, and predominantly Nuer areas. The fact that Warrap did not experience heavy fighting, can be seen as an indicator that the conflict is not ethnic based. The mere fact that both states – Warrap and Unity – are substandard compared to the rest of South Sudan, can be interpreted as a sign that there are no grievances between the populations of these states, thus, there is no reason for conflict. It is important to note that one of the Dinka militias mentioned in the actors analysis, is from Warrap, however, this can rather be ascribed to politicisation of ethnicity than grievances.

All in all, both arguments bear explanatory power in the current armed conflict. While the greed and feasibility arguments can explain the onset of the conflict, the grievance argument can explain, why one can find distinct regional patterns and participation of certain groups.

¹⁵ A map is given by Crisisgroup.org – this map can be found in the appendix.

¹⁶ A map is given by the OCHA – this map can be found in the appendix.

F. Conclusion

This paper aimed at giving a comprehensive overview about South Sudan's newest war. In the first chapter, the paper discussed the underlying theory of the analysis – the greed and grievance model. In the second chapter, a framework for the conflict analysis was outlined that rooted in Lisa Schirch's framework for peacebuilding planning and Adebayo Adedeji's framework for African conflicts.

Over the course of the third chapter, South Sudan's newest war was analysed in terms of the context, the actors and the causalities. A special emphasis has been on the context and the actors.

In the fourth chapter, the research hypotheses that had been established in the theoretical discussion were investigated. It has been checked, whether the greed or the grievance arguments were able to offer an explanation of the conflict.

This concluding chapter of the paper will now revisit the most crucial aspects of the theoretical discussion, present the most important findings of the conflict analysis, summarise the hypotheses test and then will give policy implications for the conflict resolution.

The second to last section will once again point out the reliability and practical use of this paper, before possible topics and indications for future research are discussed. At the end of this conclusion some personal impressions will be presented.

I. Summary of the Theoretical Approach

The greed vs. grievance approach is based upon the dichotomy of justice-seeking and rent-seeking conflict causes. As Collier and Hoeffler pointed out in their 2004 article, the model is aligned to the two general strings of theory in conflict analysis: one, followed by political and social scientists and one, followed by economists. (p.563)

Collier et al. presented a set of proxies, in order to analyse a large number of conflicts over a wide period of time. They found the proxies for their grievance argument to be insignificant in their studies, therefore they dismissed them from their theoretical model. This negligence of grievances as a cause for conflict has been criticised by a wide array of scientists in the field of conflict studies, both economists and political scientists.

As a consequence of the criticism of Collier et al.'s model, an adapted approach was used in this paper, which looked into the greed as well as the grievance arguments. This adapted approach was the basis for the research hypotheses, which have been presented in the final section of the first chapter.

II. Summary of the Conflict Analysis

By looking into the country's general situation in terms of political and economic situation, its history and the regional context, the analysis presented some of the most pressing issues in South Sudan.

It has been pointed out that the political situation is not ordered in a democratic fashion, although the constitution demands it. In addition, the performance of the economy has been identified as unstable and deficient. Another noteworthy point was that the provision of social services was not equal, nor sufficient at any level. South Sudan has been portrayed as underdeveloped in terms of democracy, security and livelihood.

The history of South Sudan has been summarised, as filled with violent conflict – against the north and within the south and it has been mentioned that violence against civilians was not the exception, but the rule.

South Sudan's neighbourhood has further been found violent, unstable and generally prone to conflict. A large mass of insurgent groups can be found in the neighbouring countries, and some of these other conflict situations are even under investigation by the ICC.

The analysis of actors and stakeholders displayed a large amount of third parties, who have different interests in the country – the economic interests by neighbouring nations and international actors are dominating.

The primary conflict actors have been identified as the opposition and government of South Sudan. They have been analysed in terms of power and sources thereof. One important finding was that both leaders, Salva Kiir and Riek Machar, use their ethnic identity, in order to mobilise support along ethnic lines. The assumption, that the conflict is about ethnicity, has been rejected, it is a political conflict between the leaders. Ethnicity is just one among many things that have an influence on the conflict.

By comparing the conflict's context and the actions of the conflict parties with lists of dividers and connectors, it has been pointed out that a lot of dividing issues – that were defined as potential sources of polarisation – can be found in South Sudan. Many of those, have economic connotations: the high dependence on oil exports, high unemployment rates and low GDP growth. Others have an influence on the social life: low literacy rates, discrimination against certain groups, mistrust among groups, unequal development and next to no access to social services. Another set of dividers are of political nature: unaccountability of elites and politics in general, high levels of corruption and a dysfunctional judiciary. Looking back at the actors,

it has been pointed out that the warring parties have used some of these dividers, in order to mobilise people for their cause.

Connectors on the other hand, have only been found in small numbers, and mainly focused on regional contexts. The inclusive policy of the SPLM after the Juba Declaration in 2006, inter-ethnic marriages and cooperation have to be referred to in this context.

III. Summary of the Hypotheses Test

With regard to the explanatory power of the greed and grievance model, the previous chapter applied the research hypotheses to the findings of the conflict analysis. These hypotheses each had a set of independent variables that were established in the theoretical discussion.

The greed and feasibility hypotheses were checked first, and it was found that every explanatory variable was fulfilled in the case study. The economic situation of South Sudan allowed for rebellion to be easily to finance and sustain. The rebellion itself was then identified as feasible in terms of Collier et al.'s feasibility hypothesis, resulting in the inevitability of rebellion.

It was remarked that the feasibility conditions were fulfilled long before the December outbreak of violence. This resulted in the question, whether a stronger motivation or an actual trigger moment was still needed, despite Collier et al.'s claim.

The second hypothesis test dealt with the grievance argument. In order to check for potential grievances the concept of horizontal inequalities was applied. Only looking into 7 possible variables, it was noticed that severe differences between South Sudan's states exist. Some states were found to be significantly better off in economic indicators, others were found to be marginalised. The same result was shown for the livelihood in certain states.

All in all, both research hypotheses have thus been answered in the affirmative. It was then noted that a joint model could explain the onset of the crisis in a more comprehensive way.

IV. Policy Implications

The results of this theory based case study can be used in order to transform the current conflict into a peace process. Conflict transformation or resolution is an inclusive process that relies on the willingness of actors to engage in the transition process. As Ramsbotham et al. point out in their 2012 text book *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, peace processes have certain preconditions. The conflict has to be locked in a "hurting stalemate" (ibid. p.178) i.e. the warring parties have to accept that their goals cannot be achieved via violent conflict. While there has been a lot of criticism of the hurting stalemate concept, originally introduced by

William Zartman, it is congruent with the reverse of Collier et al.'s feasibility hypothesis. If the conflict is not feasible anymore, the armed rebellion has to end. Hence, one can set the precondition of unfeasibility and a hurting stalemate as central to an efficient peace process.

The hurting stalemate could be achieved by deploying a larger UN peace-making force or an intervention by regional forces, like it was the case in the civil war in Sierra Leone and ECOWAS. On the other hand, it was an important point of criticism against Collier et al. that they would favour military intervention prior to peaceful means. Thus, targeted sanctions against the conflict actors might be considered a viable option to coerce the main actors into a real peace process. Another approach might be embargos on the exported oil or imported weapons.

Whichever approach is used, it has to be considered that "stalemates are likely to hurt the general population more than the leaders who in the end make the decisions." (Ramsbotham et al. 2012, p.179) Therefore, one must carefully balance the measures, used in order force a hurting stalemate.

Ramsbotham et al. point out 5 ways to resolve or transform a conflict: by context transformation (e.g. the social and regional context); by structural transformation (e.g. the relationship between the warring parties); by actor transformation (i.e. redefining the actor's goals); by issue transformation (i.e. transforming the underlying issues of a conflict); and by personal transformation (e.g. a guerrilla leader becoming the unifying leader). (ibid. p.175f.)

In South Sudan, it might make most sense to first act on issue and actor transformation, in order to achieve peace between the two parties. However, the root causes are not lying within the current actors themselves, they rather lie within the context. Therefore, the context transformation must be the more important next step. It is apparent from looking into South Sudan's context that the insufficiencies in economy and in the provision of social services, are the real root causes of the violence, South Sudan experiences over and over again. This assumption is congruent with the greed and grievance theory and can be deduced from the conflict analysis in this paper.

V. Limitations of the Research and Implications for Future Research

It has been acknowledged that the research presented in this paper bases on aggregated and second hand data. Consequently, the presented pieces of information are only reliable if the data, which was used to conduct the analysis, is reliable as well. It was attempted to only use reliable sources of data and, whenever there was doubt about the reliability, the concerns were

stated within the section of the analysis. However, the use of aggregated data is a weak point of this paper.

Moreover, it has to be acknowledged that the lenses of Lisa Schirch's analysis framework do not aim at an analysis within the greed and grievance approach and that another framework might have been more suitable. The use of Schirch's method was based upon personal liking, but her experience in conflict analysis and the methods of her framework are comprehensive in an extensive way, so that it was possible to implement the greed and grievance model in scheme.

Concerning future research, one has to point out the importance of more reliable and, first of all, more data. It was especially hard to get recent data of South Sudan's economic and social situation on a micro level. Furthermore, it was next to impossible to link the horizontal inequalities to certain areas and their cultural composition. If it was possible, to gather data on the ethnic background, the economic situation and the access to social services in wide areas of South Sudan, and complement this quantitative data with qualitative data on potential grievances, the analysis would be far more reliable. Therefore, stratified random cluster samples could be a useful completion to the data used in this paper.

All in all, the greed and grievance model proved to be a possible way, to investigate the underlying causes of South Sudan's current politically induced civil war. Nonetheless, there is a further need to find more reliable explanatory variables and proxies thereof.

VI. Personal Remarks and Conclusion

The research presented in this paper aimed at providing useful insight into the current situation in South Sudan. In a way it achieved this primary goal. However, in my opinion, the explanatory power of the greed and grievance model, especially concerning the actual onset of a violent rebellion, is not sufficient. Particularly the feasibility hypothesis presented by Collier et al. in order to explain why a crisis turns into violent rebellion is not sufficient. It does explain, why actors perceive violence as a means to fulfil their personal goals, but it does not explain, why the actor considers violence the only option.

From my point of view, the limited data made it very difficult to construct the grievance line of argumentation in the analysis. The data that was taken from the 2010 census is not really reliable, as there have been reports about irregularities in the data collection. Hence, I consider it vital to the reliability of any grievance based argument to conduct field research and collect one's own data for this line of argumentation.

Drawing on the results of this study I want to highlight the fact that South Sudan's newest war is not about ethnicity per se. First and foremost, it is about the political ambitions of Riek Machar and Salva Kiir. Both do argue that the other is violating the constitution of South Sudan, and the implications of their behaviour points to the conclusion that they considers themselves a more suitable leader than the other. I would consider neither good civilian leaders, though, as they have both been military leaders for most of their lifetime.

In terms of the resolution of the conflict it is hard to say how and when it might be resolved. I would consider an international intervention under the legitimacy of an UN mandate, carried out by the African Union or another regional organisation as the most effective way to reach a hurting stalemate. Yet, this intervention would have to be a long-term commitment and thus, would mean immense costs. Nonetheless, the civil war and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians in its process constitutes all the reason to me, to engage in a long-term engagement in order to break the circle of violence that South Sudan has experienced for the better part of a century. Once the violence itself is suppressed, one can focus on the desperate situation of South Sudan's people, who have to gain access to the most basic human needs. Furthermore, there are more pressing topics in South Sudan than the political ambitions of the elites – there is an induced famine and polio outbreak, which must be addressed as soon as possible.

All in all, this research has shown that the poor living conditions and the struggle of South Sudan's elites for political influence after the end of the second Sudanese civil war, have to be addressed in order to resolve the crisis South Sudan is suffering. As long as those two issues are not resolved, South Sudan will most likely not break the vicious circle of politically and, by politicised ethnicities, ethnically motivated violence.

END

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Appendix:

Appendix 1: Political, Social and Economic Constraints in South Sudan

CONSTRAINTS

ECONOMIC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highest dependency rate on oil exports in the world – 80% of the GDP • Low GDP and unstable GDP growth: 7%, 3%, 3%, -49%, 24% for the years 2009 – 2013 • Low productivity work in agriculture and pastoralism as only viable alternative to oil industry <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low level of infrastructure, hardly any paved roads outside Juba • Low level of population density (15,8) in the big country • Very high expenditures for the military ~55% of GDP • Half of the population living below the poverty line
SOCIAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More than 200 ethnic groups • Extremely low enrolment rate in secondary education (male 5.6%, female 2.6%) • Very low literacy rate of 27% • Very young population – 50% are 18 years old or younger
POLITICAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Very high level of corruption – ranking 173 out of 177 countries in Transparency Internationals 2013 raking • Bad overall performance of governance • Weak institutions • Security forces more like a coalition of militias than an actual army or police force

Appendix 2: Comparative Timeline

EVENT	SALVA KIIR (DINKA, SPLM)	RIEK MACHAR (NUER , OPPOSITION)
SPLM SPLIT 1991 – BOR MASSACRE	No real connection, rather a trauma Trauma for Dinka communities	Moment of glory at first, Military victory; fading support by other SPLM members and population
SPLM SPLIT POST 1993	Glory: SPLM stayed the only powerful movement and Garang in control	Trauma, Machar became totally marginalised
SPLM REUNION 2002	Glory, since reunion happened on SPLM’s terms	Glory, since marginalisation ended
CPA 2005	Glory	Glory
INDEPENDENCE 2011	Glory – Kiir President	Glory – Machar Vice-President
MARCH 2013	Trauma – accusations by Machar against Kiir	Glory – Possibility to become party leader
APRIL 2013	Glory – no more powers within the vice-presidents positions	Trauma – starting marginalisation

EARLY JULY	Trauma – open challenge against Kiir’s position in the party and the nation	Glory – announcement that Machar will run for presidency against Kiir
MID JULY	Glory – restructuring of the government	Trauma – dismissal as vice-president
EARLY DECEMBER	Trauma – challenge by a wide coalition of SPLM members, unlikely alliance formed against Kiir	Glory – Machar managed to form an alliance despite former rivalries and different political goals
MID DECEMBER	Order to disarm presidential guard	Accused of staging a coup
MID DECEMBER	Catastrophe – start of civil war	Catastrophe – start of civil war

Appendix 3: Actors and their Sources of Power

POWER	GOSS	SPLM – IO	THIRD PARTIES
MILITARY	SPLA – 25,000 soldiers; Dinka militias; Ugandan government military support	Defected SPLA forces ~ 10,000 soldiers; Nuer militias ~ estimated 10,000 to 50,0000 – varying strongly depending on degree of mobilisation	UNMISS 10,000 stationed troops charged with protecting the civilian population
ECONOMIC	Control over oil fields and returns from exports; taxation	Limited control over some oil fields but next to no returns; prime objective to gain control over those production sites	Targeted sanctions against the conflict actors; China’s pressure to resolve the conflict
MORAL & SPIRITUAL	Legitimate government	Self-portray as the prophesied leader, who will defeat the Dinka; supported by various Nuer leaders	IGAD, and others are brokering cease fires and peace plans, which thus far were not successful
IDENTITY	Kiir as an ethnic Dinka attempted to mobilise his Dinka constituency by politicisation of ethnicity: successful to some degree	Machar as an ethnic Nuer mobilised large numbers of Nuer <i>White Army</i> militias; politicisation of ethnic background in order to sustain his rebellion against the government	

Appendix 4: List of potential dividers and connectors

Excerpt from Schirch 2013, p.91ff.

Dividers	Connectors
Political Issues	
Politicizing along ethnic, economic, religious lines	Increasing willingness of dominant political opposition groups to talk peace and do justice in situations of hate crimes
One group dominates government and military	Establishing political institutions with increased representation and power sharing
Some groups are systematically excluded from government institutions	Encouraging an inclusive government
Little sense of participatory democracy, winner-takes-all political system	Free and fair elections accompanied by robust public-private dialogue in all sectors and with active participation at all levels
Lack of accountability of political leaders and institutions with citizens	Encouraging accountability and serious attempts to build trust in government [...]
Widespread corruption accepted	Addressing issues of corruption
Sustainable Economy	
Unequal economic growth among different territorially situated groups	Economic growth more equitable across the region
Unequal access to social services and/or relief and development programs	Conscious efforts to ensure equal access to social services and/or relief and development programs
Low economic growth rates, inflation, large debt	Rising economic growth rates, lowering inflation, managing debt
Rich/poor divide is widely accepted	Lowering rich/poor disparity, particularly along identity lines
Dependence on primary commodities or natural resources such as diamonds, timber, oil, and water	Decreasing dependence on primary commodities such as diamonds, timber, oil, and water, and encouraging production of alternate commodities
Population movements (forced or due to no opportunities to participate in economic life)	Fostering resettlement and reintegration, and ensuring the resumption of productive activity and increasing incentives for all groups
Increase in child malnutrition	Introduction of health-care programs to reduce child malnutrition
Safe and Secure Environment	
Large numbers of potential recruits for armed groups due to lack of other options	Increased employment possibilities, particularly for youth
Availability of arms and resources for armed movements	Decrease in availability of arms and resources for armed movements

Large and powerful military with little relationship to or control from civilian leadership	Increasing accountability of military to civilian leadership, and division of powers between state and military enforced
Large military budgets	Reducing military budget, arms control agreements, and restrictions to prevent the availability of arms

Justice and Rule of Law



Abuse of human rights, particularly along identity lines with arrests, rapes, disappearances, army/police brutality	Establishing human rights committees and implementing and protecting civil rights
Sporadic acts of violence, such as armed robberies	Decreasing level of violent crime and increased determination to protect civilians
Volatile region, with violence happening close by	Resolution of violent conflicts in the region, return of refugees, maintaining positive relationships

Social and Cultural Well-Being


Pre-existing social divisions, such as limited intermixing in schools, business, and marriage, and a sense of “us vs. them”	Increased respect and cohesion between groups; increased intermixing in schools, business, social groups, and marriages
Divisions between groups are overlapping along lines of ethnicity, religion, economic advantage, or territory	Growing incentives to cooperate and increasing number of cross-group associations, such as women’s groups across ethnic lines
Negative stereotypes and inflammatory rhetoric between groups	Diminishing negative stereotypes and rehumanizing efforts to make the enemy fully human
Different versions of history taught to children	Correcting historical untruths or myths and creating shared histories taught to children
Tradition of problem solving with violence; using violence seen as cultural tradition	Leaders highlight a history of positive relationships between groups and portray the current situation as the exception, and discourage the use of arms or violence to solve problems
Historic trauma continues to play an important symbolic role in narratives of conflict and identity	Media and public figures use narratives emphasizing shared traumas and collective desire to end war

Appendix 5: Horizontal Inequalities

SPSS output: descriptive statistics and diagrams




Gross Enrollment Rates, Secondary Education, in %




Area	Unemployment Rates, in %	Literacy Rates, in %	Gross Enrollment Rates, in %
Central Equatoria	9	44	10.53
Eastern Equatoria	4	19	3.4
Western Equatoria	13	33	4.63
Jonglei	20	16	0.37
Lakes	12	18	3.43
Warrap	9	16	1.6
Unity	14	45	6.23
Western Bahr el Ghazal	6	34	10.7
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	15	21	3.17
Upper Nile	16	45	6.23
South Sudan, urban	12	53	
South Sudan, rural	12	22	
South Sudan	12	27.67	4.13
Standard Deviation	4.2	3.6	4.9


Share of population under the poverty line, in %




Share of households owning a pair of shoes, in %



Share of households with access to improved water sources, in %



Share of households with access to improved sanitation, in %



Area	poverty line	shoes	water	sanitation
Central Equatoria	43.5	59.0	58.8	12.7
Eastern Equatoria	49.8	48.0	83.9	4.5
Western Equatoria	42.1	72.0	61.3	22.5
Jonglei	48.3	57.0	77.8	6.2
Lakes	48.9	45.0	92.0	4.0
Warrap	64.2	18.0	60.7	1.0
Unity	68.4	69.0	62.7	9.8
Western Bahr el Ghazal	43.2	55.0	52.2	9.6
Northern Bahr el Ghazal	75.0	63.0	68.9	1.5
Upper Nile	25.7	87.0	61.8	7.8
South Sudan, urban	24.4	79.0	73.2	15.5
South Sudan, rural	55.4	52.0	67.2	4.7
South Sudan	50.6	56.0	68.7	7.4
Standard Deviation	14.8	17.2	10.1	6.0

Appendix 6: Map of Violence in South Sudan

Taken from Crisisgroup.org 2014, p.36



Appendix 7: Map of Ethnic Distribution in South Sudan

Taken from UN OCHA 2009

