Using Dynamic Pushdown Networks to Automate a Modular Information-flow Analysis

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Abstract. In this article, we propose a static information-flow analysis for multi-threaded programs with shared memory communication and synchronization via locks. In contrast to many prior analyses, our analysis does not only prevent information leaks due to synchronization, but can also benefit from synchronization for its precision. Our analysis is a novel combination of type systems and a reachability analysis based on dynamic pushdown networks. The security type system supports flow-sensitive tracking of security levels for shared variables in the analysis of one thread by exploiting assumptions about variable accesses by other threads. The reachability analysis based on dynamic pushdown networks verifies that these assumptions are sound using the result of an automatic guarantee inference. The combined analysis is the first automatic static analysis that supports flow-sensitive tracking of security levels while being sound with respect to termination-sensitive noninterference.

Keywords: information-flow security, concurrency, static analysis

1 Introduction

Before giving a multi-threaded program access to sensitive information, one might want to know whether the program keeps this information secret. Static information-flow analyses are a solution for checking whether a program keeps sensitive information secret before running the program.

Information-flow security for sequential programs received a lot of attention in research and mature solutions exist, e.g. [12,2,5,7]. Analyzing information-flow security for concurrent programs is conceptually more difficult. In particular, analyses for sequential programs are not sufficient for analyzing concurrent programs [17], because further information leaks can occur. Consider, for instance, the program o1:=s1; s1:=s2; s2:=o1; o1:=0, which swaps the values stored in s1 and s2 via the variable o1. Assume the values of s1 and s2 shall be kept secret from an attacker who can only observe the variable o1 after the program run. While the program does not leak the values of s1 and s2 if run in isolation, it might leak the value of s1 to the attacker if the program o2:=o1; o1:=o2 is run concurrently. Synchronization adds further complexity to this problem, because it can introduce additional information leaks [14].



Fig. 1. Work flow of the proposed analysis

For verifying that multi-threaded programs have secure information flow, several security type systems were proposed and proven sound wrt. noninterference-like security properties (e.g., [17, 16]). While some of this work addresses the danger of information leakage via synchronization (e.g., [14, 19, 20]), the potential positive effects of synchronization primitives for information-flow security have been neglected for some time. However, programmers use synchronization frequently to limit the possible interferences between threads. In particular, synchronization can be employed to prevent information leakage.

Mantel, Sands, and Sudbrock propose a framework for verifying information-flow security in a modular fashion such that the positive effects of synchronization can be exploited [10]. They present a flow-sensitive security type system that is suitable for rely-guarantee-style reasoning about information-flow security based on code annotations that capture a programmer's intentions and expectations by so called modes. A mode is either an assumption about a given thread's environment that the programmer expects to hold when the thread reaches some program point, or it is a guarantee that the programmer intends to provide to the thread's environment. In [10], the security type system is proven sound under the precondition that all assumptions made by a thread are justified by corresponding guarantees of other threads and that all such guarantees are, indeed, provided. In [3], this approach is adapted to a hybrid information-flow analysis, where monitors enforce the soundness of rely-guarantee-style reasoning by forcing threads to provide all guarantees that are needed to justify the assumptions made by other threads.

In this article, we propose a particular combination of security type systems with dynamic pushdown networks [9] (brief: DPNs). The purpose of this combination is to obtain a solution for rely-guarantee-style reasoning where DPNs are used to effectively check that all assumptions are justified. In addition, we present an inference that soundly computes the guarantees that are provided at each program point. That is, our solution statically ensures that modes are used soundly and our soundness result is unconditional, unlike in [10] where a sound use of modes is assumed. In contrast to [3], we present a solution for a static analysis, i.e. one only needs to verify the information flow security of a program once and no run-time overhead is imposed on the program. Another novelty of this article in comparison to [10,3] is that our security type system covers dynamic thread creation as well as lock-based synchronization.

Figure 1 illustrates how the different modules of our analysis interact. The guarantee inference takes a program annotated with assumptions as input and adds guarantee annotations. This program is input to the assumption verifier

and the security type system. A program is then accepted as secure if and only if it is accepted by the assumption verifier as well as the security type system.

Overall, our analysis is the first completely automated, static informationflow analysis that soundly enforces termination-sensitive noninterference while permitting flow-sensitive tracking of security levels for shared variables.

2 Basic Notions and Notation

2.1 Model of Computation

We consider multi-threaded programs whose threads synchronize by locks and communicate via shared memory. We focus on interleaving concurrency (i.e., one thread performs a step at a time), non-deterministic scheduling (i.e., each thread could be chosen to perform a step next), and non-re-entrant locks (i.e., a lock can only be acquired if no thread, including the acquiring thread, holds this lock). To capture the behavior of multi-threaded programs, we use two transition systems: a local labeled transition system to capture the behavior of individual threads and a global transition system to capture the behavior of multiple threads.

We assume as given a finite set of locks Lck and define the set of all memory configurations by $Mem = Var \rightarrow Val$, where Var is a finite set of variables and Val is a set of values. We leave Var and Val both under-specified.

We refer to the states and labels of local, labeled transition systems as local configurations and events, respectively. Formally, a local transition system is a triple $(LCnf, Eve, \rightarrow)$ where LCnf and Eve are sets and $\rightarrow \subseteq LCnf \times Eve \times LCnf$. We define the set of local configurations by $LCnf = CCnf \times Mem$, where CCnf is a set of control configurations that we leave under-specified for now. An event is a term that captures the non-local effects of a thread's computation. We define the set of all events by $Eve = \{\epsilon, \nearrow_{ccnf}, l, \neg l \mid ccnf \in CCnf, l \in Lck\}$. We use the events \nearrow_{ccnf} , l, and $\neg l$ to capture the creation of a new thread with initial control configuration ccnf, the acquisition of lock l, and the release of l, respectively. The term ϵ signals that no non-local effect occurs. We assume that termination is captured by a predicate trm on control configurations.

A global transition system is a pair $(GCnf, \rightarrow)$, where GCnf is a set of global configurations and $\rightarrow \subseteq GCnf \times GCnf$. We define GCnf by $GCnf = CCnf^+ \times Mem$, i.e., a global configuration is a pair of a non-empty list of local control configurations and a memory configuration. A global configuration $\langle [ccnf_1, \ldots, ccnf_n], mem \rangle$ models a snapshot of a computation with n threads where the ith thread's state is captured by $(ccnf_i, mem)$ for $1 \le i \le n$. We say that a list of control configurations $[ccnf_1, \ldots, ccnf_n]$ has terminated (denoted $trm([ccnf_1, \ldots, ccnf_n])$) iff $trm(ccnf_i)$ holds for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$.

We assume the control configuration of a thread to capture which locks are held by this thread. To retrieve the set of acquired locks, we use a function $locks: CCnf \to 2^{Lck}$ and inductively lift it to a function $locks: CCnf^* \to 2^{Lck}$ by $locks([]) = \emptyset$ and $locks(\overrightarrow{ccnf} + +[ccnf]) = locks(\overrightarrow{ccnf}) \cup locks(ccnf)$. In a global configuration $\langle [ccnf_1, \ldots, ccnf_n], mem \rangle$, $locks(ccnf_i)$ is the set of locks acquired by the ith thread and $locks([ccnf_1, \ldots, ccnf_n])$ is the set of available locks.

We say that a local transition system $(LCnf, Eve, \rightarrow)$ handles locks properly iff (1) $(ccnf, mem) \stackrel{l}{\rightarrow} (ccnf', mem')$ implies $locks(ccnf') = locks(ccnf) \stackrel{.}{\cup} \{l\},^3$ (2) $(ccnf, mem) \stackrel{\neg l}{\rightarrow} (ccnf', mem')$ implies $locks(ccnf) = locks(ccnf') \stackrel{.}{\cup} \{l\}, (3)$ $(ccnf, mem) \stackrel{\alpha}{\rightarrow} (ccnf', mem')$ and $\alpha \notin \{l, \neg l \mid l \in Lck\}$ imply locks(ccnf') = locks(ccnf), and (4) $(ccnf, mem) \stackrel{\nearrow ccnf^*}{\rightarrow} (ccnf', mem')$ implies $locks(ccnf^*) = \emptyset$.

Let $(LCnf, Eve, \rightarrow)$ be a local transition system that handles locks properly. The global transition relation $\twoheadrightarrow \subseteq GCnf \times GCnf$ induced by this local transition system is the smallest relation that satisfies the following conditions:

- $1. \ \ \underset{\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 + + [ccnf_i] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, \, mem')}{\text{If } (\overrightarrow{ccnf}_i, mem')} \ \ \text{and} \ \ \underset{\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 + + [ccnf_i] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, \, mem'\rangle}{\text{If } (\overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 + + [ccnf_i] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, \, mem')}.$
- 2. If $(ccnf_i, mem) \xrightarrow{\checkmark_{ccnf}} (ccnf'_i, mem')$ then $\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 + + [ccnf_i] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, mem \rangle \rightarrow \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 + + [ccnf, ccnf'_i] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, mem' \rangle$.
- 3. If $(ccnf_i, mem) \stackrel{\sim}{\to} (ccnf'_i, mem')$ and $\alpha \notin \{ \nearrow_{ccnf}, l \mid ccnf \in CCnf, l \in Lck \}$ then $\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 + + [ccnf_i] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, mem \rangle \rightarrow \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 + + [ccnf'_i] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, mem' \rangle$.

The first item above captures the acquisition of a lock by the thread at position $i = 1 + \sharp(\overrightarrow{ccnf}_1)$. Since the local transition system handles locks properly, a lock can only be acquired if no thread – including thread i – holds this lock. The second item captures the creation of a thread by the ith thread. Due to the proper handling of locks, newly created threads hold no locks. Finally, the third item handles all other steps of the ith thread, including the release of a lock.

We inductively define a family of relations $(\twoheadrightarrow_k)_{k\in\mathbb{N}}$ by $gcnf \twoheadrightarrow_0 gcnf$ and if $gcnf \twoheadrightarrow_k gcnf'$ and $gcnf' \twoheadrightarrow gcnf''$ then $gcnf \twoheadrightarrow_{k+1} gcnf''$. The transitive, reflexive closure of \twoheadrightarrow is defined by $gcnf \twoheadrightarrow^* gcnf'$ iff $\exists k \in \mathbb{N}$. $gcnf \twoheadrightarrow_k gcnf'$. If $gcnf \twoheadrightarrow^* gcnf'$ then gcnf' is reachable from gcnf. We define the set of all global configurations reachable from gcnf by $gReach(gcnf) = \{gcnf' \mid gcnf \twoheadrightarrow^* gcnf'\}$.

In Section 2.5, we define a local transition system $(LCnf, Eve, \rightarrow)$ for a simple programming language and capture multi-threaded computations by the global transition system $(GCnf, \rightarrow)$, where \rightarrow is induced by $(LCnf, Eve, \rightarrow)$.

2.2 Attacker Model and Definition of Security

We focus on confidentiality in this article. More concretely, we assume that certain variables store secrets, and we only classify a program as secure if it does not reveal information about these secrets when it is run. We consider attackers that might be able to observe the values of all other variables both, before and after a program run. We refer to variables that initially store secrets as **high** and to variables that might be observable to the attacker as **low**.

We define a set of security levels by $Lev = \{low, high\}$ and use a function $lev : Var \rightarrow Lev$ to associate a security level with each variable. For the attacker, two memory configurations are indistinguishable if they agree on the values of

We use $\dot{\cup}$ to denote the disjoint union of two sets, e.g., $locks(ccnf') = locks(ccnf)\dot{\cup}\{l\}$ is equivalent to $locks(ccnf') = (locks(ccnf) \cup \{l\}) \land l \notin locks(ccnf)$.

all low variables. We say that $mem, mem' \in Mem$ are low-equal (denoted by $mem = \frac{lev}{low} \ mem'$) iff $\forall x \in Var. (lev(x) = low \implies mem(x) = mem'(x))$ holds.

Definition 1. A control configuration ccnf is secure for lev: $Var \rightarrow Lev$ iff

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\forall mem_1, mem_1', mem_2 \in Mem. \ \forall \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 \in CCnf^+.
\langle [ccnf], mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\rightarrow^*} \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_1, mem_1' \rangle \wedge trm(\overrightarrow{ccnf}_1) \wedge mem_1 = _{\mathbf{low}}^{lev} mem_2
\implies \exists mem_2' \in Mem. \ \exists \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2 \in CCnf^+.
\langle [ccnf], mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\rightarrow^*} \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2, mem_2' \rangle \wedge trm(\overrightarrow{ccnf}_2) \wedge mem_1' = _{\mathbf{low}}^{lev} mem_2'
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Our security definition captures possibilistic, termination-sensitive noninterference for a two-level security policy [15]. That is, if a program satisfies our security definition then the initial values of **high** variables do not influence the possibility of a **low** attacker's observations. In particular, programs that leak information via their termination behavior [4] do not satisfy Definition 1.

2.3 Dynamic Pushdown Networks

We briefly recall the result on analysis of dynamic pushdown networks (DPNs) from [9] exploited in the assumption verifier and describe the connection to our model of computation. A DPN consists of multiple instances of independent pushdown systems running in parallel. Additional instances can be created dynamically. Synchronisation is supported in the form of locks. Using finite data abstraction, DPNs can thus model concurrent programs with recursive procedures, dynamic thread creation, and synchronization with locks.

Formally, a DPN is a tuple (P, Γ, A, Δ) where P is a finite set of control states, Γ is a finite set of stack symbols, A is a finite set of actions, and $\Delta \subseteq P\Gamma \times A \times P\Gamma^*$ is a finite set of transitions. An action from $\{\nearrow_{p,\gamma}|\ p\in P, \gamma\in \Gamma\}\subseteq A$ indicates creation of a new pushdown instance with a control state p and stack symbol γ , and an action from $\{l,\neg l\mid l\in Lck\}\subseteq A$ indicates acquisition and release of a lock l. The set of acquired locks can be retrieved from a control state with the function $locks: P\to 2^{Lck}$. The set of acquired locks in a control state must be consistent with transitions, i.e. for all $(p\gamma, a, p'w')\in \Delta$ we have $locks(p')=\{l\}\ \dot\cup\ locks(p)$ if $a=l,\ locks(p)=\{l\}\ \dot\cup\ locks(p')$ if $a=\neg l$ and locks(p)=locks(p') otherwise; in addition $locks(p'')=\emptyset$ if $a=\nearrow_{p'',\gamma''}$. Note that there is no re-entrant use of locks.

Configurations of a DPN are lists of pushdown instances represented as words from $DCnf = (P\Gamma^*)^+$. Let $locks(p_1w_1 \dots p_nw_n) = \bigcup_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}} locks(p_i)$. A step of the semantics of the DPN rewrites the control state and topmost stack-symbol of one pushdown instance according to a transition rule, if allowed by the state of locks. On thread creation, a new pushdown instance is added to the left of the current instance in the configuration. Formally, the transition relation \rightarrow is the smallest relation such that $s p \gamma w s' \rightarrow s s'' p'w'w s'$ holds for all $s, s' \in DCnf, w \in \Gamma^*$, $(p\gamma, a, p'w') \in \Delta$ provided $l \notin locks(sp\gamma ws')$ if a = l and $s'' = p''\gamma''$ if $a = \nearrow_{p'',\gamma''}$ and $s'' = \varepsilon$ otherwise.

We say that a thread uses locks in a well-nested fashion if it releases all locks in opposite order of their acquisition. Given a DPN whose threads use locks in a well-nested fashion and a regular set $B \subseteq (P \cup \Gamma)^*$, we can check effectively, whether a configuration in B is reachable from initial configuration s_0 or not, i.e., whether $\exists s \in B : s_0 \to^* s$ (see [9]).

In order to analyze a program from an initial configuration $\langle [ccnf], mem \rangle$, we consider a DPN $\mathcal{M}_{ccnf} = (P_{ccnf}, \Gamma_{ccnf}, A_{ccnf}, \Delta_{ccnf})$ with $P_{ccnf} \subseteq CCnf$, $ccnf \in P_{ccnf}$ and $\Gamma_{ccnf} = \{\#\}$ that satisfies the following condition: if $ccnf' \in P_{ccnf}$ and $(ccnf', mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (ccnf'', mem')$ then $ccnf'' \in P_{ccnf}$, $\alpha' \in A_{ccnf}$ and $(ccnf'\#, \alpha', ccnf''\#) \in \Delta_{ccnf}$, where $\alpha' = \alpha$ for $\alpha \notin \{\nearrow_{ccnf} | ccnf \in CCnf\}$, and $ccnf''' \in P_{ccnf}$ and $\alpha' = \nearrow_{ccnf''',\#}$ for $\alpha = \nearrow_{ccnf'''}$. Elements of P_{ccnf} abstract local configurations in the sense that they do not carry information about memory configurations. Correspondingly, the transitions in Δ_{ccnf} abstract steps in the local semantics. However, labelling and hence synchronisation and thread creation is preserved. We reuse the function locks defined for control configurations.

The DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf} can be used to approximate reachability of configurations starting from $\langle [ccnf], mem \rangle$ respecting synchronisation via locks and thread creation, since $\langle [ccnf], mem \rangle \rightarrow^* \langle [ccnf_1, \ldots, ccnf_n], mem' \rangle$ implies that $ccnf \# \rightarrow^* ccnf_1 \# \ldots ccnf_n \#$. Hence, an unreachable configuration in the DPN translates to an unreachable configuration in the program. Since we abstract from the shared global memory, the converse direction does not hold in general.

The above approach is fitted to non-recursive programs but can easily be extended to recursive programs by using a larger stack alphabet.

2.4 Control Configurations and Modes

We specialize control configurations to triples of the form (c, lkst, mdst), where c is a command, lkst is a lock state, and mdst is a mode state. In the control configuration of a thread, the command specifies how the thread's computation will continue, the lock state specifies which locks the thread currently holds, and the mode state specifies the thread's current assumptions about its environment as well as the guarantees that the thread currently provides to its environment.

We use Com, LkSt, and MdSt to denote the set of all commands, the set of all lock states, and the set of all mode states, respectively, i.e., $CCnf = Com \times LkSt \times MdSt$. We leave Com under-specified and define LkSt and MdSt below. In Section 2.5, we specialize Com for the syntax of a concrete programming language and formalize the language's semantics by a local transition system.

Formally, a lock state is a set of locks, i.e., $LkSt = 2^{Lck}$. In a control configuration (c, lkst, mdst) of a thread, the lock state lkst specifies which locks this thread holds. Hence, we define the function locks by locks((c, lkst, mdst)) = lkst.

We define mode states to be functions from modes to sets of variables, i.e., $MdSt = Md \rightarrow 2^{Var}$, where $Md = \{\text{A-NR, A-NW, G-NR, G-NW}\}$ is the set of modes. The modes A-NR (for no-read assumption) and A-NW (for no-write assumption) represent assumptions, while the modes G-NR (for no-read guarantee) and G-NW (for no-write guarantee) represent guarantees. If $x \in mdst(\text{A-NW})$ then it is assumed that the thread's environment does not write x. Similarly, if $y \in mdst(\text{A-NR})$ then it is assumed that the thread's environment does not

read the variable y. If $x \in mdst(G-NW)$ and $y \in mdst(G-NR)$, then the thread guarantees to not write x and to not read y, respectively. We say a mode state mdst is consistent with a mode state mdst' iff $mdst(A-NW) \subseteq mdst'(G-NW)$ and $mdst(A-NR) \subseteq mdst'(G-NR)$, i.e., if all assumptions made by mdst are matched by corresponding guarantees of mdst'.

We say that a local configuration ((c, lkst, mdst), mem) provides its no-write guarantees iff for all $x \in mdst(G-NW)$ and $(ccnf', mem') \in LCnf$ the implication

$$((c, lkst, mdst), mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (ccnf', mem') \implies mem'(x) = mem(x)$$
 (1)

holds. Moreover, we say ((c, lkst, mdst), mem) provides its no-read guarantees iff for all $y \in mdst(G-NR)$, $v \in Val$, and $(ccnf', mem') \in LCnf$ the implication

$$((c, lkst, mdst), mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (ccnf', mem')$$

$$\Longrightarrow ((c, lkst, mdst), mem[y \mapsto v]) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (ccnf', mem')$$

$$\vee ((c, lkst, mdst), mem[y \mapsto v]) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (ccnf', mem'[y \mapsto v])$$
(2)

holds. The two disjuncts on the right hand side of the implication cover the case where the variable y is written and not written, respectively, in the step. Finally, we say that a local configuration *provides its guarantees* if it provides both, its no-write guarantees and its no-read guarantees.

We say that a global configuration $\langle [ccnf_1, \ldots, ccnf_n], mem \rangle$ with $ccnf_i = (c_i, lkst_i, mdst_i)$ for each $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$ justifies its assumptions iff $mdst_j$ is consistent with $mdst_k$ for all $j, k \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, $j \neq k$. Intuitively, this means that if one thread makes an assumption about a variable then all other threads must provide the corresponding guarantee.

Modes and mode states were introduced in [10] as a basis for rely-guarantee-style reasoning about information-flow security. The approach enables one to verify the security of multi-threaded programs in a modular fashion, based on security guarantees for each individual thread. More concretely, one statically verifies that steps of each thread only cause flows of information that comply with a given security policy. Rely-guarantee-style reasoning frees one from having to reason about arbitrary environments, one only needs to consider environments that satisfy the thread's current assumptions. Such rely-guarantee-style reasoning is sound if at each step of a computation the assumptions of all threads are justified and the guarantees of all threads are provided.

Definition 2. A global configuration gcnf ensures a locally sound use of modes iff for each gcnf' \in gReach(gcnf), where gcnf' $= \langle [ccnf'_1, \ldots, ccnf'_n], mem' \rangle$, and each $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$, the local configuration (ccnf'_i, mem') provides its guarantees.

A global configuration gcnf ensures a globally sound use of modes iff each $gcnf' \in gReach(gcnf)$ justifies its assumptions.

A global configuration gcnf ensures a sound use of modes iff gcnf ensures both, a locally sound use of modes and a globally sound use of modes.

Our semantics of modes is similar to the one in [10,3]. One original extension of rely-guarantee-style reasoning about information-flow security in this article is that we cover dynamic thread creation and synchronization with locks, which are two language features not supported by this prior work.

2.5 A Concrete Programming Language with Modes

We define an example programming language with annotations for acquiring and releasing modes. The set of annotations is $Ann = \{\mathsf{acq}(md, \overline{x}), \mathsf{rel}(md, \overline{x}) \mid md \in Md \land \overline{x} \subseteq Var\}$. An annotation $\mathsf{acq}(md, \overline{x})$ acquires the mode md for all variables in \overline{x} , and an annotation $\mathsf{rel}(md, \overline{x})$ releases the mode md for all variables in \overline{x} . To capture this formally, we define the function $updMds: MdSt \times Ann \to MdSt$ by $updMds(mdst, \mathsf{acq}(md, \overline{x})) = mdst[md \mapsto mdst(md) \cup \overline{x}]$ and $updMds(mdst, \mathsf{rel}(md, \overline{x})) = mdst[md \mapsto mdst(md) \setminus \overline{x}]$, and lift it to lists of annotations by updMds(mdst, []) = mdst and $updMds(mdst, [a]++\overrightarrow{d}) = updMds(updMds(mdst, a), \overrightarrow{d})$.

We define the special mode state $mdst_{\perp}$ by $mdst_{\perp}(A-NR) = mdst_{\perp}(A-NW) = \emptyset$ and $mdst_{\perp}(G-NR) = mdst_{\perp}(G-NW) = Var$. It is minimal in the sense that it imposes no constraints on assumptions and guarantees of its environment.

We assume as given a set Exp of expressions, a function $eval: Exp \times Mem \rightarrow Val$ that returns the value to which an expression evaluates in a given memory, and a function $vars: Exp \rightarrow 2^{Var}$ that returns the set of all variables that appear syntactically in an expression.

The set Com_p of syntactically correct programs is defined by the grammar:

where $\overrightarrow{d} \in Ann^*$, $x \in Var$, $e \in Exp$, and $l \in Lck$. The syntax ensures a well-nested use of locks. The set Com of commands is defined by the grammar:

$$c := \mathbf{stop} \mid \mathbf{lock}(l) \odot \mid \mathbf{unlock}(l) \odot \mid c; c \mid c_p$$

We define that trm((c, lkst, mdst)) holds iff $c = \mathbf{stop}$. That is, the symbol \mathbf{stop} indicates that the computation of a thread has terminated.

The local transition system for our programming language is defined by the calculus in Figure 2. For the rules sk, As, sq1, sq2, ift, iff, wht, and whf, sp, the lock state as well as the mode state is irrelevant for the premises and both remain unchanged. The rules LK and ULK realize acquiring and releasing a lock, respectively. The rule AN1 updates the mode state according to an annotation if the annotated command is reduced to **stop**. The rule AN2 preserves the annotation if the command is not reduced to **stop**.

Given a program c_p , we say that c_p is secure for lev iff $(c_p, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})$ is secure for lev, that c_p ensures a locally sound use of modes iff $\langle [(c_p, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})], mem \rangle$ ensures a locally sound use of modes for all $mem \in Mem$, that c_p ensures a globally sound use of modes iff $\langle [(c_p, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})], mem \rangle$ ensures a globally sound use of modes for all $mem \in Mem$, and that c_p ensures a sound use of modes iff $\langle [(c_p, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})], mem \rangle$ ensures a sound use of modes for all $mem \in Mem$.

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(\mathbf{skip}, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\epsilon} (\mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst, mem)
                           eval(e, mem) = v mem' = mem[x \mapsto v]
                     (x:=e, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\epsilon} (\mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst, mem')
     sq1 \underline{(c_1, lkst, mdst, mem)} \xrightarrow{\alpha} (c'_1, lkst', mdst', mem') \quad c'_1 \neq \mathbf{stop}
                    (c_1; c_2, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (c'_1; c_2, lkst', mdst', mem')
             SO2 (c_1, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (\mathbf{stop}, lkst', mdst', mem')
                       (c_1; c_2, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (c_2, lkst', mdst', mem')
  SP
         (\mathbf{spawn}(c), lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\nearrow (c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})} (\mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst, mem)
                                               eval(e, mem) = true
            (if e then c else c' fi, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\epsilon} (c, lkst, mdst, mem)
                                               eval(e, mem) = false
  IFF
           (if e then c else c' fi, lkst, mdst, mem) \stackrel{\epsilon}{\rightarrow} (c', lkst, mdst, mem)
                                               eval(e, mem) = true
 (while e do c od, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\epsilon} (c; while e do c od, lkst, mdst, mem)
                                               eval(e, mem) = false
              (while e do c od, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\epsilon} (stop, lkst, mdst, mem)
                                                 lkst \ \dot{\cup} \ \{l\} = lkst'
                    (\mathbf{lock}(l), lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{l} (\mathbf{stop}, lkst', mdst, mem)
                                               lkst = lkst' \dot{\cup} \{l\}
                 \frac{\mathit{lkst} = \mathit{lkst'} \cup \{l\}}{(\mathbf{unlock}(l), \mathit{lkst}, \mathit{mdst}, \mathit{mem}) \xrightarrow{\neg l} (\mathbf{stop}, \mathit{lkst'}, \mathit{mdst}, \mathit{mem})}
       ULK-
(c, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (\mathbf{stop}, lkst', mdst', mem') \ mdst'' = updMds(mdst', \overrightarrow{d})
                    (c@\overrightarrow{d}, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (\mathbf{stop}, lkst', mdst'', mem')
    AN2 \frac{(c, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (c', lkst', mdst', mem') \qquad c' \neq \mathbf{stop}}{(c @ \overrightarrow{a}, lkst, mdst, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (c' @ \overrightarrow{a}, lkst', mdst', mem')}
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Fig. 2. Semantics of the programming language

3 A DPN-based Analysis for Sound Assumptions

We propose a two-step approach for ensuring a globally sound use of modes for a given program c_p . First, we construct a DPN that simulates c_p in the sense of Section 2.3. Second, we build an automaton that accepts all DPN configurations that contain a pair of inconsistent mode states. By the connection between DPN and program executions, c_p uses modes globally sound, if no such configuration

is reachable in the DPN from a particular initial configuration. The techniques from [9] then enable us to determine whether this is the case.

We construct a DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf} for the control configuration $ccnf = (c_p, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})$ as follows: Starting with ccnf, we collect all reachable control configurations, actions, and transitions using the rules from Figure 2, ignoring the memory configurations. The resulting sets P_{ccnf} , A_{ccnf} and Δ_{ccnf} of control states, actions, and transitions satisfy all requirements from Section 2.3. Due to the syntax of programs locks are used well-nested in the DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf} and mode states are preserved in its configurations.

For the second step, we first introduce a function that checks the mutual consistency of two mode states and returns a summary mode state.

Definition 3. Let $MdSt_{\top} = MdSt \cup \{\top\}$. The function $\oplus : MdSt_{\top} \times MdSt_{\top} \rightarrow MdSt_{\top}$ is defined by $mdst \oplus mdst' = mdst''$ where

```
 \begin{array}{l} -\ mdst''(md) = mdst(md) \cup mdst'(md) \ for \ md \in \{\text{A-NR,A-NW}\} \ and \\ mdst''(md) = mdst(md) \cap mdst'(md) \ for \ md \in \{\text{G-NR,G-NW}\} \\ if \ mdst \neq \top, \ mdst' \neq \top, \ mdst \ is \ consistent \ with \ mdst', \ and \\ mdst' \ is \ consistent \ with \ mdst. \end{array}
```

 $- mdst'' = \top otherwise.$

If the two parameter mode states are mutually consistent, the function \oplus returns a regular mode state that imposes the same constraints on concurrent threads as the combination of the original mode states. That is, it makes all assumptions that at least one of the mode states makes and provides only those guarantees that both mode states provide. If one of the parameter mode states makes an assumption that the other mode state does not match with a corresponding guarantee, the function returns the special symbol \top .

We are now ready to define the automaton that characterizes DPN configurations containing inconsistent mode states using the function \oplus .

Definition 4. For a DPN $\mathcal{M}_{ccnf} = (P_{ccnf}, \Gamma_{ccnf}, A_{ccnf}, \Delta_{ccnf})$ as described above, we define $\mathcal{A}_{ccnf} = (MdSt_{\top}, P_{ccnf} \cup \Gamma_{ccnf}, \delta, mdst_{\bot}, \{\top\})$ as the conflict automaton, where $\delta = \{(q, (c, lkst, mdst), q \oplus mdst) \mid q \in MdSt_{\top}, (c, lkst, mdst) \in P_{ccnf}\} \cup \{(q, \#, q) \mid q \in MdSt_{\top}\}$. We denote the language accepted by the automaton by $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{ccnf})$.

The states of the automaton record the summary mode state of the partial configuration already read. Thus the initial state is the minimal mode state and transitions accepting a control state add the mode state of the process to the summary using the \oplus operation. Since we are interested in the configurations with inconsistent mode states, \top is the only accepting state.

DPN-reachability and globally sound use of modes are connected as follows:

Theorem 1. Let $ccnf = (c_p, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})$. If $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{ccnf})$ is not reachable from $ccnf \# in DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf}$, then c_p ensures a globally sound use of modes.

$$\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{x} = anno(\overline{x}, \emptyset, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w) \\ & \overline{x} \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip} \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{skip} @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \text{IAS} \frac{\overrightarrow{a} = anno(vars(e) \cup \overline{x}, \{x\}, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w)}{\overline{x} \vdash vars(e), \{x\} \{x := e\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : x := e@ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{a} = anno(\overline{x}, \emptyset, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w) \\ & \overline{x} \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \text{IUL} \frac{\overrightarrow{a} = anno(\overline{x}, \emptyset, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w)}{\overline{x} \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{unlock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{unlock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{a} = anno(\overline{x}, \emptyset, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w) \\ & \overline{x} \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \text{IUL} \frac{\overrightarrow{a} = anno(\overline{x}, \emptyset, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w)}{\overline{x} \vdash vars(e), \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{a} \vdash 0, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \text{IUL} \frac{\overrightarrow{a} = anno(\overline{x}, \emptyset, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w) : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{a} \vdash 0, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{a} \vdash 0, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned}$$

$$\end{aligned} \quad \begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{a} \vdash 0, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned}$$

$$\end{aligned} \quad \begin{aligned} & \overrightarrow{a} \vdash 0, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{lock}(l) \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{a} \end{aligned} \quad \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow$$

Fig. 3. Inference of guarantee annotations

4 An Inference for Sound Guarantees

We propose an inference to automatically annotate a command with guarantees. Recall that the initial mode state provides all guarantees, and that mode states are updated based on annotations after the annotated command terminates. With this in mind, the intuition of our inference is that a command requests the release of guarantees that it cannot provide from the preceding command and vouches to re-acquire said guarantees. Hence, the inference propagates sets of variables which may be read or written by a command backwards.

A judgment $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c' \text{ with } \overline{x}, \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}_w, \overline{x}'_w \subseteq Var \text{ and } c, c' \in Com \text{ of the inference is derivable with the rules in Figure 3. The set } \overline{x} \text{ comprises variables for which a conditional requests that a no-read guarantee shall be reacquired in the body of the conditional. The sets <math>\overline{x}'_r$ and \overline{x}'_w comprise variables for which c does not provide a no-read and no-write guarantee, respectively. The sets \overline{x}_r and \overline{x}_w comprise variables for which a release of the respective guarantees is requested. The resulting command c' is annotated with guarantees.

All rules, except IIF and IAN, annotate a command to re-acquire guarantees that this command cannot provide before releasing requested guarantees. The rule IIF requests that its branches re-acquire and release all guarantees. The rule IAN removes existing guarantee annotations to avoid conflicts with inferred guarantees using a projection to assumption annotations The projection \upharpoonright_A is defined by $[\upharpoonright \upharpoonright_A = [], ([a]++\overrightarrow{a}) \upharpoonright_A = [a]++(\overrightarrow{a} \upharpoonright_A)$ if $a \in \{\operatorname{acq}(md, \overline{x}), \operatorname{rel}(md, \overline{x}) \mid md \in \{A-\operatorname{NR}, A-\operatorname{NW}\} \land \overline{x} \subseteq \operatorname{Var}\}$ and $([a]++\overrightarrow{a}) \upharpoonright_A = \overrightarrow{a} \upharpoonright_A$ otherwise.

Theorem 2. If $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset$, \emptyset {skip; c'_p } \emptyset , \emptyset : c_p is derivable, then c_p ensures a locally sound use of modes.

Note that some rules add **skip** commands. These additional commands do not influence which final memories are reachable. We do this as a lightweight measure to support pre-annotations without further complicating our formalism.

5 A Type System for Information-flow Security

We extend the security type system from [10, 18]. To this end, we define a total, reflexive order \sqsubseteq on Lev such that $\mathbf{low} \sqsubseteq \mathbf{high}$. To support flow-sensitive tracking of security levels for shared variables, we use $partial\ level\ assignments$, i.e. partial functions from $Var \rightharpoonup Lev$. For a given level assignment lev and a given partial level assignment Λ , a lookup $\Lambda_{lev}\langle x\rangle$ is defined by $\Lambda_{lev}\langle x\rangle = \Lambda(x)$ if $x \in pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda_{lev}\langle x\rangle = lev(x)$ otherwise. Moreover, the partial type environment $\Lambda' = \Lambda \oplus_{lev} a$ is defined by $\Lambda'(x) = \Lambda_{lev}\langle x\rangle$ for all $x \in pre(\Lambda')$ and

$$pre(\Lambda') = \begin{cases} pre(\Lambda) \cup \{x \mid x \in \overline{x} \land lev(x) = \mathbf{low}\} \text{ if } a = \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{A}\text{-}\mathsf{NR}, \overline{x}) \\ pre(\Lambda) \cup \{x \mid x \in \overline{x} \land lev(x) = \mathbf{high}\} \text{ if } a = \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{A}\text{-}\mathsf{NW}, \overline{x}) \\ pre(\Lambda) \setminus \{x \mid x \in \overline{x} \land lev(x) = \mathbf{low}\} \text{ if } a = \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{A}\text{-}\mathsf{NR}, \overline{x}) \\ pre(\Lambda) \setminus \{x \mid x \in \overline{x} \land lev(x) = \mathbf{high}\} \text{ if } a = \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{A}\text{-}\mathsf{NW}, \overline{x}) \\ pre(\Lambda) \text{ otherwise }. \end{cases}$$

For **low**-variables, acquiring a no-read assumption enables floating of security levels. This allows tracking when a **low**-variable possibly stores sensitive information. For **high**-variables, acquiring a no-write assumption enables floating of security levels. This allows tracking when a **high**-variable definitely stores public information. Releasing the respective assumptions disables floating of security levels again. We lift the definition of \bigoplus_{lev} to lists of annotations as follows $\Lambda \oplus_{lev} [] = \Lambda$ and $\Lambda \oplus_{lev} ([a]++\overrightarrow{a}) = (\Lambda \oplus_{lev} a) \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{a}$.

The type system in Figure 4 allows to derive judgements of the form $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda':c'$. If such a judgment is derivable and lev and Λ together approximate where secrets are stored initially, then lev and Λ' approximate where secrets are stored after running c, provided concurrent threads behave according to the assumptions. The command c' is a **low**-slice of c, i.e. an abstraction of c in which sub-commands that do not contribute to the behaviour observable via **low**-variables are replaced by **skip**. The rule TTH with judgment $\vdash_{lev} c:c'$ ensures that lev alone approximates where secrets are stored. If no such judgment is derivable for a command c, then a secret might influence a **low**-variable in c.

The rule TAN enables and disables flow-sensitivity for particular variables by updating the pre-image of the partial level assignment, and ensures that a secret written into a variable x with $lev(x) = \mathbf{low}$ must be overwritten before disabling flow-sensitivity for x. The rules TFL and TFH track the floating security level of a variable x by updating the level of x in the partial level assignment. The rule TIH permits branching on secrets. To avoid implicit information leaks due to such branchings, TIH requires that the \mathbf{low} -slices of both branches are syntactically identical. The rules TAH, TFH, and TIH perform the \mathbf{low} -slicing.

$$\text{TEX} \frac{ lev(x) = \text{high} \quad x \notin pre(\Lambda) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{s : \sqsubseteq_{x \in vars(e)} \Lambda_{lev} \langle x \rangle} \\ \text{TAL} \frac{ lev(x) = \text{low} \quad lev(x) = \text{low} \quad x \notin pre(\Lambda) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{s : = e\} \Lambda : s : = e} \\ \text{TLO} \frac{ }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{lock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{lock}(l)} \\ \text{TEL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{lock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{lock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{lock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{lock}(l)} \\ \text{TFH} \frac{ x \in pre(\Lambda) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{x : = e\} \Lambda [x \mapsto \text{low}] : x : = e} \\ \text{TUL} \frac{ \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l)} \\ \text{TFH} \frac{ x \in pre(\Lambda) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{x : = e\} \Lambda [x \mapsto \text{high}] : \text{skip}} \\ \text{TWL} \frac{ \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{while } e \text{ do } c \text{ od}\} \Lambda ' : \text{while } e \text{ do } c' \text{ od}} \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{while } e \text{ do } c \text{ od}\} \Lambda ' : \text{while } e \text{ do } c' \text{ od}} \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{while } e \text{ do } c \text{ od}\} \Lambda ' : \text{while } e \text{ do } c' \text{ od}} \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{while } e \text{ do } c \text{ od}\} \Lambda ' : \text{while } e \text{ do } c' \text{ od}} \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{while } e \text{ do } c \text{ od}\} \Lambda ' : \text{while } e \text{ do } c' \text{ od}} \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{while } e \text{ do } c \text{ od}\} \Lambda ' : \text{while } e \text{ do } c' \text{ od}} \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) } \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l)} \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) } \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) } \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) } \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) } \\ \text{TIL} \frac{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text{unlock}(l)\} \Lambda : \text{unlock}(l) }{ \vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{\text$$

Fig. 4. Security type system

Theorem 3. If c_p ensures a sound use of modes and $\vdash_{lev} c_p : c'$ is derivable, then c_p is secure for lev.

Theorems 1, 2, and 3 establish the soundness result for our combined analysis:

Corollary 1. If $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset\{\mathbf{skip}; c_p'\}\emptyset, \emptyset : c_p$, and $\vdash_{lev} c_p : c'$ are derivable and $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{ccnf})$ is not reachable from ccnf # in DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf} for $ccnf = (c_p, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})$, then c_p is secure for lev.

6 Applying the Analysis

We illustrate how our type system gains precision from assumptions, while the DPN-based analysis ensures soundness of the combined analysis with the example program $c_1 = \mathbf{spawn}(o2:=o1;o1:=o2); o1:=s1;s1:=s2;s2:=o1;o1:=0$ and level assignment lev with $lev(o1) = lev(o2) = \mathbf{low}$ and $lev(s1) = lev(s2) = \mathbf{high}$. The program c_1 may leak the value of s1 to an observer of s1 due to concurrent execution of both threads.

Our security type system indeed rejects c_1 , because no typing rule is applicable for o1:=s1: The rule TAH cannot be applied due to $lev(o1) \neq \mathbf{high}$, the rule TAL cannot be applied due to $lev(s1) \neq \mathbf{low}$, and the rules TFL as well as TFH cannot be applied due to $o1 \notin pre(\Lambda)$ (as the pre-image of the partial level assignment is initially empty and there are no annotations in the program). Using the assumption A-NR to enable flow-sensitivity for variable o1, o1:=s1 can be typed using TFH. To this end the program c_1 can be annotated as follows:

```
spawn(o2:=o1; o1:=o2)@[acq(A-NR, \{o1\})];
o1:=s1; s1:=s2; s2:=o1; o1:=0@[rel(A-NR, \{o1\})]
```

However the program still contains the leak and the analysis detects this. The guarantee inference transforms the command o2:=o1; o1:=o2 of the spawned thread with the rules ISP, ISQ, ISK, and IAS into the following command:

```
 \begin{split} \mathbf{skip} @ [ \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \emptyset), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \{o1\}), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \{o2\})]; \\ o2 := & o1 @ [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \{o1\}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \{o2\}), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \{o2\}), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \{o1\})]; \\ o1 := & o2 @ [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \{o2\}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \{o1\}), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \emptyset)] \ . \end{split}
```

The annotation $\operatorname{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR},\{o1\})$ in the first line makes explicit that the thread cannot provide the guarantee to not read o1 during its next step, i.e. during the step of o2:=o1 in the second line. By spawning the new thread and executing its annotated first skip step, we reach a configuration with two threads. We have $o1 \notin \operatorname{mdst}_2(\mathsf{G-NR})$ for the mode state of the spawned thread due to the annotation $\operatorname{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR},\{o1\})$. Furthermore, we have $o1 \in \operatorname{mdst}_1(\mathsf{A-NR})$ for the mode state of the original thread due to the annotation $\operatorname{acq}(\mathsf{A-NR},\{o1\})$. Hence we have a reachable configuration that does not justify its assumptions. The corresponding DPN configuration preserves the mode states and is thus accepted by our conflict automaton that accepts DPN configurations with inconsistent mode states. Since the DPN over-approximates reachablity of the semantics, the reachability analysis from [9] detects that this DPN configuration is reachable, i.e. it detects a possible violation of globally sound use of modes and, hence, the program is rejected.

Adding synchronization via locks to ensure mutual exclusion of the regions accessing variable o1 finally makes the program secure and no configuration with inconsistent mode states is reachable in the semantics anymore. Since the DPN models locking precisely, the DPN analysis also no longer detects reachability of any violation of globally sound use of modes. The following version of c_1 with additional synchronization has no leak and is accepted by our analysis:

```
c_2\!=\!\mathbf{spawn}(\mathbf{lock}(l); o2\!:=\!o1; o1\!:=\!o2; \mathbf{unlock}(l)); \mathbf{lock}(l)@[\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{A-NR}, \{o1\})]; \\ o1\!:=\!s1; s1\!:=\!s2; s2\!:=\!o1; o1\!:=\!0; \mathbf{unlock}(l)@[\mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{A-NR}, \{o1\})]
```

Theorem 4. Let lev be a domain assignment with lev(o1) = lev(o2) = **low** and lev(s1) = lev(s2) = **high**. Then there are c_2' , c_2'' such that $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset$, \emptyset {skip; c_2 } \emptyset , \emptyset : c_2' and $\vdash_{lev} c_2'$: c_2'' are derivable, and $\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{ccnf})$ is not reachable from ccnf # in DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf} for ccnf = (c_2' , \emptyset , $mdst_{\perp}$). Hence, c_2' is secure for lev.

7 Related Work

Andrews and Reitman [1] were the first to propose a static information-flow analysis based on flow rules, yet without a soundness proof wrt. a semantic security property. In [17], Smith and Volpano proposed the first security type system with a soundness proof against termination-sensitive noninterference.

The focus for most security type systems with support for synchronization, e.g. [14, 19, 20], has been preventing information leaks via synchronization. To the best of our knowledge, only the analyses in [11, 10, 18] can exploit synchronization for their precision. In [11], barrier synchronization allows combining different proof techniques in an analysis. In [10], Mantel, Sands, and Sudbrock introduced the rely-guarantee-style reasoning and the first flow-sensitive security type system for concurrent programs. The relationship of this article to [10] has already been clarified in the introduction.

Beyond security type systems, model-checking, e.g. in [8, 13], as well as program dependence graphs, e.g. in [6], have been used to verify information-flow security for concurrent programs. These techniques promise very precise results, but are not necessarily compositional. A compositional analysis reduces the conceptual complexity of the verification, opens up the possibility to re-use analysis results of components, and, thus, can contribute to the scalability of an analysis. Our type system and our guarantee inference are compositional, meaning they can be applied to individual threads. Only our DPN-based analysis, which verifies the assumptions exploited by the type system for the actual program composed of multiple threads, is a whole-program analysis.

8 Conclusion

We automated a modular information-flow analysis for multi-threaded programs with a novel combination of a security type system and a reachability analysis based on DPNs. The combined analysis is sound wrt. termination-sensitive non-interference. The security type system supports flow-sensitive tracking of security levels for shared variables in the analysis of a given thread by exploiting assumptions about accesses to said variables by other threads. Using a conceptual example, we illustrated how the modules of our analysis interact and how synchronization with locks can contribute to the precision of our analysis.

Lifting the analysis to a realistic language with recursive procedure calls and dynamically allocated data structures is an open task for future work. Finally, we would like to implement our analysis and evaluate it in practice.

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Proofs for the Theorems in the Paper

Soundness of the DPN-based Analysis

In this subsection, we provide a proof for our soundness theorem for the DPN analysis (Theorem 1). The following table lists the dependencies between lemmas and theorems in this subsection.

Lemma/Theorem	Depends on lemmas/theorems
Lemma 1	none
Lemma 2	Lemma 1
Theorem 1	Lemmas 1, 2

In a first step, we proof that the semantics of a DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf} for a control configuration $ccnf \in CCnf$ simulates the semantics of the any global configuration $\langle [ccnf], mem \rangle$. For this purpose, we define a simulation relation that relates global configurations to potential DPN configurations.

Definition 5. The function toDPN: $GCnf \rightarrow (CCnf\{\#\})^+$ is defined by

$$toDPN(\langle [ccnf_1, \dots, ccnf_n], mem \rangle) = ccnf_1 \# \dots ccnf_n \#.$$

Lemma 1. For $ccnf \in CCnf$, let $\mathcal{M}_{ccnf} = (P_{ccnf}, \Gamma_{ccnf}, A_{ccnf}, \Delta_{ccnf})$ be a DPN as described above. If toDPN(gcnf) = s, $s \in DCnf$, and $gcnf \rightarrow gcnf'$, then exists s' with $toDPN(qcnf') = s', s' \in DCnf \text{ and } s \rightarrow s'.$

Proof. Let $gcnf = \langle [ccnf_1, \dots, ccnf_n], mem \rangle$. From toDPN(gcnf) = s and $s \in DCnf$ we have $ccnf_i \in P_{ccnf}$ for all $1 \le i \le n$.

We consider the following two cases for $gcnf \rightarrow gcnf'$:

- 1. If $gcnf' = \langle [ccnf_1, \dots, ccnf'_i, \dots, ccnf_n], mem' \rangle$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$ and there exists $\alpha \notin \{\nearrow_{ccnf} | ccnf \in CCnf\}$ with $(ccnf_i, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (ccnf'_i, mem')$. Then also $ccnf'_i \in P_{ccnf}, \ \alpha \in A_{ccnf} \ \text{and} \ (ccnf_i \#, \alpha, ccnf'_i \#) \in \Delta_{ccnf}.$ From this we get $ccnf_1 \# \dots ccnf'_i \# \dots ccnf_n \# \in DCnf$ and $\operatorname{ccnf}_1\#\ldots\operatorname{ccnf}_i\#\ldots\operatorname{ccnf}_n\#\to\operatorname{ccnf}_1\#\ldots\operatorname{ccnf}_i'\#\ldots\operatorname{ccnf}_n\#,$ since for $\alpha=l$ we have $l \notin locks([\mathit{ccnf}_1, \ldots, \mathit{ccnf}_n])$ and thus also $l \notin locks(ccnf_1 \# \dots ccnf_n \#).$ Furthermore $toDPN(gcnf') = ccnf_1 \# \dots ccnf_i \# \dots ccnf_n \#$ and thus the hypoth-
- 2. If $gcnf' = \langle [ccnf_1, \dots, ccnf_s, ccnf_i', \dots, ccnf_n], mem' \rangle$ for some $1 \leq i \leq n$ and there exists $\alpha = \nearrow_{ccnf_s}$ with $(ccnf_i, mem) \xrightarrow{\alpha} (ccnf_i', mem')$. Then also $ccnf_s, ccnf_i' \in$ $P_{ccnf}, \nearrow_{ccnf_s,\#} \in A_{ccnf} \text{ and } (ccnf_i\#, \nearrow_{ccnf_s,\#}, ccnf_i'\#) \in \Delta_{ccnf}.$ From this we get $ccnf_1 \# \dots ccnf_s \# ccnf_i \# \dots ccnf_n \# \in DCnf$ and $\operatorname{ccnf}_1 \# \dots \operatorname{ccnf}_i \# \dots \operatorname{ccnf}_n \# \to \operatorname{ccnf}_1 \# \dots \operatorname{ccnf}_s \# \operatorname{ccnf}_i \# \dots \operatorname{ccnf}_n \#$. Furthermore $toDPN(gcnf') = ccnf_1 \# \dots ccnf_s \# ccnf'_i \# \dots ccnf_n \#$ and thus the hypothesis.

Corollary 2. For all $gcnf \in gReach(\langle ccnf, mem \rangle)$ there exists $s \in DCnf$, with toDPN(gcnf) = $s \text{ and } ccnf \# \rightarrow^* s.$

Proof. This follows by simple induction from Lemma 1 and the fact that $ccnf \in P_{ccnf}$, $ccnf\# \in DCnf_{ccnf}$ and $toDPN(\langle [ccnf], mem \rangle) = ccnf\#$.

In the second step, we show that for all reachable configurations that violates sound use of modes there is a DPN configuration that is accepted by the automaton \mathcal{A}_{ccnf} .

Lemma 2. Let command $c \in Com$, $gcnf \in GCnf$, and $\overrightarrow{mdst} \in MdSt^*$ be arbitrary. If $gcnf \in gReach(\langle (c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}), mem \rangle)$, \overrightarrow{mdst} is the list of mode states in gcnf, and the list of mode states \overrightarrow{mdst} violates at least one of the conditions

$$- \ \forall x, i, j.i \neq j \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[i](\mathsf{A-NR}) \Longrightarrow x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[j](\mathsf{G-NR}), \ or \\ - \ \forall x, i, j.i \neq j \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[i](\mathsf{A-NW}) \Longrightarrow x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[j](\mathsf{G-NW}),$$

then $toDPN(gcnf) \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{M}_c})$.

Proof. Let command $c \in Com$, $gcnf \in GCnf$, and $\overrightarrow{mdst} \in MdSt^*$ be arbitrary such that $gcnf \in gReach(\langle (c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}), mem \rangle)$, \overrightarrow{mdst} is the list of mode states in gcnf, and \overrightarrow{mdst} violates at least one of the following conditions

C1:
$$\forall x, i, j.i \neq j \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[i](A-NR) \Longrightarrow x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[j](G-NR)$$
, or **C2:** $\forall x, i, j.i \neq j \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[i](A-NW) \Longrightarrow x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[j](G-NW)$.

From the fact that \overline{mdst} violates one of the two conditions C1 and C2, we know that there is a smallest index n such that there is an index m with m < n and the pair of indices contributes to the violation, i.e. at least one of the following four conditions holds:

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C3: x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[m](A-NR) \land x \notin \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](G-NR) for some x \in Var, or C4: x \notin \overrightarrow{mdst}[m](G-NR) \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](A-NR) for some x \in Var, or C5: x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[m](A-NW) \land x \notin \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](G-NW) for some x \in Var, or C6: x \notin \overrightarrow{mdst}[m](G-NW) \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](A-NW) for some x \in Var.
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From the fact that n is the smallest index such that there is a mode state at a smaller index that violates one of the four conditions, we get from the definition of \oplus (Definition 3) that there is a mode state $mdst' \in \underline{MdSt}$ with $mdst' = \oplus_{i=0}^{n-1} \overrightarrow{mdst}[i]$, $\underline{mdst}[m](A-NR) \subseteq mdst'(A-NR)$, $\underline{mdst}'(G-NR) \subseteq \overline{mdst}[m](G-NR)$, $\underline{mdst}[m](A-NR) \subseteq mdst'(A-NW)$, and $mdst'(G-NW) \subseteq \overline{mdst}[m](G-NW)$. Hence, one of the following conditions holds:

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C7: x \in mdst'(A-NR) \land x \notin \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](G-NR) for some x \in Var, or C8: x \notin mdst'(G-NR) \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](A-NR) for some x \in Var, or C9: x \in mdst'(A-NW) \land x \notin \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](G-NW) for some x \in Var, or C10: x \notin mdst'(G-NW) \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[n](A-NW) for some x \in Var.
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Thus, we get from definition of \oplus that $mdst' \oplus \overrightarrow{mdst}[n] = \top$ and, in consequence, $\bigoplus_{i=0}^{len(\overrightarrow{mdst})-1} \overrightarrow{mdst}[i] = \top$ where $len(\overrightarrow{mdst})$ denotes the length of the list of mode states. By Corollary 2 we obtain $s \in DCnf$ with toDPN(gcnf) = s. From the fact that \overrightarrow{mdst} is the list of mode states in gcnf, we get by the definition of toDPN that \overrightarrow{mdst} is also the list of mode states of s. Since $s \in DCnf$, all symbols in s are from the correct alphabet for $\mathcal{A}_{(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})}$ and from the fact that $\bigoplus_{i=0}^{len(\overrightarrow{mdst})-1} \overrightarrow{mdst}[i] = \top$ and \overrightarrow{mdst} is the list of mode states in s, we get by the definition of the automaton $\mathcal{A}_{(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})}$. (Definition 4) that the word s results in the state \top in the automaton $\mathcal{A}_{(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})}$. Since \top is an accepting state, we have $s \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})})$.

Finally, we can proof the soundness of the DPN analysis (Theorem 1).

Proof. We prove Theorem 1 by contradiction. Let $c \in Com$ be arbitrary such that $(c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}) \# \notin pre^*(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})}))$ and c does not use modes globally sound.

From the fact that c does not use modes globally sound, we get by the definition of globally sound use of modes and the definition of gReach that there is a global configuration $gcnf \in GCnf$ such that $gcnf \in gReach(\langle (c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp}),mem\rangle)$ and the list of mode states \overrightarrow{mdst} in the global configuration violates at least one of the following conditions:

C1:
$$\forall x, i, j.i \neq j \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[i](A-NR) \Longrightarrow x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[j](G-NR)$$
, or **C2:** $\forall x, i, j.i \neq j \land x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[i](A-NW) \Longrightarrow x \in \overrightarrow{mdst}[j](G-NW)$.

From Lemma 2 and Corollary 2 we obtain $s \in DCnf$ with toDPN(gcnf) = s, $s \in \mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})})$ and $(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})\# \to^* s$. This contradicts our initial assumption that $(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})\# \notin pre^*(\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{A}_{(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})}))$.

9.2 Soundness of the Guarantee Inference

Lemma/Theorem	Depends on lemmas/theorems
Lemma 3	none
Lemma 4	none
Lemma 5	Lemma 4
Theorem 2	Lemma 3, Lemma 5

In the first step, we show that a command does not read and write the variables for which a mode state provides the noread and nowrite guarantees, if the mode state does not provide the guarantees for the inferred sets of variables.

Lemma 3. If $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c, \overline{x}'_r \cap mdst(G-NR) = \emptyset$, and $\overline{x}'_w \cap mdst(G-NW) = \emptyset$ then c provides its guarantees.

Proof. We prove this lemma by structural induction on $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'$. We distinguish cases based on the last rule to derive this judgment.

Case (ISK): In this case, we have $c = \mathbf{skip} @ \overrightarrow{d}$. From $c = \mathbf{skip} @ \overrightarrow{d}$, we get by the rules AN1, SK that c does not read x holds for all $x \in Var$ and c does not write x holds for all $x \in Var$. Thus, c provides its guarantees.

Case (IAS): In this case, we have $c=x':=e@\overrightarrow{d}$. From the rule IAS we get that $\overline{x}'_r=vars(e)$ and $\overline{x}'_w=\{x'\}$. From $c=x':=e@\overrightarrow{d}$, $\overline{x}'_r\cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NR})=\emptyset$, $\overline{x}'_w\cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NW})=\emptyset$, $\overline{x}'_r=vars(e)$, and $\overline{x}'_w=\{x'\}$, we get by the rules AN1 and AS that c' does not read x holds for all $x\in mdst(\mathsf{G-NR})$ and c' does not write x holds for all $x\in mdst(\mathsf{G-NW})$. Thus, c provides its guarantees.

Case (ILO): In this case, we have $c = \mathbf{lock}(l)@\overrightarrow{d}$. From $c = \mathbf{lock}(l)@\overrightarrow{d}$, we get by the rules AN1, and LK, that c does not read x for all $x \in Var$ and c does not write x for all $x \in Var$. Thus, c provides its guarantees.

Case (IUL): In this case, we have $c = \mathbf{unlock}(l)@\overrightarrow{d}$. From $c = \mathbf{unlock}(l)@\overrightarrow{d}$, we get by the rules AN1, and ULK, that c does not read x for all $x \in Var$ and c does not write x for all $x \in Var$. Thus, c provides its guarantees.

Case (ISP): In this case, we have $c = \mathbf{spawn}(c_s)@\overrightarrow{d}$ for some $c'_s \in Com$ and some $\overrightarrow{d} \in Ann^*$. From $c = \mathbf{spawn}(c_s)@\overrightarrow{d}$, we get by the rules AN1, and SP, that c does not read x for all $x \in Var$ and c does not write x for all $x \in Var$. Thus, c provides its guarantees.

Case (ISQ): In this case, we have $c = c_1$; c_2 . From the rule ISQ, we get that $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c_{o,1}\} \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w : c_1$.

From $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x'_r}, \overline{x'_w}\{c_{o,1}\}\overline{x''_r}, \overline{x''_w}: c_1 \text{ and } \overline{x'_r} \cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) = \emptyset \text{ and } \overline{x'_w} \cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NW}) = \emptyset$, we get by the induction hypothesis that c_1 provides its guarantess.

From $c = c_1$; c_2 we get by the rules SQ1 and SQ2 and the fact that c_1 provides its guarantees that c provides its guarantees.

Case (IIF): In this case, we have $c = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_2 \ \mathbf{fi}$. From the rule IIF we get that $vars(e) = \overline{x}'_r$.

From $c = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_1'\ \mathbf{else}\ c_2'\ \mathbf{fi},\ vars(e) = \overline{x}_r',\ \mathrm{and}\ \overline{x}_r' \cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) = \emptyset,\ \mathrm{we}\ \mathrm{get}$ by the rules ift, and iff, that c does not read x holds for all $x \in mdst(\mathsf{G-NR})$ and c does not write x holds for all $x \in mdst(\mathsf{G-NW})$. Thus, c provides its guarantees.

Case (IWH): In this case, we have $c = \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{od} @ \overrightarrow{d}$. From the rule IWH, we get that $vars(e) = \overline{x}'_r$. From $c = \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{od} @ \overrightarrow{d}$, $vars(e) = \overline{x}'_r$, and $\overline{x}'_r \cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) = \emptyset$, we get by the rules AN2, WHT, AN1, and WHF, that c does not read x holds for all $x \in mdst(\mathsf{G-NR})$ and c does not write x holds for all $x \in mdst(\mathsf{G-NW})$. Thus, c provides its guarantees.

Case (IAN): In this case, we have $c = c_1@\overrightarrow{d}$ with $\overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d} \upharpoonright_A$. From the rule IAN, we get that $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c_{o,1}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1$ is derivable.

From $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c_{o,1}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1 \text{ and } \overline{x}'_r \cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) = \emptyset \text{ and } \overline{x}'_w \cap mdst(\mathsf{G-NW}) = \emptyset$, we get by the induction hypothesis that c_1 provides its guarantees.

From $c = c_1@\overrightarrow{a}$ we get by the rules AN1 and AN2 and the fact that c_1 provides its guarantees. that c provides its guarantees.

Next we show that a command that results from an execution step of a command obtained with our guarantee inference again can be obtained with our guarantee inference and if the mode state and variable sets in the inference fit to each other before the step, they also fit to each other after the step.

Lemma 4. If $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c_o\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c \text{ is derivable, } mdst(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}'_r = \emptyset \text{ and } mdst(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}'_w = \emptyset \text{ hold, } and \langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem \rangle \text{ is derivable, then either the following three conditions are satisfied:}$

- 1. $c' = \mathbf{stop} \ and$
- 2. $mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset$ and
- 3. $mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset$

or the following three conditions are satisfied:

- 1. $\overline{x}' \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_o\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'$ and
- 2. $mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}''_r = \emptyset$ and
- 3. $mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}''_w = \emptyset$.

Moreover, if $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c'', \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}$, then $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ c''_o \} \emptyset, \emptyset : c''$.

Proof. We prove this lemma by structural induction on $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c_o\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c$. We distinguish cases for the last rule used in the derivation of this judgment.

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Case (ISK): In this case, we have c = \mathbf{skip} @ \overrightarrow{d} with
         \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \overline{x}_w)]. \text{ From } c = \mathbf{skip}@\overrightarrow{a}
        \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acg}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acg}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \overline{x}_w)], \text{ we get by the rules}
        AN1, SK, and the definition of updMds that c' = \text{stop}, \alpha = \epsilon, mdst'(G-NR) =
        (mdst(G-NR)\cup \overline{x})\setminus \overline{x}_r, and mdst'(G-NW)=mdst(G-NW)\setminus \overline{x}_w. Hence, mdst'(G-NR)\cap
        \overline{x}_r = \emptyset and mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset.
        Since c' = \mathbf{stop} and \alpha = \epsilon we can conclude this case.
Case (IAS): In this case, we have c = x := e @ \overrightarrow{d} with
         \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NR}, vars(e) \cup \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \{x\}), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \overline{x}_w)].
        From c = x := e @ \overrightarrow{a} and
        \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, vars(e) \cup \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \{x\}), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \overline{x}_w)] \text{ we get}
        by the rules AN1, AS, and the definition of updMds that c' = stop, \alpha = \epsilon,
        mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) = (mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cup vars(e) \cup \overline{x}) \setminus \overline{x}_r, and mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) = (mdst(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cup vars(e) \cup \overline{x}) \setminus \overline{x}_r
        \{x\}) \setminus \overline{x}_w. Hence, mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset, and mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset.
        Since c' = \mathbf{stop} and \alpha = \epsilon we can conclude this case.
Case (ILO): In this case, we have c = \mathbf{lock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{d} with
         \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW}, \overline{x}_w)].
        From c = \mathbf{lock}(l)@\overrightarrow{d} and
        \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \overline{x}_w)], \text{ we get by the rules}
        AN1, LK, and the definition of updMds that c' = \text{stop}, \alpha = l, mdst'(G-NR) =
        (mdst(G-NR)\cup \overline{x})\setminus \overline{x}_r, and mdst'(G-NW)=mdst(G-NW)\setminus \overline{x}_w. Hence, mdst'(G-NR)\cap
        \overline{x}_r = \emptyset, and mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset.
        Since c' = \mathbf{stop} and \alpha = l we can conclude this case.
Case (IUL): In this case, we have c = \mathbf{unlock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{d} with
        \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \overline{x}_w)].
        From c = \mathbf{unlock}(l) @ \overrightarrow{d} and
        \overrightarrow{d} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \overline{x}_w)], \text{ we get by the rules}
        AN1, ULK, and the definition of updMds that c' = \text{stop}, \alpha = \neg l, mdst'(G-NR) =
        (mdst(G-NR)\cup \overline{x})\setminus \overline{x}_r, and mdst'(G-NW)=mdst(G-NW)\setminus \overline{x}_w. Hence, mdst'(G-NR)\cap
        \overline{x}_r = \emptyset, and mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset.
        Since c' = \mathbf{stop} and \alpha = \neg l we can conclude this case.
Case (ISP): In this case, we have c = \mathbf{spawn}(c_s) @ \overrightarrow{d} with
         \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acg}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acg}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \overline{x}_w)] \text{ and }
        \emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{c_{o,s}\}\emptyset, \emptyset : c_s.
        From c = \mathbf{spawn}(c_s) @ \overrightarrow{d} and
        \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\mathsf{-NW}, \overline{x}_w)], \text{ we get by the rules}
        AN1, SP, and the definition of updMds that c' = stop,
        \alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c_s, \emptyset, mdst_\perp \rangle}, \ mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) = (mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cup \overline{x}) \setminus \overline{x}_r, \ \text{and} \ mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) =
        mdst(G-NW) \setminus \overline{x}_w. Hence, mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset, and mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset.
        Since c' = \text{stop} and mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset and mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset and
        \emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{c_{o,s}\}\emptyset, \emptyset : c_s we can conclude this case.
Case (ISQ): In this case, we have c = c_1; c_2.
        From c=c_1;c_2 and \overline{x}\vdash\overline{x}'_r,\overline{x}'_w\{c_o\}\overline{x}_r,\overline{x}_w: c, we get by the rule ISQ that \overline{x}\vdash
        \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c_{o1}\}\overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w: c_1 and
        \overline{x}' \vdash \overline{x}_r'', \overline{x}_w'' \{c_{o2}\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_2.
        From c = c_1; c_2 we get that the last rule in the derivation of
        \langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle must be either SQ1 or SQ2. We dis-
        tinguish these two cases.
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c'_1; c_2 and \langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle and c'_1 \neq \mathbf{stop}.
                              From \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c_{o1}\}\overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w : c_1 and
                              \langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle and mdst(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r' = \emptyset and
                              mdst(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}'_w = \emptyset and c'_1 \neq \mathbf{stop}, we get by the induciton hypothesis that
                                  1. \overline{x}'' \vdash \overline{x}'''_r, \overline{x}''''_w \{c'_{o1}\} \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w : c'_1 \text{ and }
                                  2. mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r'' = \emptyset and
                                  3. mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w'' = \emptyset.
                              Moreover we get from the induction hypothesis, that if \alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c'', \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}, then
                              \emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ c_o^{\prime \prime} \} \emptyset, \emptyset : c^{\prime \prime}.
                              From c' = c'_1; c_2 and
                             \overline{x}'' \vdash \overline{x}_r''', \overline{x}_w'''\{c_{o1}\}\overline{x}_r', \overline{x}_w'' : c_1' \text{ and } \overline{x}' \vdash \overline{x}_r'', \overline{x}_w''\{c_{o2}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_2 \text{ we get by the rule ISQ that } \overline{x}'' \vdash \overline{x}_r'', \overline{x}_w'''\{c_o'\}\overline{x}_r'', \overline{x}_w'' : c'.
              Case (sq2): From the assumption of this case, we get by the rule sq2 that c' = c_2
                              and \langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle and c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}.
                              From \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c_{o1}\}\overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w : c_1 and
                               \langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle and mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}_r' = \emptyset and
                               mdst(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}'_w = \emptyset and c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}, we get by the induction hypothesis that
                                  1. mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}''_r = \emptyset and
                                  2. mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}''_w = \emptyset.
                              Moreover we get from the induction hypothesis, that if \alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c'', \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}, then
                              \emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{c_o''\}\emptyset, \emptyset : c''.
                              Since, \overline{x}' \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c_{o2}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_2 \text{ and } mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}''_r = \emptyset \text{ and } mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}''_r = \emptyset
                             \overline{x}_w^{\prime\prime} = \emptyset we can conclude this case.
Case (IIF): In this case, we have c = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_2 \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathrm{and} \ \overline{x} \cup vars(e) \vdash
              \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c_{o,1} \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1 \text{ and } \overline{x} \cup vars(e) \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c_{o,2} \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_2.
              From c = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_2 \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathbf{we} \ \mathbf{get} \ \mathbf{by} \ \mathbf{the} \ \mathbf{rules} \ \mathbf{ift} \ \mathbf{and} \ \mathbf{iff} \ \mathbf{that} \ c' = c_1 \ \mathbf{or}
              c'=c_2 and, furthermore, mdst'=mdst and \alpha=\epsilon or \alpha=\epsilon
              Since \overline{x} \cup vars(e) \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c_{o,1} \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1
              and \overline{x} \cup vars(e) \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c_{o,2} \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_2 \text{ and } mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset, \text{ and } mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset
               mdst'(G-NW) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset, we can conclude this case.
Case (IWH): In this case, we have c = while e do c_1 od  <math> d  and
               \overrightarrow{a} = [\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \overline{x} \cup vars(e)), \mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \emptyset), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NR}, \overline{x}_r), \mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G-NW}, \overline{x}_w)] \text{ and } \overline{x} \cup
               vars(e) \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c_{o,1} \} vars(e), \emptyset : c_1 \text{ and } \overline{x} \vdash vars(e), \emptyset \{ c_o \} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{while } e \mathbf{do } c_1 \mathbf{od} @ \overrightarrow{a}.
              From c = while e do c_1 od we get by the rules WHF, WHT, AN1 and AN2 that
              either c' = \mathbf{stop} and \alpha = \epsilon or c' = c_1; while e do c_1 od@\overrightarrow{d} and \alpha = \epsilon. We
              distinguish the two cases.
              Case (c' = \mathbf{stop}): From the assumption of this case we get by the rules WHF and
                              AN1 and the definition of updMds that
                              mdst'(G-NR) = (mdst(G-NR) \cup \overline{x} \cup vars(e)) \setminus \overline{x}_r \text{ and } mdst'(G-NW) = mdst(G-NW) \setminus \overline{x}_r \cup \overline{
                              \overline{x}_w. Hence, mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset and mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset.
                              Since c' = \text{stop} and mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset and mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset, we
                              can conclude this case.
              Case (c' = c_1; \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{od} @ \overrightarrow{a}): From the assumption of this case we get by
                              the rules WHT and AN2 that mdst' = mdst.
                              From \overline{x} \cup vars(e) \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c_{o,1} \} vars(e), \emptyset : c_1 \text{ and }
                              \overline{x} \vdash vars(e), \emptyset\{c_o\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{od} @ \overrightarrow{d} \ \text{we get by the rule ISQ that}
                              \overline{x} \cup vars(e) \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{c_o\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1;  while e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{od} @ \overrightarrow{d}.
                              Since mdst(G-NR) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset and mdst(G-NW) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset, we can conclude this case.
```

Case (SQ1): From the assumption of this case, we get by the rule SQ1 that c'=

Case (IAN): In this case, we have $c = c_1@\overrightarrow{a}$ and $\overrightarrow{a} = \overrightarrow{a}' \upharpoonright_A$ and $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c_{o,1}\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1.$ From $c = c_1 @ \overrightarrow{a}$ we get by the rule in the derivation of

 $\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle$ must be either AN1 or AN2. We distinguish these two cases.

Case (AN1): In this case, we get from the rule AN1 that

 $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle \mathbf{stop}, lkst', mdst'', mem' \rangle$ and $c' = \mathbf{stop}$ and mdst' = $updMds(mdst'', \overrightarrow{a}).$

From $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle \mathbf{stop}, lkst', mdst'', mem' \rangle$ and $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c_{o,1}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1 \text{ and } mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}'_r = \emptyset \text{ and } mdst(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}'_w = \emptyset$ \emptyset and c' = stop and $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c_{o,1}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1 \text{ we get by the induction}$ hypothesis that $mdst''(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset$ and $mdst''(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset$.

From $mdst' = updMds(mdst'', \overrightarrow{a})$ and $\overrightarrow{a} = \overrightarrow{a}' \upharpoonright_A$ we get by definition of updMds and \uparrow_A that mdst''(G-NR) = mdst'(G-NR) and mdst''(G-NW) = $mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW})$. Hence, due to $mdst''(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset$ and $mdst''(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset$ we have $mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset$ and $mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset$.

Moreover we get from the induction hypothesis, that if $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c'', \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}$, then $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ c_o'' \} \emptyset, \emptyset : c''.$

Since $c' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}_r = \emptyset$ and $mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}_w = \emptyset$ we can conclude this case.

Case (AN2): In this case, we get from the rule AN2 that

 $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle$ and $c_1' \neq \mathbf{stop}$ and $c' = c_1' @ \overrightarrow{a}$.

From $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle$ and

 $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c_{o,1}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1 \text{ and } mdst(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}'_r = \emptyset \text{ and } mdst(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}'_w = \emptyset$ \emptyset and $c' \neq \text{stop}$ and $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w\{c_{o,1}\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c_1 \text{ we get by the induction}$ hypothesis that $\overline{x}' \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } mdst'(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}''_r = \emptyset$ and $mdst'(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}_w'' = \emptyset.$

Moreover we get from the induction hypothesis, that if $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c'', \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}$, then $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{c_o''\}\emptyset, \emptyset : c''.$

From $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ we get that } \overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1}@\overrightarrow{d}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{d}' \upharpoonright_A \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} = \overrightarrow{x} \vdash_A \text{ and } \overrightarrow{d} =$ $c_1'@\overrightarrow{a}$.

Since $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}''_r, \overline{x}''_w \{c'_{o,1} @ \overrightarrow{a}'\} \overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'_1 @ \overrightarrow{a}' \text{ and } mdst'(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}''_r = \emptyset \text{ and }$ $mdst'(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}''_w = \emptyset$, we can conclude this case.

Lemma 5. Let $gcnf = \langle [(c_1, lkst_1, mdst_1), \dots, (c_n, lkst_n, mdst_n)], mem \rangle$ be a global configuration such that for all i we have either $c_i = \mathbf{stop}$ or the following three conditions are satisfied:

- 1. $\overline{x}_i \vdash \overline{x}'_{r,i}, \overline{x}'_{w,i} \{c_{o,i}\} \overline{x}_{r,i}, \overline{x}_{w,i} : c_i, \text{ and }$
- 2. $mdst_i(G-NR) \cap \overline{x}'_{r,i} = \emptyset$, and
- 3. $mdst_i(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}'_{w,i} = \emptyset$.

If $gcnf \Rightarrow \langle [(c'_1, lkst'_1, mdst'_1), \dots, (c'_m, lkst'_m, mdst'_m)], mem' \rangle$, then for all i we have either $c'_i = \mathbf{stop}$ or the following three conditions are satisfied:

- 1. $\overline{x}'_i \vdash \overline{x}'''_{r,i}, \overline{x}'''_{w,i} \{c'_{o,i}\} \overline{x}''_{r,i}, \overline{x}''_{w,i} : c'_i, and$
- 2. $mdst'_i(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}'''_{v,i} = \emptyset$, and 3. $mdst'_i(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}'''_{w,i} = \emptyset$.

Proof. From the definition of the global transition system we know that either m = n or m = n + 1 and there are j, j' with $j \le n$ and j' = n - j such that

```
\begin{array}{ll} - \ c_i' = c_i, \ lkst_i' = lkst_i, \ mdst_i' = mdst_i \ \text{for all} \ i < j, \ \text{and} \\ - \ c_{m-i}' = c_{n-i}, \ lkst_{m-i}' = lkst_{n-i}, \ mdst_{m-i}' = mdst_{n-i} \ \text{for all} \ i < j'. \end{array}
```

For these control configurations, we get that the conclusion of the lemma holds directly from the assumptions of the lemma.

From the definition of the global transition system we further get that

$$\langle c_j, lkst_j, mdst_j, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_{m-j'}, lkst'_{m-j'}, mdst'_{m-j'}, mem' \rangle.$$
 From $\overline{x}_j \vdash \overline{x}'_{r,j}, \overline{x}'_{w,j} \{c_{o,j}\} \overline{x}_{r,j}, \overline{x}_{w,j} : c_j \text{ and }$

 $\langle c_j, lkst_j, mdst_j, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_{m-j'}, lkst'_{m-j'}, mdst'_{m-j'}, mem' \rangle$ and $mdst_j(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}'_{r,j} = \emptyset$ and $mdst_j(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}'_{w,j} = \emptyset$ we get by Lemma 4 that either $c'_{m-j'} = \mathbf{stop}$ or the following three conditions hold:

```
1. \overline{x}_{m-j'} \vdash \overline{x}'_{r,m-j'}, \overline{x}'_{w,m-j'} \{c'_{o,m-j'}\} \overline{x}_{r,m-j'}, \overline{x}_{w,m-j'} : c'_{m-j'} \text{ and}
2. mdst_j(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}'_{r,j} = \emptyset and
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3. $mdst_j(G-NW) \cap \overline{x}'_{w,j} = \emptyset$.

It remains to show that c'_j and $mdst'_j$ satisfy the conditions from the lemma. If m=n, the cases for j and m-j' coincide. Hence assume m=n+1. Then we get from the definition of the global transition system that $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c_s, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}$ and $c'_j = c_s$ and $mdst_j = mdst_{\perp}$. In this case, we additionally get from Lemma 4 that $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{c'_{o,j}\}\emptyset, \emptyset : c'_j$. Since $mdst_{\perp}(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset$ and $mdst_{\perp}(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset$, we can conclude the proof.

The following is the proof sketch for Theorem 2.

Proof. Let $c, c' \in Com$ be arbitrary such that $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c' \} \emptyset, \emptyset : c$ is derivable.

We must proof that $\langle [c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}], mem \rangle$ ensures a locally sound use of modes for all $mem \in Mem$. According to the definition of "ensures a locally sound use of modes" this means we must show that (c'', lkst'', mdst'') provides its guarantees holds for all $(c'', lkst'', mdst'') \in CCnf$, \overrightarrow{ccnf} , \overrightarrow{ccnf} $\in CCnf^*$, and $mem'' \in Mem$ with $\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf} + + [(c'', lkst'', mdst'')] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}'$, $mem'' \rangle \in qReach(\langle [c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}], mem \rangle)$.

 $\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf} + + [(c'', lkst'', mdst'')] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}', \overrightarrow{mem''} \rangle \in gReach(\langle [c, \emptyset, mdst_{\bot}], mem \rangle).$ Let $(c'', lkst'', mdst'') \in CCnf$, $\overrightarrow{ccnf}, \overrightarrow{ccnf}' \in CCnf^*$, and $mem'' \in Mem$ be arbitrary such that

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\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf} + + [(c'', lkst'', mdst'')] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}', mem'' \rangle \in gReach(\langle [c, \emptyset, mdst], mem \rangle).
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From $\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf} + + [(c'', lkst'', mdst'')] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}', mem'' \rangle \in gReach(\langle [c, \emptyset, mdst], mem \rangle)$, we get by definition of global reachability that

 $\langle [c,\emptyset, mdst_{\perp}], mem \rangle \rightarrow * \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf} + + [(c'', lkst'', mdst'')] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf'}, mem'' \rangle$. Hence, we have either

Assume $\langle \overrightarrow{ccnf} + + [(c'', lkst'', mdst'')] + + \overrightarrow{ccnf}', mem'' \rangle = \langle [c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}], mem \rangle$. Hence c'' = c and $mdst'' = mdst_{\perp}$. From $\emptyset, \emptyset \{ \mathbf{skip}; c' \} \emptyset, \emptyset : c$ we get by the definition of the inference Figure 3 that $c = \mathbf{skip}@\overrightarrow{a}; c_B$ for some \overrightarrow{a} and c_B . Hence, we get from the rules sQ1, AN1, and sK, that c does not read or write any variable and, consequently, c'' also does not read or write any variable. Thus, $((c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}), mem)$ provides its guarantees.

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Now assume there is a k such that \langle [c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp}],mem\rangle \twoheadrightarrow_k \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}++[(c'',lkst'',mdst'')]++\overrightarrow{ccnf}',mem''\rangle. Since \emptyset \vdash \emptyset,\emptyset\{\mathbf{skip};c'\}\emptyset,\emptyset:
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c and $mdst_{\perp}(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset$ and $mdst_{\perp}(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \emptyset = \emptyset$ and the fact that Lemma 5 re-establishes its prerequisits for the resulting configuation after a global transition, we can apply Lemma 5 k times inductively to obtain that $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c'''\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c''$ and $mdst''(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}'_r = \emptyset \text{ and } mdst''(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}'_w = \emptyset.$

From $\overline{x} \vdash \overline{x}'_r, \overline{x}'_w \{c'''\}\overline{x}_r, \overline{x}_w : c'' \text{ and } mdst''(\mathsf{G-NR}) \cap \overline{x}'_r = \emptyset \text{ and } mdst''(\mathsf{G-NW}) \cap \overline{x}'_w = \emptyset \text{ we get by Lemma 3 that } ((c'', lkst'', mdst''), mem'') \text{ provides its guarantees.} \square$

9.3 Soundness of the Security Type System

In this subsection, we introduce a bisimulation-based security property and prove the soundness of our security type system with respect to this bisimulation-based security property. The following table lists the dependencies between lemmas and theorems in this subsection.

Lemma/Theorem	Depends on lemmas/theorems
Lemma 6	none
Lemma 7	none
Lemma 8	Lemma 7
Lemma 9	none
Lemma 10	Lemma 6, Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Lemma 9
Lemma 11	Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Lemma 10
Lemma 12	none
Lemma 13	Lemma 11, Lemma 12
Lemma 14	Lemma 6
Theorem 5	Lemma 13, Lemma 14

We first introduce a type system that has subtyping for partial level assignments integrated and has a typing rule for stop. We show that this type system is sound and in a second step that a program that can be typed with the type system form the body of the article can be typed with this type system.

Now we show that whenever a command that is accepted by our type system is also accepted by our type system after lowering some security levels in the initial partial type environment and raising some security levels in the resulting partial type environment.

Lemma 6. If $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c\}\Lambda'_1: c_s$ is derivable, then $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ is derivable for all Λ_2 and Λ'_2 with $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$.

Proof. We proof this lemma by induction on $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c\}\Lambda'_1:c_s$. We distinguish the cases for the last rule used in the derivation of this judgment.

Case (TSK2): We get by the rule TSK2 that $c = \mathbf{skip}$ and $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. Let Λ_2 and Λ_2' be arbitrary with $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$.

From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$, $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$, and $\Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$, we get that $\Lambda'_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$

Hence, we get from the rule TSK2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ is derivable.

Case (TAL2): We get by the rule TAL2 that c = x := e and $c_s = x := e$ and $\vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e : low$ and $lev(x) = \mathbf{low}$ and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. Let Λ_2 and Λ'_2 be arbitrary with $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 \text{ and } \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'.$

From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e : \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e : \mathbf{low}$. From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$, $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$, and $\Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$, we get that $\Lambda'_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$.

Hence, we get from the rule TAL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda_2': c_s$ is derivable.

Fig. 5. Security type system for proofs

Case (TAH2): We get by the rule TAH2 that c = x := e and $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$ and $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$ and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$. Let Λ_2 and Λ_2' be arbitrary with $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$.

From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$, $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$, and $\Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$, we get that $\Lambda_2' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$.

Hence, we get from the rule TAH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ is derivable.

Case (TFL2): We get by the rule TFL2 that c = x := e and $c_s = x := e$ and $\Vdash_{lev, \Lambda_1} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$. Let Λ_2 and Λ_2' be arbitrary with $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$.

From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e : \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e : \mathbf{low}$.

From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ we get that $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]$. From $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]$, $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$, and $\Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. Hence, we get from the rule TFL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ is derivable.

Case (TFH2): We get by the rule TFH2 that c = x := e and $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$ and $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. Let Λ_2 and Λ'_2 be arbitrary with $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ we get that $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}]$. From $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}]$, $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$, we get that $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. Hence, we get from the rule TFH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ is derivable.

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Let \Lambda_2 and \Lambda'_2 be arbitrary with \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2.
       From \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1, \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1, and \Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2, we get that \Lambda'_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2
       Hence, we get from the rule TLO2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2:c_s is derivable.
Case (TUL2): We get by the rule TUL2 that c = \mathbf{unlock}(l) and c_s = \mathbf{unlock}(l) and
       \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'. Let \Lambda_2 and \Lambda_2' be arbitrary with \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'.
       From \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1, \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1', and \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2', we get that \Lambda_2' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'
       Hence, we get from the rule TUL2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s is derivable.
Case (TSP2): We get by the rule TSP2 that c = \mathbf{spawn}(c_1) and c_s = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{s1}) and
       \Vdash_{lev} c_1 : c_{s1} \text{ and } \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'. Let \Lambda_2 and \Lambda_2' be arbitrary with \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'.
       From \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1, \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1', and \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2', we get that \Lambda_2' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'
       Hence, we get from the rule TSP2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda_2': c_s is derivable.
Case (TIH2): We get by the rule TIH2 that c = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_2 \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathrm{and} \ c_s = \mathbf{skip}; c_{s1}
       and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_{s_1} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_2\}\Lambda'_1: c_{s_2} and c_{s_1}=c_{s_2}. Let \Lambda_2 and \Lambda'_2 be
       arbitrary with \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2.
       From \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda_1': c_{s_1} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_2\}\Lambda_1': c_{s_2} we get by the induction hypoth-
       esis that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_1\}\Lambda'_2 : c_{s_1} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_{s_2}.
       Hence, we get from the rule TIH2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s is derivable.
Case (TIL2): We get by the rule TIL2 that c = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_2 \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathrm{and} \ c_s =
       if e then c_{s1} else c_{s2} fi and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_{s1} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2} and
       \Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e: \mathbf{low}. Let \Lambda_2 and \Lambda_2' be arbitrary with \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'.
       From \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1:c_{s_1} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2:c_{s_2} we get by the induction hypoth-
       esis that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_1\}\Lambda'_2 : c_{s_1} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_{s_2}.
       From \Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e : \mathbf{low} and \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 we get that \Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e : \mathbf{low}
       Hence, we get from the rule TIL2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s is derivable.
Case (TWL2): We get by the rule TWL2 that c = while e do c_1 od and c_s = 
       while e do c_{s1} od and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_1\}\Lambda_1'': c_{s1} and \Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1''} e: low and \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''
       and \Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'. Let \Lambda_2 and \Lambda_2' be arbitrary with \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'.
       From \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'' and \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 we get that \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''.
       From \Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1' and \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2' we get that \Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'.
       Hence, we get from the rule TWL2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s is derivable.
Case (TSQ2): We get by the rule TSQ2 that c = c_1; c_2 and c_s = c_{s1}; c_{s2} and \Vdash_{lev}
        \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda_1'':c_{s_1} and \Vdash_{lev}\Lambda_1''\{c_2\}\Lambda_1':c_{s_2}. Let \Lambda_2 and \Lambda_2' be arbitrary with \Lambda_2\sqsubseteq\Lambda_1
       and \Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2.
       From \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda_1'': c_{s_1} we get by the induction hypothesis that
       \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_1\}\Lambda_1'': c_{s_1}. From \Lambda_1' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2' and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_2\}\Lambda_1': c_{s_2}, we get by the
       induction hypothesis that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_2\}\Lambda_2': c_{s2}.
       Hence, we get from the rule TSQ2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda_2': c_s is derivable.
Case (TAN2): We get by the rule TAN2 that c = c_1@\overrightarrow{d} and c_s = c_{s1}@\overrightarrow{d} | A-NR,A-NW and
       \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda_1'': c_{s_1} \text{ and } \Lambda_1' = \Lambda_1'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d} \text{ and } \forall x.\Lambda_{1 lev}'(x) \sqsubseteq \Lambda_{1 lev}'(x). \text{ Let } \Lambda_2 \text{ and } \Lambda_1'' = \Lambda_1'' \oplus_{lev} (x) = \Lambda_1'' \oplus_{lev} (x)
        \Lambda'_2 be arbitrary with \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2.
       From c = c_1 @ \overrightarrow{a} we get that that last rule in any derivation of \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c\}\Lambda'_2: c_s
       must be TAN2. We now must show that there is \Lambda_2'' such that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c_1\} \Lambda_2'' : c_{s_1},
       \varLambda_2' = \varLambda_2'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d} \text{ and } \forall x. \varLambda_{2 \, lev}' \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \varLambda_{2 \, lev}' \langle x \rangle.
       From \Lambda'_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2 and \forall x. \Lambda''_{1 lev} \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_{1 lev} \langle x \rangle we get that \forall x. \Lambda''_{1 lev} \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_{2 lev} \langle x \rangle.
       From \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1 and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda_1'': c_{s_1} we get by the induction hypothesis that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2
       \Lambda_2\{c_1\}\Lambda_2'': c_{s1} is derivable for all \Lambda_2'' with \Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''. Since, \forall x.\Lambda_{1 \, lev}'(x) \sqsubseteq \Lambda_{2 \, lev}'(x) holds, this judgment is also derivable for \Lambda_2'' with \Lambda_2'(x) = \Lambda_{2 \, lev}'(x) for all x \in
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 $pre(\Lambda'_2)$ and $\Lambda''_1(x) = \Lambda''_2(x)$ for all $x \in pre(\Lambda''_2) \setminus pre(\Lambda'_2)$. From $\Lambda'_2(x) = \Lambda''_{2 lev}(x)$

Case (TLO2): We get by the rule TLO2 that $c = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $c_s = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$.

for all $x \in pre(\Lambda'_2)$, $pre(\Lambda''_1) = pre(\Lambda''_2)$, $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$, and $\Lambda'_1 = \Lambda''_1 \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}$, we get that $\Lambda'_2 = \Lambda''_2 \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}$.

From $\Lambda_2'(x) = \Lambda_{2 lev}'(x)$ for all $x \in pre(\Lambda_2')$ and $\Lambda_1''(x) = \Lambda_2''(x)$ for all $x \in pre(\Lambda_2'') \setminus pre(\Lambda_2')$ and $\forall x. \Lambda_{1 lev}'(x) \sqsubseteq \Lambda_{2 lev}'(x)$ we get that $\forall x. \Lambda_{2 lev}''(x) \sqsubseteq \Lambda_{2 lev}'(x)$. Hence, we get from the rule TAN2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c\} \Lambda_2' : c_s$ is derivable.

We now define, when a partial type environment is compatible with a domain assignment and a mode state as follows.

Definition 6. A partial type environment $\Lambda: Var \rightarrow Lev$, a mode state $mdst \in MdSt$, and a domain assignment lev are compatible, if and only if

$$pre(\Lambda) = \left\{ x \in Var \middle| \begin{array}{l} (lev(x) = \mathbf{low} \land x \in mdst(\mathsf{A-NR})) \\ \lor (lev(x) = \mathbf{high} \land x \in mdst(\mathsf{A-NW})) \end{array} \right\}$$

We denote the set of mode states that is compatible with lev and Λ by comp(lev, Λ).

Intuitively, a partial type environment is compatible with a domain assignment and a mode state, if it only tracks flow-sensitive levels for **low** variables for which a no-read assumption is made, and for **high** variables for which a no-write assumption is made.

We further define a notion of memory equivalence that relates exactly those memorys that refer to equal values for all variables that currently have the security level **low** as follows.

Definition 7. Two memories mem, mem' \in Mem are low-equal wrt. a partial type environment Λ and a domain assignment lev (denoted by: mem $=_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda}$ mem'), if and only if the following condition holds:

$$-\Lambda_{lev}\langle x\rangle = \mathbf{low} \implies mem(x) = mem'(x) \text{ for all } x \in Var.$$

We now show that whenever the **low** slice of a command is a **skip**, then the memories before and after the execution step of the command are **low**-equal with respect to the partial type environment after the step and the domain assignment, and the command terminates in one step.

Lemma 7. If $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda'$: skip is derivable, then

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle \mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst, mem' \rangle$$

is derivable with mem $=_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda'}$ mem' and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ holds.

Proof. The last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda'$: **skip** must be either TSK2, TAH2, or TFH2

We distinguish these three cases.

Case (TSK2): We get by the rule TSK2 that $c = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ holds. From $c = \mathbf{skip}$ we get by the rule SK that

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle \mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst, mem' \rangle$$

is derivable with mem' = mem.

From mem' = mem we get that $mem = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem'$.

Case (TAH2): We get by the rule TAH2 that c = x := e and $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$ and lev(x) =high and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ holds.

From c = x := e we get by the rule SK that

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle \mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst, mem' \rangle$$

is derivable with $mem' = mem[x \mapsto v]$ for some $v \in Val$.

From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$ we get that $x \notin pre(\Lambda')$.

From $x \notin pre(\Lambda')$ and $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$ we get $mem = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem[x \mapsto v]$. Hence, $mem = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem'$.

Case (TFH2): We get by the rule TFH2 that c = x := e and $x \in pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ holds.

From c = x := e we get by the rule SK that

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle \mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst, mem' \rangle$$

is derivable with $mem' = mem[x \mapsto v]$ for some $v \in Val$.

From $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $Lev = \{\mathbf{low}, \mathbf{high}\}$ and $\mathbf{low} \sqsubseteq \mathbf{high}$ and $\mathbf{high} \sqsubseteq \mathbf{high}$ we get that $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$.

From $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $Lev = \{\mathbf{low}, \mathbf{high}\}$ and $\mathbf{high} \not\sqsubseteq \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Lambda'(x) = \mathbf{high}$. From $\Lambda'(x) = \mathbf{high}$ we get that $mem = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem[x \mapsto v]$. Hence, $mem = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem'$.

We now show that, whenever two commands have the same **low**-slice, and partial type environments in the beginning with identical pre-images, then the resulting partial type environments have the same pre-image.

Lemma 8. If $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$, $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1 : c_s$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_s$, then $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Proof. We proof this lemma by structural induction on the judgment $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_s$. We make a case distinction on the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda_2: c_s$.

Case (TSK2): We get by the rule TSK2 that $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$.

From $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_s$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TAL2): We get by the rule TAL2 that $c_s = x := e$ and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and lev(x) = low and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$

From $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ we get that $x \notin pre(\Lambda_2)$. From $c_s = x := e$ and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_2)$ and lev(x) = low we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_s$ must be TAL2. From this rule we get $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$.

From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$. From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

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Case (TFL2): We get by the rule TFL2 that c_s = x := e and x \in pre(\Lambda_1) and \Lambda_1[x \mapsto low] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1.
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From $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ we get that $x \in pre(\Lambda_2)$. From $c_s = x := e$ and $x \in pre(\Lambda_2)$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_s$ must be TFL2. From this rule we get $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$.

From $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TAH2): We get by the rule TSK2 that $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$.

From $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1 : c_s$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_s$ we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TFH2): We get by the rule TSK2 that $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$.

From $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_s$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TLO2): We get by the rule TLO2 that $c_s = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$

From $c_s = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_s$ must be TLO2. From this rule we get $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$.

From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$. From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TUL2): We get by the rule TLO2 that $c_s = \mathbf{unlock}(l)$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$

From $c_s = \mathbf{unlock}(l)$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2$: c_s must be TUL2. From this rule we get $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$.

From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$. From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TSP2): We get by the rule TSP2 that $c_s = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{sA})$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$

From $c_s = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{sA})$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2$: c_s must be TSP2. From this rule we get $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$.

From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$. From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TSQ2): We get by the rule TSQ2 that $c_1 = c_A$; c_B and $c_s = c_{sA}$; c_{sB} and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1 \{c_A\} \Lambda_1'' : c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1'' \{c_B\} \Lambda_1' : c_{sB}$.

From $c_s = c_{sA}$; c_{sB} we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda_2': c_s$ must be either TSQ2 or TIH2. We distinguish these two cases.

Case (TSQ2): In this case, we get from the rule TSQ2 that $c_2 = c_C$; c_D and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c_C\} \Lambda_2'' : c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2'' \{c_D\} \Lambda_2' : c_{sB}$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $pre(\Lambda_1'') = pre(\Lambda_2'')$. From $pre(\Lambda_1'') = pre(\Lambda_2'')$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_B\}\Lambda_1': c_{sB}$ and and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2''\{c_D\}\Lambda_2': c_{sB}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $pre(\Lambda_1') = pre(\Lambda_2')$.

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Case (TIH2): In this case, we get from the rule TIH2 that c_2 = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_C\ \mathbf{else}\ c_D\ \mathbf{fi} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2': c_{sB} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_D\}\Lambda_2': c_{sB} and c_{sA} = \mathbf{skip}.
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From $c_{sA} = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA}$ we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_1'')$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_1'')$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_B\}\Lambda_1': c_{sB}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2': c_{sB}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $pre(\Lambda_1') = pre(\Lambda_2')$.

Case (TIL2): We get by the rule TIL2 that $c_1 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_A \ \mathbf{else} \ c_B \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathbf{and} \ c_s = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_{sA} \ \mathbf{else} \ c_{sB} \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathbf{and} \ \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1 \{c_A\} \Lambda'_1 : c_{sA}.$

From $c_s = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_{sA}\ \mathbf{else}\ c_{sB}\ \mathbf{fi}$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda_2': c_s$ must be TIL2. From this rule we get that $c_2 = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_C\ \mathbf{else}\ c_D\ \mathbf{fi}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2': c_{sA}$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda'_1 : c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda'_2 : c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TIH2): We get by the rule TIH2 that $c_1 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_A \ \mathbf{else} \ c_B \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathrm{and} \ c_s = \mathbf{skip}; c_{sA} \ \mathrm{and} \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1': c_{sA}.$

From $c_s = \mathbf{skip}$; c_{sA} we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ must be either TiH2 or TSQ2. We distinguish these two cases.

Case (TiH2): In this case, we get by the rule TiH2 that $c_2 = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_C\ \mathbf{else}\ c_D\ \mathbf{fi}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2': c_{sA}$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda'_1 : c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda'_2 : c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TSQ2): In this case, we get by the rule TSQ2 that $c_2 = c_C$; c_D and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c_C\} \Lambda_2'' : \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2'' \{c_D\} \Lambda_2' : c_{sA}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2''$: **skip** we get that $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$. From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda_2'')$. From $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda_2'')$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2''\{c_D\}\Lambda_2': c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $pre(\Lambda_1') = pre(\Lambda_2')$.

Case (TWL2): We get by the rule TWL2 that $c_s = \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_{sA} \ \mathbf{od} \ \mathrm{and} \ \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''$ and $\Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''$ and $\Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_1')$.

From $c_s =$ while e do c_{sA} od we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda_2': c_s$ must be TWL2. From this rule we get $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$ and $\Lambda_2'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$. From $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$ and $\Lambda_2'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda_2')$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda'_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$ we get that $pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2)$.

Case (TAN2): We get by the rule TAN2 that $c_1 = c_A @ \overrightarrow{d}_A$ and $c_s = c_{sA} @ \overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1 \{c_A\} \Lambda_1'' : c_{sA}$ and $\Lambda_1' = \Lambda_1'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_A$.

From $c_s = c_{sA} @ \overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW}$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_s$ must be TAN2. From this rule we get that $c_2 = c_B @ \overrightarrow{d}_B$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_B\}\Lambda''_2: c_{sA}$ and $\Lambda'_2 = \Lambda''_2 \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_B$ and $\overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW} = \overrightarrow{d}_B \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW}$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_B\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $pre(\Lambda_1'') = pre(\Lambda_2'')$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1'') = pre(\Lambda_2'')$ and $\overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW} = \overrightarrow{d}_B \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW}$ and $\Lambda_1' = \Lambda_1'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_A$ and $\Lambda_2' = \Lambda_2'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_B$ we get by the definition of \bigoplus_{lev} that $pre(\Lambda_1') = pre(\Lambda_2')$.

We define the least upper bound of two partial type environments by a point-wise least upper bound of all variables in the pre-image of the partial type environments.

Definition 8. The least upper bound Λ of two partial type environments Λ' and Λ'' with $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda'')$ (denoted by: $\Lambda = \Lambda' \sqcup \Lambda''$) is defined by $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda')$ and $\Lambda(x) = \Lambda'(x) \sqcup \Lambda''(x)$ for all $x \in pre(\Lambda)$.

We show that whenever a command has **skip** as **low**-slice and is accepted by our type system for an initial and final partial type environment, then it is also accepted by our type system when using the least upper bound of the initial and final partial type environments with an arbitrary partial type environment.

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Lemma 9. If \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c\}\Lambda'_1 : \mathbf{skip} \ and \ pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2), then \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : \mathbf{skip}.
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Proof. The last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c\}\Lambda'_1$: **skip** must be either TSK2, TAH2, or TFH2.

We distinguish these three cases.

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Case (TSK2): We get by the rule TSK2 that c = \mathbf{skip} and \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1 holds.
From \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1 we get that (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2).
From (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) we get by the rule TSK2 that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c\} (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2):
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Case (TAH2): We get by the rule TAH2 that c = x := e and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and lev(x) =high and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ holds.

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From \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1' we get that (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2).
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From $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ we get that $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$.

From $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ and $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$ and $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ we get by the rule TAH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_s$.

Case (TFH2): We get by the rule TFH2 that c = x := e and $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ holds.

From $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $Lev = \{\mathbf{low}, \mathbf{high}\}$ and $\mathbf{high} \not\sqsubseteq \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Lambda_1'(x) = \mathbf{high}$. From $\Lambda_1'(x) = \mathbf{high}$ we get that $(\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2)(x) = \mathbf{high}$. From $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $Lev = \{\mathbf{low}, \mathbf{high}\}$ and $\mathbf{low} \sqsubseteq \mathbf{high}$ and $\mathbf{high} \sqsubseteq \mathbf{high}$ we get that $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2)$. From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ and $(\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2)(x) = \mathbf{high}$ and $\mathbf{high} \sqsubseteq \mathbf{high}$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2)$.

From $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ we get that $x \in pre(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$.

From $x \in pre(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ and $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ we get by the rule TFH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_s$.

Now we show that whenever two commands with identical **low**-slices are accepted by our type system for some, possibly different initial and final partial type environments, then the first command is also accepted by our type system when using the least upper bounds of the respective partial type environments as initial and final partial type environments. Note that the conclusion the lemma establishes also holds for the second command, because all premises are symmetric and, hence, one could simply switch the two typing judgments.

Lemma 10. If $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1 : c_{s1} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2 : c_{s2} \text{ and } c_{s1} = c_{s2} \text{ and } pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2) \text{ and } pre(\Lambda'_1) = pre(\Lambda'_2), \text{ then } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{s1}.$

Proof. We prove this lemma by structural induction on $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_{s_1}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s_2}$. To this end, we distinguish cases based on the last rule applied in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_{s_1}$.

Case (TSK2): We get by the rule TSK2 that $c_1 = c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$ we get $c_{s2} = \mathbf{skip}$. From $c_{s2} = \mathbf{skip}$ we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$. From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2)$ we get by the rule TSK2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2)$: Case (TAH2): We get by the rule TAH2 that $c_1 = x := e$ and $c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$ and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$ we get $c_{s2} = \mathbf{skip}$. From $c_{s2} = \mathbf{skip}$ we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$. From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2)$ and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$ we get by the rule TAH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{s1}$. Case (TFH2): We get by the rule TFH2 that $c_1 = x := e$ and $c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$ and $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. From $c_{s1}=c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1}=\mathbf{skip}$ we get $c_{s2}=\mathbf{skip}$. From $c_{s2}=\mathbf{skip}$ we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$. From $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ we get $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2)$. From $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}]$ $\mathbf{high} = (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2').$ From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ we get that $x \in pre((\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2))$. From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$ and $x \in pre((\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2))$ we get by the rule TFH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2): c_{s1}$. Case (TAL2): We get by the rule TAL2 that $c_1 = x := e$ and $c_{s1} = x := e$ and $\vdash_{lev,A_1} e$: low and $x \notin pre(\Lambda_1)$ and lev(x) = low and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1} = x := e$ we get $c_{s2} = x := e$. From $c_{s2} = x := e$ and $x \notin$ $pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} A_2\{c_2\}A_2': c_{s2}$ must be TAL2. From this rule we get that $c_2 = x := e$ and $c_{s2} = x := e$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e : low$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$. From $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e : \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e : \mathbf{low}$. From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$ and $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $x \notin pre((\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2))$ and lev(x) = low we get by the rule TAL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{s1}$. Case (TFL2): We get by the rule TFL2 that $c_1 = x := e$ and $c_{s1} = x := e$ and $\vdash_{lev,A_1} e$: **low** and $x \in pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1$. From $c_{s1}=c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1}=x:=e$ we get $c_{s2}=x:=e$. From $c_{s2}=x:=e$ and $x\in$ $pre(\Lambda_1)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2}$ must be TFL2. From this rule we get that $c_2=x:=e$ and $c_{s2} = x := e$ and $\Vdash_{lev, \Lambda_2} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. From $\Lambda_1[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq$ From $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e : \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e : \mathbf{low}$. From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $x \in pre((\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2))$ we get by the rule TFL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{s1}$. Case (TLO2): We get by the rule TLO2 that $c_1 = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $c_{s1} = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$. From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1} = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ we get $c_{s2} = \mathbf{lock}(l)$. From $c_{s2} = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2}$ must be TLO2. From this rule we get $c_2 = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$.

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From (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) we get by the rule TLO2 that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2)
       \Lambda'_2): c_{s1}.
Case (TUL2): We get by the rule TUL2 that c_1 = \mathbf{unlock}(l) and c_{s1} = \mathbf{unlock}(l) and
       \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'.
       From c_{s1} = c_{s2} and c_{s1} = \mathbf{unlock}(l) we get c_{s2} = \mathbf{unlock}(l). From c_{s2} = \mathbf{unlock}(l)
       unlock(l) we get that the last rule in the derivation of \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s_2} must
       be TUL2. From this rule we get c_2 = \mathbf{unlock}(l) and \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_2.
       From \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1' and \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2' we get that (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2').
       From (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) we get by the rule TUL2 that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2):
Case (TSP2): We get by the rule TSP2 that c_1 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_A) and c_{s1} = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{sA})
       and \Vdash_{lev} c_A : c_{sA} and \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_1.
       From c_{s1} = c_{s2} and c_{s1} = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{sA}) we get c_{s2} = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{sA}). From c_{s2} =
       spawn(c_{sA}) we get that the last rule in the derivation of \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2} must
       be TSP2. From this rule we get c_2 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_B) and \Vdash_{lev} c_B : c_{sA} and \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'.
       From \Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1' and \Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2' we get that (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2').
       From (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) and \Vdash_{lev} c_A : c_{sA} we get by the rule TSP2 that
       \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2'): c_{s1}.
Case (TSQ2): We get by the rule TSQ2 that c_1 = c_A; c_B and c_{s1} = c_{sA}; c_{sB} and \Vdash_{lev}
       \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_B\}\Lambda_1': c_{sB}.
       From c_{s2}=c_{s1} and c_{s1}=c_{sA}; c_{sB} we get that c_{s2}=c_{sA}; c_{sB}. From c_{s2}=c_{sA}; c_{sB}
       we get that there are only two rules that can be applied last in the derivation of
       \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2}, namely TSQ2 and TIH2. We make a case distinction based on
       these two possibilities.
       Case (TSQ2): In this case, we get by the rule TSQ2 that c_2 = c_C; c_D and \Vdash_{lev}
               \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2''\{c_D\}\Lambda_2': c_{sB}.
              From \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_B\}\Lambda_1': c_{sB} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}
              and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2''\{c_D\}\Lambda_2': c_{sB} we get by the induction hypothesis that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup
               (\Lambda_2)\{c_A\}(\Lambda_1''\sqcup\Lambda_2''):c_{sA} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1''\sqcup\Lambda_2'')\{c_B\}(\Lambda_1'\sqcup\Lambda_2'):c_{sB}.
               From \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_A\}(\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'') : c_{sA} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'')\{c_B\}(\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sB}
              we get by the rule TSQ2 that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{s1}.
       Case (TIH2): In this case, we get by the rule TIH2 that c_2 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_C \ \mathbf{else} \ c_D \ \mathbf{fi}
              and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sB} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_D\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sB} and c_{sA} = \mathbf{skip}.
              From \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_B\}\Lambda_1': c_{sB} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2': c_{sB} we get by the induction
              hypothesis that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda''_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_B\} (\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{sB}.
              From c_{sA} = \mathbf{skip} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA} we get by Lemma 9 that \Vdash_{lev}
               (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_A\}(\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{sA}.
              From \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_A\} (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{sA} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_B\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sB}
               we get by the rule TSQ2 that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{s1}.
Case (TIL2): We get by the rule TIL2 that c_1 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_A \ \mathbf{else} \ c_B \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathrm{and} \ c_{s1} =
       if e then c_{sA} else c_{sB} fi and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sA} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_B\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sB} and
       \Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e: \mathbf{low}.
       From c_{s1} = c_{s2} and c_{s1} = if \ e \ then \ c_{sA} \ else \ c_{sB} \ fi \ we get \ c_{s2} = if \ e \ then \ c_{sA} \ else \ c_{sB} \ fi.
       From c_{s2} = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_{sA} \ \mathbf{else} \ c_{sB} \ \mathbf{fi} we get that the last rule in the derivation of
       \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2} must be TIL2. From this rule we get c_2 = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_C\ \mathbf{else}\ c_D\ \mathbf{fi}
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and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_D\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sB}$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e: \mathbf{low}$. From $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e: \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e: \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e: \mathbf{low}$.

 Λ_2 $\{c_A\}$ $\{\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2\}$: c_{sA} and $\Vdash_{lev} \{\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2\}$ $\{c_B\}$ $\{\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2\}$: c_{sB} .

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_B\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sB}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_D\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sB}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup I_{lev})$

From $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1\sqcup\Lambda_2)} e: \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1\sqcup\Lambda_2)\{c_A\}(\Lambda'_1\sqcup\Lambda'_2): c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1\sqcup\Lambda_2)\{c_B\}(\Lambda'_1\sqcup\Lambda'_2): c_{sB}$ we get by the rule TIL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1\sqcup\Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda'_1\sqcup\Lambda'_2): c_{s1}$.

Case (TIH2): We get by the rule TIL2 that $c_1 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_A \ \mathbf{else} \ c_B \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathbf{and} \ c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}; c_{sA} \ \mathbf{and} \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda'_1 : c_{sA} \ \mathbf{and} \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_B\}\Lambda'_1 : c_{sA}.$

From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$; c_{sA} we get that $c_{s2} = \mathbf{skip}$; c_{sA} . From $c_{s2} = \mathbf{skip}$; c_{sA} we get that there are only two rules that can be applied last in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2}$, namely TSQ2 and TIH2. We make a case distinction based on these two possibilities.

Case (TIH2): In this case, we get by the rule TIH2 that $c_2 = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_C\ \mathbf{else}\ c_D\ \mathbf{fi}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda_2': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_D\}\Lambda_2': c_{sA}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_B\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_C\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_D\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_A\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2): c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_B\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2): c_{sA}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_A\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_B\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sA}$ we get by the rule TiH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{s1}$.

Case (TSQ2): In this case, we get by the rule TSQ2 that $c_2 = c_C$; c_D and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c_C\} \Lambda_2'' : \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2'' \{c_D\} \Lambda_2' : c_{sA}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_B\}\Lambda'_1: c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''_2\{c_D\}\Lambda'_2: c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda''_2)\{c_A\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2): c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda''_2)\{c_B\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2): c_{sA}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c_C\} \Lambda_2''$: **skip** we get by Lemma 7 that $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$. From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2'')$. From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2'')$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2'') \{c_A\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2'') \{c_B\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sA}$ we get by Lemma 6 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_A\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_B\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{sA}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_A\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{sA} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_B\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{sA}$ we get by the rule TiH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_1\}(\Lambda'_1 \sqcup \Lambda'_2) : c_{s1}$.

Case (TWL2): We get by the rule TWL2 that $c_1 =$ while e do c_A od and $c_{s1} =$ while e do c_{sA} od and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''$ and $\Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1' = \Lambda_1''$ and $\Pi_{lev,\Lambda_1''} = 0$: low and $\Pi_{lev,\Lambda_1''} = 0$: low and $\Pi_{lev,\Lambda_1''} = 0$.

From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1} =$ while e do c_{sA} od we get that $c_{s2} =$ while e do c_{sA} od. From $c_{s2} =$ while e do c_{sA} od we get that the last rule in the derivation of \Vdash_{lev} $\Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda_2': c_{s2}$ must be TWL2. From this rule we get that $c_2 =$ while e do c_B od and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$ and $\Lambda_2'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2''} e: low$ and $\Vdash_{lev}\Lambda_2'''\{c_B\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1''} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2''} e : \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1''\sqcup\Lambda_2'')} e : \mathbf{low}$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1''\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2''\{c_B\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'')\{c_A\}(\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2''): c_{sA}$.

From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1''$ and $\Lambda_1'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2''$ and $\Lambda_2'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'')$ and $(\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'') \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$.

From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'')$ and $(\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'') \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'') \{c_A\} (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'') : c_{sA}$ we get by the rule TWL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{s1}$.

Case (TAN2): We get by the rule TAN2 that $c_1 = c_A @ \overrightarrow{d}_A$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1 \{c_A\} \Lambda_1'' : c_{sA}$ and $c_{s1} = c_{sA} @ \overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$ and $\Lambda_1' = \Lambda_1'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_A$ and $\forall x. \Lambda_{1lev}' \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1'_{lev} \langle x \rangle$. From $c_{s2} = c_{s1}$ and $c_{s1} = c_{sA} @ \overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$ we get that $c_{s2} = c_{sA} @ \overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$. From $c_{s2} = c_{sA} @ \overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c_2\} \Lambda_2' : c_{s2}$ must be TAN2. From this rule we get that $c_2 = c_B @ \overrightarrow{d}_B$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2 \{c_B\} \Lambda_2'' : c_{sA}$ and $\overrightarrow{d}_B \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} = \overrightarrow{d}_A \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$ and $\Lambda_2' = \Lambda_2'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_B$ and $\forall x. \Lambda_{2lev}' \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda_{2lev}' \langle x \rangle$.

From $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_B\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}$ we get by Lemma 8 $pre(\Lambda_1'') = pre(\Lambda_2'')$. Hence, from $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_A\}\Lambda_1'': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_B\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_B\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}\}\Lambda_2'': c_{sA}$

 $A_2\{c_B\}A_2'': c_{sA}$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev} (A_1 \sqcup A_2)\{c_A\}(A_1'' \sqcup A_2''): c_{sA}$.

From $\forall x.A_1''_{lev}\langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq A_1'_{lev}\langle x \rangle$ and $\forall x.A_2''_{lev}\langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq A_2'_{lev}\langle x \rangle$ we get that $\forall x.(A_1'' \sqcup A_2'')_{lev}\langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq A_1' \sqcup A_2'\rangle_{lev}\langle x \rangle$.

From $A_1' = A_1'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_A$ and $A_2' = A_2'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_B$ we get by definition of \oplus_{lev} that $\forall x \in pre(A_1').A_1'(x) = A_1''_{lev}\langle x \rangle$ and $\forall x \in pre(A_2').A_2'(x) = A_2''_{lev}\langle x \rangle$. From $pre(A_2') = pre(A_1')$ and $\forall x \in pre(A_1').A_1'(x) = A_1''_{lev}\langle x \rangle$ and $\forall x \in pre(A_2').A_2'(x) = A_2''_{lev}\langle x \rangle$ we get that $\forall x \in pre((A_1' \sqcup A_2')).(A_1' \sqcup A_2') = (A_1'' \sqcup A_2'')_{lev}\langle x \rangle$. From $\forall x \in pre((A_1' \sqcup A_2')).(A_1' \sqcup A_2') = (A_1'' \sqcup A_2'')_{lev}\langle x \rangle$ we get by definition of \oplus_{lev} that $(A_1' \sqcup A_2') = (A_1'' \sqcup A_2'') \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_A$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} (A_1 \sqcup A_2) \{c_A\}(A_1'' \sqcup A_2'') \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_A$, we get by the rule TAN2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (A_1 \sqcup A_2') \oplus_{lev} \langle x \rangle$ and $(A_1' \sqcup A_2') \oplus_{lev} \langle x \rangle = (A_1'' \sqcup A_2'') \oplus_{lev} \langle x \rangle$

From $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_A\} (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'') : c_{sA} \text{ and } \forall x. (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'')_{lev} \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2')_{lev} \langle x \rangle$ and $(\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') = (\Lambda_1'' \sqcup \Lambda_2'') \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_A$ we get by the rule TAN2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} (\Lambda_1' \sqcup \Lambda_2') : c_{s1}$.

We define an equality that relates all mode states that agree on all the assumptions made in these mode states.

Definition 9. Two mode states $mdst, mdst' \in MdSt$ make equal assumptions (denoted by: $mdst = \{A-NR, A-NW\} \ mdst'\}$, if and only if mdst(A-NR) = mdst'(A-NR) and mdst(A-NW) = mdst'(A-NW)

We now show that, whenever two commands are typeable with the same partial type environments and have identical **low**-slices, then the fact that the first command can do a step in a given memory, then this implies that the second command can also do a step in any memory that is **low** equal with respect to a partial type environment, the resulting commands are again typable with identical partial type environments (type preservation), and the resulting memories are again **low**-equal with respect to a partial type environment.

Lemma 11. If

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- \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda': c_{s1} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2} \text{ with } c_{s1} = c_{s2}, \text{ and } - mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev_1, \Lambda), \text{ and } - mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2, \text{ and } - mem_1 =_{lov}^{lev,\Lambda} mem_2, \text{ and } - \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle
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then there is $\alpha' \in Eve$, $mdst_2' \in MdSt$, $c_2', c_{s1}', c_{s2}' \in Com$, $mem_2' \in Mem$, and Λ'' such that

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 \begin{array}{l} - \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda': c_{s1}', \ and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2'\}\Lambda': c_{s2}', \ with \ c_{s1}' = c_{s2}', \\ - \ mdst_1', mdst_2' \in comp(lev, \Lambda''), \ and \\ - \ mdst_1' =_{\{\text{A-NR,A-NW}\}} \ mdst_2', \ and \\ - \ mem_1' =_{\substack{lev, \Lambda'' \\ low}}^{lev, \Lambda''} \ mem_2', \ and \\ - \ \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle. \end{array}
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Proof. We proof this lemma by structural induction on the derivations of the two judgments $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda': c_{s_1}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s_2}$.

Hence, let Λ, Λ' , $c_1, c_{s1}c_2, c_{s2}, c'_1 \in Com$, $mem_1, mem_2, mem'_1 \in Mem$, $lkst, lkst' \in LkSt$, and $mdst_1, mdst_2, mdst'_1 \in MdSt$ be arbitrary such that

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- \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda': c_{s1} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2} \text{ with } c_{s1} = c_{s2}, \text{ and } - mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev_1, \Lambda), \text{ and } - mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2, \text{ and } - mem_1 =_{low}^{lev,\Lambda} mem_2, \text{ and } - \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle
```

We make a case distinction on the last rule applied used in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda': c_{s1}$.

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Case (TSK2): By the rule TSK2 we get c_1 = c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}, \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda', and thus also pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda'). From c_1 = \mathbf{skip} we get that the only rule to derive \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle is SK and, hence, c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}, lkst' = lkst, mdst'_1 = mdst_1, and mem'_1 = mem_1. Thus, mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_1 holds.
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From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda'$: **skip** we get by Lemma 7 that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$ with $c_2' = \mathbf{stop}$, lkst' = lkst, $mdst_2' = mdst_2$, $mem_2' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 .

From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 we get that $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 . From $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 , $mem'_2 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 , and $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_1 we get $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem'_2 .

From $mdst_1' = mdst_1$, $mdst_2' = mdst_2$, $mdst_1$, $mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$, and $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda')$ we get by the definition of comp that $mdst_1'$, $mdst_2' \in comp(lev, \Lambda')$, and from $mdst_1 = \{A-NR,A-NW\}$ $mdst_2'$ that $mdst_1' = \{A-NR,A-NW\}$ $mdst_2'$.

Since $c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}$ and $c'_2 = \mathbf{stop}$, we get from the rule TST that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c'_1\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c'_2\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ with $\Lambda'' = \Lambda'$.

Case (TAH2): By the rule TAH2 we get that $c_1 = x := e$, $c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$, $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$, $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$, $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$, and thus also $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda')$ and $\Lambda'_{lev}\langle x \rangle = \mathbf{high}$. From $c_1 = x := e$ we get that the only rule to derive $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ is AS and, hence, $c_1' = \mathbf{stop}$, lkst' = lkst, $mdst_1' = mdst_1$, and $mem_1' = mem_1[x \mapsto v]$ for some v. From $mem_1' = mem_1[x \mapsto v]$ and $\Lambda'_{lev}\langle x \rangle = \mathbf{high}$ we get by definition of $= \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ that $mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_1 .

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda'$: **skip** we get by Lemma 7 that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$ with $c_2' = \mathbf{stop}$, lkst' = lkst, $mdst_2' = mdst_2$, $mem_2' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 .

From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 we get that $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 . From $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 , $mem'_2 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_2 , and $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_1 we get $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem'_2 .

From $mdst_1' = mdst_1$, $mdst_2' = mdst_2$, $mdst_1$, $mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$, and $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda)$ we get by the definition of comp that $mdst_1'$, $mdst_2' \in comp(lev, \Lambda')$, and from $mdst_1 = \{A-NR,A-NW\}$ $mdst_2'$ that $mdst_1' = \{A-NR,A-NW\}$ $mdst_2'$.

Since $c_1' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $c_2' = \mathbf{stop}$, we get from the rule TST that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ with $\Lambda'' = \Lambda'$.

Case (TFH2): By the rule TFH2 we get that $c_1 = x := e$, $c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}$, $x \in pre(\Lambda)$, $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$, and thus also $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda')$. From $c_1 = x := e$ we get that the only rule to derive $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ is AS and, hence, $c_1' = \mathbf{stop}$, lkst' = lkst, $mdst_1' = mdst_1$, and $mem_1' = mem_1[x \mapsto v]$ for some v. From $mem_1' = mem_1[x \mapsto v]$ and $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{high}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ we get by definition of $= \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ that $mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem_1 .

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From \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda' and mem_1 = ^{lev,\Lambda'}_{\mathbf{low}} mem_2 we get that mem_1 = ^{lev,\Lambda'}_{\mathbf{low}} mem_2. From mem_1 = ^{lev,\Lambda'}_{\mathbf{low}} mem_2, mem_2' = ^{lev,\Lambda'}_{\mathbf{low}} mem_2, and mem_1' = ^{lev,\Lambda'}_{\mathbf{low}} mem_1 we get mem_1' = ^{lev,\Lambda'}_{\mathbf{low}} mem_2'. From mdst_1' = mdst_1, mdst_2' = mdst_2, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev,\Lambda), and pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda) we get by the definition of comp that mdst_1', mdst_2' \in comp(lev,\Lambda'), and from mdst_1 = _{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2 that mdst_1' = _{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2'. Since c_1' = \mathbf{stop} and c_2' = \mathbf{stop}, we get from the rule TST that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_1'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_2'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop} with \Lambda'' = \Lambda'.
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- Case (TAL2): By the rule TAL2 we get that $c_1 = x := e$, $c_{s1} = c_{s2} = x := e$, $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$, lev(x) = low, $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e : low$, $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$, and thus also $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda)$. From $c_1 = x := e$ we get that the only rule to derive $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ is As and, hence, $c_1' = stop$, lkst' = lkst, $mdst_1' = mdst_1$, and $mem_1' = mem_1[x \mapsto eval(e, mem_1)]$.
 - From $c_{s2} = x := e$, lev(x) = low, and $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$ we know that the only rule to derive the judgment $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda' : c_{s2}$ can be TAL2. Hence, $c_2 = x := e$. Thus we get by the rule AS that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c'_2, lkst', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$ with $lkst' = lkst, mdst'_2 = mdst_2$, and $mem'_2 = mem_2[x \mapsto eval(e, mem_2)]$.
 - From $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem_2 and $\Vdash_{lev, \Lambda} e$: low we get that $eval(e, mem_1) = eval(e, mem_2)$. Hence, $mem'_1 = mem_1[x \mapsto v]$ and $mem'_2 = mem_2[x \mapsto v]$ for $v = eval(e, mem_1)$. Thus, we have $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem'_2 . From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem'_2 we get $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem'_2 .
 - $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem'_2$. From $mdst'_1 = mdst_1$, $mdst'_2 = mdst_2$, $mdst_1$, $mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$, and $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda)$ we get by the definition of comp that $mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda')$, and from $mdst_1 = \{A-NR, A-NW\}$ $mdst_2$ that $mdst'_1 = \{A-NR, A-NW\}$ $mdst'_2$.
 - Since $c_1' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $c_2' = \mathbf{stop}$, we get from the rule TST that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ with $\Lambda'' = \Lambda'$.
- Case (TFL2): By the rule TFL2 we get that $c_1 = x := e$, $c_{s1} = c_{s2} = x := e$, $x \in pre(\Lambda)$, $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e : \mathbf{low}$, $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$, and thus also $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda)$. From $c_1 = x := e$ we get that the only rule to derive $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle$ is As and, hence, $c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}$, lkst' = lkst, $mdst'_1 = mdst_1$, and $mem'_1 = mem_1[x \mapsto eval(e, mem_1)]$.
 - From $c_{s2} = x := e$, $x \in pre(\Lambda)$, we know that the only rule to derive the judgment $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2}$ can be TFL2. Hence, $c_2 = x := e$. Thus we get by the rule As that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$ with $lkst' = lkst, mdst_2' = mdst_2$, and $mem_2' = mem_2[x \mapsto eval(e, mem_1)]$.
 - From $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem_2 and $\Vdash_{lev, \Lambda} e : low$ we get that $eval(e, mem_1) = eval(e, mem_2)$. Hence, $mem'_1 = mem_1[x \mapsto v]$ and $mem'_2 = mem_2[x \mapsto v]$ for $v = eval(e, mem_1)$. Thus, we have $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem'_2 . From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem'_2 we get $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}$ mem'_2 .
 - $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem'_2$. From $mdst'_1 = mdst_1$, $mdst'_2 = mdst_2$, $mdst_1$, $mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$, and $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda)$ we get by the definition of comp that $mdst'_1$, $mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda')$, and from $mdst_1 = \{A-NR,A-NW\}$ $mdst_2$ that $mdst'_1 = \{A-NR,A-NW\}$ $mdst'_2$.
 - Since $c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}$ and $c'_2 = \mathbf{stop}$, we get from the rule TST that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c'_1\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c'_2\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ with $\Lambda'' = \Lambda'$.
- Case (TLO2): By the rule TLO2 we get that $c_1 = c_{s1} = c_{s2} = \mathbf{lock}(l)$, $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$, and thus also $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda)$. From $c_1 = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ we get that the only rule to derive $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ is LK and, hence, $c_1' = \mathbf{stop}$, $lkst' = lkst \cup \{l\}$, $mdst_1' = mdst_1$, and $mem_1' = mem_1$.

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From c_{s2} = \mathbf{lock}(l), we know that the only rule to derive the judgment \Vdash_{lev}
          \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2} can be TLO2. Hence, c_2 = \mathbf{lock}(l). Thus we get by the rule LK
         that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c'_2, lkst'', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle with lkst'' = lkst \cup \{l\}, mdst'_2 = mdst_2, and mem'_2 = mem_2. Since lkst'' = lkst \cup \{l\} and lkst' = lkst \cup \{l\}
         we have lkst'' = lkst'.
         From mem'_1 = mem_1, mem'_2 = mem_2, and mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2 we get mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}
         mem_2'. From \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda' and mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2' we get mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_2'. From mdst_1' = mdst_1, mdst_2' = mdst_2, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), and pre(\Lambda') = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}
         pre(\Lambda) we get by the definition of comp that mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda'), and
         from mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2 that mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2.
         Since c_1' = \mathbf{stop} and c_2' = \mathbf{stop}, we get from the rule TST that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}
         and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_2'\} \Lambda' : \mathbf{stop} \text{ with } \Lambda'' = \Lambda'.
Case (TUL2): From the assumption of this case we get by the rule TUL2 that c_1
          c_{s1} = c_{s2} = \mathbf{unlock}(l), \ l \in \mathit{lkst}, \ \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda', \ \text{and thus also} \ \mathit{pre}(\Lambda') = \mathit{pre}(\Lambda). From
          c_1 = \mathbf{unlock}(l) we get that the only rule to derive \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\sim}
          \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle is ULK and, hence, c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}, lkst' = lkst \setminus \{l\}, mdst'_1 = lkst \setminus \{l\}
          mdst_1, and mem'_1 = mem_1.
         From c_{s2} = \mathbf{unlock}(l), we know that the only rule to derive the judgment \Vdash_{lev}
          \Lambda'_2\{c_2\}\Lambda_2: c_{s2} can be TUL2. Hence, c_2 = \mathbf{unlock}(l). Since l \in lkst we get by
         the rule ULK that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst'', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle with lkst'' =
         lkst \setminus \{l\}, mdst'_2 = mdst_2, \text{ and } mem'_2 = mem_2. \text{ Since } lkst'' = lkst \setminus \{l\} \text{ and } lkst' = lkst \setminus \{l\}
          lkst \setminus \{l\} we have lkst'' = lkst'.
         From mem'_1 = mem_1, mem'_2 = mem_2, and mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2 we get mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}
         mem_2'. From \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda' and mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2' we get mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_2'. From mdst_1' = mdst_1, mdst_2' = mdst_2, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), and pre(\Lambda') = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}
         pre(\Lambda) we get by the definition of comp that mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda'), and
         from mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2 that mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2.
         Since c_1' = \mathbf{stop} and c_2' = \mathbf{stop}, we get from the rule TST that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}
         and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_2'\} \Lambda' : \mathbf{stop} \text{ with } \Lambda'' = \Lambda'.
Case (TSP2): From the assumption of this case we get by the rule TSP2 that c_1 =
         \mathbf{spawn}(c_3), c_{s1} = c_{s2} = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{s3}), \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda', \text{ and thus also } pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda).
         From c_1 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_3) we get that the last rule in the derivation of \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\sim}
          \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle must be SP and, hence, c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}, lkst' = lkst, mdst'_1 = lkst
         mdst_1, and mem'_1 = mem_1. Thus, mem_1 = \frac{lev, A'}{low} mem_{1'}.
From c_{s2} = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{s3}), we know that the last rule in the derivation of \Vdash_{lev}
          \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s_2} must be TSP2. Hence, c_2 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_4). Thus we get by the rule SP
         that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle with lkst' = lkst, mdst_2' =
         mdst_2, and mem'_2 = mem_2. Thus, mem_2 = \frac{lev, A'}{low} mem_{2'}.
         From \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda' and mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2 we get that mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_2. From mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_2, mem_2 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_1, and mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_1 we get mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low}
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From $mdst'_1 = mdst_1$, $mdst'_2 = mdst_2$, $mdst_1$, $mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$, and $pre(\Lambda') = pre(\Lambda)$ we get by the definition of comp that $mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda')$, and

Since $c_1' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $c_2' = \mathbf{stop}$, we get from the rule TST that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$

Case (TSQ2): By the rule TSQ2 that $c_1 = c_3$; c_4 , $c_{s1} = c_{s3}$; c_{s4} , $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}\Lambda_1 : c_{s3}$, and

from $mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ that $mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2$.

and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2'\}\Lambda'$: **stop** with $\Lambda'' = \Lambda'$.

 $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_4\}\Lambda': c_{s3}.$

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From c_1 = c_3; c_4 and \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle we get by
the rule SQ1 and SQ2 that \langle c_3, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_3', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle.
From c_{s1} = c_{s3}; c_{s4} and c_{s1} = c_{s2} we get that c_{s2} = c_{s3}; c_{s4}. Hence, the last rule
applied in the derivation of \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_2\}\Lambda_2: c_{s2} must be either TSQ2 or TIH2. We
distinguish these two cases.
Case (TSQ2): From the assumption of this case, we get by the rule TSQ2 that
       c_2 = c_5; c_6, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda_2 : c_{s5}, \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_6\}\Lambda' : c_{s6} \text{ with } c_{s5} = c_{s3} \text{ and } \Gamma_{s5} = c_{s5}
       From \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}\Lambda_1: c_{s3} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda_2: c_{s5} and c_{s5}=c_{s3} we get by
       Lemma 10 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s5}. From
       \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_4\}\Lambda': c_{s4} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s6} \text{ and } c_{s6} = c_{s4} \text{ we get by Lemma } 10
       that \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_4\}\Lambda' : c_{s4} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_6\}\Lambda' : c_{s6}.
       From \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s5} and c_{s5} = c_{s3} and
       mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda_1) and mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2 and mem_1 =_{low}^{lev,\Lambda}
       mem_2 and \langle c_3, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_3', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle we get by the
       induction hypothesis that there is \alpha' \in Eve, mdst'_2 \in MdSt, c'_5, c'_{s3}, c'_{s5} \in Com,
       mem_2' \in Mem, and \Lambda'' such that
          * \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_3'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3}', and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_5'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s5}', with c_{s3}' = c_{s5}',
          * mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda''), and
          * mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2, and

* mem'_1 =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda''} mem'_2, and
          * \langle c_5, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c'_5, lkst', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle.
       We now distinguish two cases based on whether c_3' = \mathbf{stop}.
       Case (c_3' = \mathbf{stop}): In this case, we get from \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_3'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3}' by the
              rule TST that c'_{s3} = \mathbf{stop} and \Lambda'' = (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2). From c'_{s3} = \mathbf{stop} and c'_{s3} = c'_{s5} we get c'_{s5} = \mathbf{stop}. From c'_{s5} = \mathbf{stop} we get that the last rule in
              the derivation of \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_5'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s5}' must be TST. From this rule
              we get that c_5' = \mathbf{stop}.
              From c_1 = c_3; c_4 and c_3' = \mathbf{stop} and \langle c_3, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_3', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle
              we get that the last rule in the derivation of \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha}
              \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle must be SQ2. From this rule we get that c'_1 = c_4.
              From c_2 = c_5; c_6 and c_5' = \mathbf{stop} and \langle c_5, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_5', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle
              we get that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle with c_2' =
              c_6 is derivable with the rule sq2.
              Since \Lambda'' = (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) and
                  · \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_4\}\Lambda' : c_{s4}, and \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_6\}\Lambda' : c_{s6}, with c_{s4} =
                  · mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda''), and
                   mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2, and
                  mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda''}{low} mem'_2, and
                  \cdot \ \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle.
              we can conclude this case.
       Case (c_3' \neq \mathbf{stop}): In this case, we get from \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_3'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3}' by
              the typing rules that c'_{s3} \neq \text{stop}. From c'_{s3} \neq \text{stop} and c'_{s3} = c'_{s5} we get
              c'_{s5} \neq \mathbf{stop}. From c'_{s5} \neq \mathbf{stop} we get that the last rule in the derivation
              of \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_5'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s5}' cannot be TST and, hence, we get from the
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typing rules that $c_5' \neq \mathbf{stop}$

From $c_3' \neq \text{stop}$ and $\langle c_3, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_3', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha}$ $\langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle$ must be SQ1. From this rule we get that $c'_1 =$ $c_3'; c_4.$

From $c_2 = c_5$; c_6 and $c_5' \neq \text{stop}$ and $\langle c_5, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_5', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$ we get by SQ1 that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c'_2, lkst', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$ is derivable with $c_2' = c_5'$; c_6 .

From $c_1'=c_3'$; c_4 and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_3'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2): c_{s3}'$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_4\}\Lambda':$ c_{s4} we get by the rule TSQ2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_3'; c_4\}\Lambda': c_{s3}'; c_{s4}$ is derivable. From $c_2' = c_5'$; c_6 and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_5'\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s5}'$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_6\}\Lambda'$: c_{s6} we get by the rule TSQ2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_5'; c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s5}'; c_{s6}$ is derivable. From $c'_{s3} = c'_{s5}$ and $c_{s4} = c_{s6}$ we get that c'_{s3} ; $c_{s4} = c'_{s5}$; c_{s6} . Hence, we can conclude this case.

Case (TIH2): From the assumption of this case, we get by the rule TIH2 that $c_2 =$ if e then c_5 else c_6 fi and $c_{s2} = \text{skip}$; c_5 and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda' : c_{s5}$, and \Vdash_{lev} $\Lambda\{c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s6} \text{ with } c_{s5} = c_{s6}. \text{ From } c_{s1} = c_{s2} \text{ and } c_{s1} = c_{s3}; c_{s4} \text{ and } c_{s2} = c_{s4}$ **skip**; c_5 we get that $c_{s3} =$ **skip** and $c_{s4} = c_{s5}$.

From $c_{s3} = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}\Lambda_1 : c_{s3}$ we get by Lemma 7 and the fact that commands evaluate deterministically in our language that $c_3' = \mathbf{stop}$ and lkst' = lkst and $mdst'_1 = mdst_1$ and $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda_1}{low}$ mem_1 and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$. From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ we get that $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda_1)$. From $c_1 = c_3$; c_4 and $c'_3 = \mathbf{stop}$ and $\langle c_3, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_3', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle$ must be sq2. From this rule we get that $c_1' = c_4$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_4\}\Lambda': c_{s4} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda': c_{s5} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s6} \text{ and }$ $c_{s5} = c_{s6}$ and $c_{s4} = c_{s5}$ we get by Lemma 10 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1)\{c_4\}\Lambda' : c_{s4}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1)\{c_5\}\Lambda' : c_{s5}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1)\{c_6\}\Lambda' : c_{s6}$.

From $c_2 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_5 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_6 \ \mathbf{fi} \ \mathbf{we} \ \mathbf{get} \ \mathbf{by} \ \mathbf{the} \ \mathbf{rule} \ \mathbf{ift} \ \mathbf{and} \ \mathbf{iff} \ \mathbf{that}$ $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst'', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$ is derivable with $c_2' = c_i$ for some $i \in \{5, 6\}$ and lkst'' = lkst and $mdst'_2 = mdst_2$ and $mem'_2 = mem_2$. It remains to show that

- * $mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1)),$ and
- $\begin{array}{l} * \ \, mdst_1' =_{\{\text{A-NR,A-NW}\}} \, mdst_2', \, \text{and} \\ * \ \, mem_1' =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,(A \sqcup A_1)} \, mem_2'. \end{array}$

From $mdst_1 = mdst'_1$ and $mdst_2 = mdst'_2$ and $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda_1) = pre((\Lambda \sqcup I))$ (Λ_1)) and $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ we get that $mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1))$ $\Lambda_1)).$

From $mdst_1 = mdst'_1$ and $mdst_2 = mdst'_2$ and $mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ we get that $mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2$.

From $mem'_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda_1}{low} mem_1$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2$ and $mem'_2 = mem_2$ and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1)$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1)$ we get that $mem'_1 = \frac{lev,(\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_1)}{low} mem'_2$.

Case (TIL2): By the rule TIL2 we get that $c_1 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_3 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_4 \ \mathbf{fi}, \ c_{s1} = c_{s2} =$ if e then c_{s3} else c_{s4} fi, $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e : \mathbf{low}$, $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}\Lambda' : c_{s3}$, and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_4\}\Lambda' : c_{s4}$. From $c_{s2} = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_{s3} \ \mathbf{else} \ c_{s4} \ \mathbf{fi}$ we get that the last rule applied in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2}$ must be TIL2. From $c_{s2} = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_{s3}\ \mathbf{else}\ c_{s4}\ \mathbf{fi}$ we get by this rule that $c_2 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_5 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_6 \ \mathbf{fi}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda' : c_{s3}, \text{ and}$ $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s3}.$

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eval(e, mem_2). We now distinguish two cases based on whether eval(e, mem_1) =
      true or eval(e, mem_1) = false.
      Case (eval(e, mem_1) = true): From the assumption of this case we get by the rule
             IFT that c'_1 = c_3, lkst' = lkst, mdst'_1 = mdst_1, and mem'_1 = mem_1.
             From eval(e, mem_1) = eval(e, mem_2) and the assumption of this case we also
             get by the rule IFT that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_2', lkst'', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle is
             derivable with c_2' = c_5, lkst'' = lkst, mdst_2' = mdst_2, and mem_2' = mem_2.
            Since \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}\Lambda': c_{s3}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda': c_{s3}, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 = \{A-NR,A-NW\} mdst_2, and mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2, we can conclude this case.
      Case (eval(e, mem_1) = false): From the assumption of this case we get by the rule
             IFF that c'_1 = c_4, lkst' = lkst, mdst'_1 = mdst_1, and mem'_1 = mem_1.
             From eval(e, mem_1) = eval(e, mem_2) and the assumption of this case we also
             get by the rule IFF that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_2, lkst'', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle is
             derivable with c'_2 = c_6, lkst'' = lkst, mdst'_2 = mdst_2, and mem'_2 = mem_2.
            Since \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_4\}\Lambda': c_{s4}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s4}, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} mdst_2, and mem_1 =_{\text{low}}^{lev, \Lambda} mem_2, we can conclude this case.
Case (TIH2): From the assumption of this case we get by the rule TIH2 that c_1 =
      if e then c_3 else c_4 fi, c_{s1} = \text{skip}; c_{s3}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{c_3\} \Lambda' : c_{s3}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{c_4\} \Lambda' : c_{s4}, and
      c_{s3} = c_{s4}.
      From c_1 = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_3\ \mathbf{else}\ c_4\ \mathbf{fi}\ \mathrm{and}\ \langle c_1, \mathit{lkst}, \mathit{mdst}_1, \mathit{mem}_1\rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', \mathit{lkst}', \mathit{mdst}_1', \mathit{mem}_1'\rangle
      we get by IFT and IFF that c'_1 = c_i for some i \in \{3,4\} and lkst' = lkst and
      mdst'_1 = mdst_1 and mem'_1 = mem_1.
      From c_{s1} = c_{s2} and c_{s1} = \mathbf{skip}; c_{s3} we get that c_{s2} = \mathbf{skip}; c_{s3}. From c_{s2} =
      skip; c_{s3} we get that that last rule in the derivation of \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2} must be
      either Tih2 or TsQ2. We distinguish these two cases.
      Case (TIH2): In this case, we get by the rule TIH2 that c_2 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_5 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_6 \ \mathbf{fi}
             and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda': c_{s5} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s6} and c_{s3} = c_{s5} = c_{s6}.
             From c_2 = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_5 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_6 \ \mathbf{fi} \ \text{we get that} \ \langle c_2, \mathit{lkst}, \mathit{mdst}_2, \mathit{mem}_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha}
             \langle c'_2, lkst'', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle is derivable with the rule IFT or IFF, and c'_2 = c_i for
             some i \in \{5,6\} and lkst'' = lkst and mdst'_2 = mdst_2 and mem'_2 = mem_2.
             Hence, all conditions that we need to show hold directly due to the assumptions
             of this case.
      Case (TSQ2): In this case, we get by the rule TSQ2 that c_2 = c_5; c_6 and \Vdash_{lev}
             \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda_2: \mathbf{skip}, \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_6\}\Lambda': c_{s6} \text{ with } c_{s6} = c_{s3}.
             From \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_5\}\Lambda_2: skip we get by Lemma 7 that \langle c_5, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'}
             \langle c_5', lkst'', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle is derivable with c_5' = \mathbf{stop} and lkst'' = lkst and
             mdst'_2 = mdst_2 and mem'_2 = \frac{lev_1\Lambda_2}{low} mem_2 and \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2. From \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2 we get that
             pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda_2). From \langle c_5, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c'_5, lkst'', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle
             and c_5' = \mathbf{stop} we get by the rule SQ2 that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst'', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle
             with c_2' = c_6.
             From c_{s6} = c_{s3} and c_{s3} = c_{s4} and pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda_2) and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_6\}\Lambda' : c_{s6}
             and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_3\}\Lambda': c_{s3} and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_4\}\Lambda': c_{s4} we get by Lemma 10 that \Vdash_{lev}
             (\Lambda\sqcup\Lambda_2)\{c_6\}\Lambda':c_{s6} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda\sqcup\Lambda_2)\{c_3\}\Lambda':c_{s3} \text{ and } \Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda\sqcup\Lambda_2)\{c_4\}\Lambda':c_{s4}.
             It remains to show that
                * mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)), and
                * mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2, and
               * mem'_1 = \frac{lev,(\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)}{low} mem'_2.
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From $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e$: low and $mem_1 = \frac{lev,\Lambda}{low}$ mem_2 , we get that $eval(e, mem_1) = \frac{lev,\Lambda}{low}$

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From mdst_1 = mdst'_1 and mdst_2 = mdst'_2 and pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda_1) = pre((\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)) and mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda) we get that mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)).
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From $mdst_1 = mdst'_1$ and $mdst_2 = mdst'_2$ and $mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ we get that $mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2$.

get that $mdst_1' = _{\{\mathbf{A}-\mathsf{NR},\mathbf{A}-\mathsf{NW}\}} mdst_2'$. From $mem_2' = _{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda_2} mem_2$ and $mem_1 = _{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda} mem_2$ and $mem_1' = mem_1$ and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ we get that $mem_1' = _{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,(\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)} mem_2'$.

Case (TWL2): We get by the rule TWL2 that $c_1 =$ while edo c_3 od and $c_{s1} =$ while edo c_{s3} od and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e :$ low and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1 \{c_3\}\Lambda_1 : c_{s3}$.

From $c_{s1} =$ while e do c_{s3} od and $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ we get that $c_{s2} =$ while e do c_{s3} od. Hence, the last rule applied in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2}$ must be TWL2. From this rule we get that $c_2 =$ while e do c_4 od and $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_2$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_4\}\Lambda_2: c_{s3}$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e:$ low.

From $\Lambda \subseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev,\Lambda}{low}$ mem_2 we get that $eval(e, mem_1) = eval(e, mem_2)$.

We now distinguish two cases based on whether $eval(e, mem_1) =$ **false** or $eval(e, mem_1) =$ **true**.

Case $(eval(e, mem_1) = \mathbf{false})$: From the assumption of this case we get by the rule WHF that $c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}$, lkst' = lkst, $mdst'_1 = mdst_1$, and $mem'_1 = mem_1$.

From $c_2 =$ while e do c_4 od and $eval(e, mem_1) = eval(e, mem_2)$ and the assumption of this case we also get by the rule WHF that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_2, lkst'', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$ is derivable with $c'_2 =$ stop, $lkst'' = lkst, mdst'_2 =$ mdst₂, and $mem'_2 = mem_2$.

From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $mem_1' = mem_1$ and $mem_2' = mem_2$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_2$ we get that $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda'}{low} mem_2$. From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda$ we get that $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda')$. Hence, we get

From $\Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda_1$ and $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda$ we get that $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda')$. Hence, we get from $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$, by definition of comp that $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda')$.

Since $c_1' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $c_2' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda' \{\mathbf{stop}\}\Lambda' : \mathbf{stop}$ and $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda')$ and $mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ and $mem_1 =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda'} mem_2$, we can conclude this case.

Case $(eval(e, mem_1) = \mathbf{true})$: From the assumption of this case we get by the rule WHT that $c_1' = c_3$; c_1 and lkst' = lkst and $mdst_1' = mdst_1$ and $mem_1' = mem_1$. From $c_2 = \mathbf{while}\ e\ \mathbf{do}\ c_4\ \mathbf{od}\$ and $eval(e, mem_1) = eval(e, mem_2)\$ and the assumption of this case we also get by the rule WHF that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_2', lkst'', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$ is derivable with $c_2' = c_4$; c_2 , lkst'' = lkst, $mdst_2' = mdst_2$, and $mem_2' = mem_2$.

From $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_1} e: \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev,\Lambda_2} e: \mathbf{low}$ we get that $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e: \mathbf{low}$. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_3\}\Lambda_1: c_{s3}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_4\}\Lambda_2: c_{s3}$ we get by Lemma 10 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_3\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2): c_{s3}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_4\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2): c_{s3}$.

From $\Lambda_1 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $\Lambda_2 \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ we get that $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$.

From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ and $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_3\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3}$ and $c_1 = \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_3 \ \mathbf{od}$ we get by the rule TWL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} \Lambda' : c_{s1}$. From $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_3\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_1\} \Lambda' : c_{s1}$ and $c'_1 = c_3 : c_1$ we get by the rule TSQ2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c'_1\} \Lambda' : c_{s3} : c_{s1}$.

From $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ and $(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $\Vdash_{lev,(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)} e : \mathbf{low}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_4\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3}$ and $c_2 = \mathbf{while} \ e \ \mathbf{do} \ c_4 \ \mathbf{od}$ we get by the rule

TWL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_2\} \Lambda' : c_{s1}$. From $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_4\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s3}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)\{c_2\}\Lambda' : c_{s1}$ and $c_2' = c_4; c_2$ we get by the rule TSQ2 that $\Vdash_{lev} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \{c_2'\} \Lambda' : c_{s3}; c_{s1}.$

It remains to show that

- * $mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)),$ and
- * $mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2$, and

* $mem_1' = \frac{lev_1(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)}{low} mem_2'$. From $mdst_1 = mdst_1'$ and $mdst_2 = mdst_2'$ and $pre(\Lambda) = pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ $pre((\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2))$ and $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ we get that $mdst'_1, mdst'_2 \in$ $comp(lev, (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)).$

From $mdst_1 = mdst'_1$ and $mdst_2 = mdst'_2$ and $mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ we get that $mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst'_2$.

From $mem_2' = mem_2$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem_2 and $mem_1' = mem_1$ and $\Lambda \subseteq (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$ we get that $mem_1' = \frac{lev, (\Lambda \sqcup \Lambda_2)}{low}$ mem_2' . Hence, we can conclude this case.

Case (TAN2): From the assumption of this case we get by the rule TAN2 that c_1 $\overrightarrow{c_1''} @ \overrightarrow{d}_1$, $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{c_1''\} \Lambda_1 : \overrightarrow{c_{s1}''}, \Lambda' = (\Lambda_1 \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_1), \forall x. \Lambda_{1lev} \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_{lev} \langle x \rangle$, and $c_{s1} = c_{s1}^{"} @ \overrightarrow{a}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}.$

We first show, that the last rule in the type derivation for c_2 must TAN2 and how the variables in this last step must be instantiated. From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ and $c_{s1}=c_{s1}'''$ @ \overrightarrow{d}_1 |A-NR,A-NW we get that the last rule to derive $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1'\{c_2\}\Lambda_2:c_{s2}$ must be TAN2. Thus, we get from this rule that $c_2 = c_2'' @ \overrightarrow{d}_2$, $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2''\}\Lambda_2 : c_{s2}''$, $\Lambda' = (\Lambda_2 \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_2), \ \forall x.\Lambda_2{}_{lev}\langle x\rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda'{}_{lev}\langle x\rangle, \ \text{and} \ c_{s2} = c''_{s2}@\overrightarrow{d}_2 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}. \ \text{From} \ c_{s1} = c_{s2} \ \text{and} \ c_{s2} = c''_{s2}@\overrightarrow{d}_2 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}, \ \text{we get that} \ c_{s2} = c''_{s1}@\overrightarrow{d}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}, \ c''_{s2} = c''_{s1}, \ \text{and} \ \overrightarrow{d}_2 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} = \overrightarrow{d}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}. \ \text{Now we show that} \ c''_1 \ \text{and} \ c''_2 \ \text{can be typed with the same resulting partial type}$

environment and this type environment can still fulfill the premises for TAN2. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1''\}\Lambda_1: c_{s1}''$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2''\}\Lambda_2: c_{s2}''$ and $c_{s1}''=c_{s2}''$ we get by Lemma 8 that $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$. Hence, we get from Lemma 10 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1''\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s1}''$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2''\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s2}''$. Since $\forall x.\Lambda_{1lev}\langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_{lev}\langle x \rangle$ and $\forall x.\Lambda_{2lev}\langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq$ $\Lambda'_{lev}\langle x\rangle$ we also have $\forall x.(\Lambda_1\sqcup\Lambda_2)_{lev}\langle x\rangle\sqsubseteq\Lambda'_{lev}\langle x\rangle$. From $\Lambda'=(\Lambda_1\oplus_{lev}\overrightarrow{d}_1)$ and $\Lambda' = (\Lambda_2 \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_2)$ and $pre(\Lambda_1) = pre(\Lambda_2)$ and $\overrightarrow{d}_2 \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW} = \overrightarrow{d}_1 \upharpoonright_{A-NR,A-NW}$ we get by definition of \bigoplus_{lev} that $\Lambda' = (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \bigoplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_1$.

From $c_1 = c_1'' @ \overrightarrow{d}_1$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha}$ $\langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle$ must be either AN1 or AN2. From these rules we get that $\langle c_1'', lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1''', lkst', mdst_1'', mem_1' \rangle$ is derivable. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{c_1''\} \{\Lambda_1 \sqcup A_1 \sqcup A_2 \sqcup A_2 \sqcup A_3 \sqcup A_4 \sqcup$ $(c_1, list, mast_1, mem_1) \rightarrow (c_1, list, mast_1, mem_1)$ is derivative. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{c_1'\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s2}''$ and $c_{s1}'' = c_{s2}''$ and $mst_1, mast_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ and $mdst_1 = \{A-NR,A-NW\} \ mdst_2$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} \ mem_2$ we get by the induction hypothesis that there is $\alpha' \in Eve$, $mdst_2'' \in MdSt$, $c_2''', c_{s1}'', c_{s2}''' \in Com$, $mem_2' \in Mem$, and Λ'' such that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_1'''\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s1}'''$, and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_2'''\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s2}'''$, with $c_{s1}''' = c_{s2}'''$, and $mdst_1'', mdst_2'' \in comp(lev, \Lambda'')$, and $mdst_1'' = \{A-NR,A-NW\} \ mdst_2''$, and $mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda''}{low} \ mem_2'$, and $\langle c_2'', lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_{s2}''', lkst_1'', mdst_2''' = mdst_1''' \ mem_2'' = mdst_1''' \ mem_2'' \ mem_2'' \ mem_2''$ $\langle c_2^{\prime\prime\prime}, lkst^{\prime}, mdst_2^{\prime\prime}, mem_2^{\prime} \rangle$.

We now distinguish two cases depending on the last rule in the derivation of $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle.$

Case (AN1): In this case, we get by the rule AN1 that $c_1''' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $mdst_1' =$ $updMds(mdst''_1, \overrightarrow{d}_1)$ and $c'_1 = \mathbf{stop}$.

From $c_1''' = \mathbf{stop}$ we get that the last rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_1'''\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s1}'''$ must be TST. Hence, $c_{s1}''' = \mathbf{stop}$ and $\Lambda'' = (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)$. From $c_{s1}''' = \mathbf{stop}$

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and c_{s1}^{""}=c_{s2}^{""} we get c_{s2}^{""}= stop. Hence, the last rule in the derivation of
              \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2'''\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s2}''' must also be TST and, thus, c_2''' = \mathbf{stop}.
              From c_2''' = \mathbf{stop} and \langle c_2'', lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2''', lkst', mdst_2'', mem_2' \rangle
             and c_2 = c_2'' @ \overrightarrow{d}_2 we get by the rule AN1 that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'}
              \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle is derivable with mdst_2' = updMds(mdst_2'', \overrightarrow{d}_2) and
              From c_1' = \mathbf{stop} and c_2' = \mathbf{stop} we get by the rule TST that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'\{c_1'\}\Lambda':
              stop and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'\{c_2'\}\Lambda': stop.
              It remains to show that mdst_1' =_{\{\text{A-NR},\text{A-NW}\}} mdst_2' and mdst_1', mdst_2' \in comp(lev, \Lambda')
             and mem'_1 = \frac{lev, A'}{low} mem'_2.
From mdst'_1 = updMds(mdst''_1, \overrightarrow{d}_1) and mdst'_2 = updMds(mdst''_2, \overrightarrow{d}_2) and
               \overrightarrow{d}_2 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} = \overrightarrow{d}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} \text{ we get by the definition of } updMds \text{ that } mdst'_1 =_{\{\text{A-NR,A-NW}\}}
              mdst'_{2}.
              From \Lambda'' = (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) and \Lambda' = (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_1 we get that \Lambda' = (\Lambda'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_1).
              From mdst''_1 \in comp(lev, \Lambda'') and mdst'_1 = updMds(mdst''_1, \overrightarrow{d}_1) and \Lambda' =
               (\Lambda'' \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_1) we get that mdst'_1 \in comp(lev, \Lambda'). From mdst'_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}}
              mdst'_2 and mdst'_1 \in comp(lev, \Lambda') we get that mdst'_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda').
             From \forall x. (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)_{lev} \langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_{lev} \langle x \rangle and \Lambda'' = (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) and mem'_1 = ^{lev,\Lambda''}_{low}
mem'_2 we get that mem'_1 = \frac{lev, A'}{low} mem'_2.
Case (AN2): In this case, we get by the rule AN2 that c'''_1 \neq \mathbf{stop} and mdst'_1 = \frac{lev, A'}{low} mem'_2.
             mdst_1'' and c_1' = c_1'''@\overrightarrow{d}_1. From c_1''' \neq \mathbf{stop} and \Vdash_{lev} A''\{c_1'''\}(A_1 \sqcup A_2) : c_{s1}''' we get that c_{s1}''' \neq \mathbf{stop}. Hence, we get from c_{s1}''' = c_{s2}''' that c_{s2}''' \neq \mathbf{stop}. From c_2''' \neq \mathbf{stop} and \langle c_2'', klst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2''', klst', mdst_2'', mem_2' \rangle
              and c_2 = c_2'' @ \overrightarrow{d}_2 we get by the rule AN2 that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'}
              \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle is derivable with mdst_2' = mdst_2'' and c_2' = c_2''' @ \overrightarrow{d}_2. From c_1' = c_1''' @ \overrightarrow{d}_1 and c_2' = c_2''' @ \overrightarrow{d}_2 and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_1'''\} (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s1}''',
              and \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2'''\}(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) : c_{s2}''' and \forall x.(\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2)_{lev}\langle x \rangle \sqsubseteq \Lambda'_{lev}\langle x \rangle and \Lambda' =
              (\Lambda_1 \sqcup \Lambda_2) \oplus_{lev} \overrightarrow{d}_1 we get by the rule TAN2 that \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda' : c_{s1}' and \Vdash_{lev}
            \Lambda''\{c_2'\}\Lambda': c_{s2}' \text{ with } c_{s1}'=c_{s1}'''@\overrightarrow{a}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} \text{ and } c_{s2}'=c_{s2}'''@\overrightarrow{a}_2 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}. Hence, from c_{s1}'''=c_{s2}''' \text{ and } \overrightarrow{a}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} = \overrightarrow{a}_2 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}} \text{ we get } c_{s1}'=c_{s2}''. From mdst_1'', mdst_2'' \in comp(lev, \Lambda'') and mdst_1''=\{_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}\} mdst_2'' \text{ and } mdst_1''=mdst_1'' and mdst_2''=mdst_2'' we get that mdst_1'', mdst_2'' \in comp(lev, \Lambda'') and mdst_1''=(lev, \Lambda'')
              mdst_1'' =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2''.
             Since we already obtained mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda''}{low} mem_2' from the induction hypothesis,
              we can conclude this case.
```

We now show that whenever two commands have identical **low**-slices and the first command spawns a new thread, then the second command can also spawn a new thread in its next step and the commands of the spawned threads have identical **low**-slices.

```
Lemma 12. If \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda'_1: c_{s1}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2}, c_{s1} = c_{s2}, and \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_\perp \rangle} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle, then there is c'_2, c_4 \in Com, mdst_2, mdst'_2 \in MdSt, mem'_2 \in Mem, and \Lambda_3 such that \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_\perp \rangle} \langle c'_2, lkst'', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_3\{c_3\}\Lambda_3: c_{s3}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_3\{c_4\}\Lambda_3: c_{s4}, c_{s3} = c_{s4}, and pre(\Lambda_3) = \emptyset.
```

Proof. We prove this by structural induction on the derivation height of $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle$.

The induction base is the tuple a derivation height of 1. From

 $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\langle (c_3, \emptyset, mdst_\perp) \rangle} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$, we know that derivations of height 1 are only possible with the rule SP and, hence, $c_1 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_3)$. Thus, the only rule to derive $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1\}\Lambda_1': c_{s1}$ is TSP2. From this rule we get $c_1 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_3)$, $c_{s1} = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{s3})$, $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_3\{c_3\}\Lambda_3: c_{s3}$, and $pre(\Lambda_3) = \emptyset$.

From $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ we get that $c_{s2} = \mathbf{spawn}(c_{s4})$ with $c_{s3} = c_{s4}$. Hence, we know that the last rule used in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda'_2: c_{s2}$ must have been TSP2. From this rule we get $c_2 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_4)$, $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_4\{c_4\}\Lambda_4: c_{s4}$, and $pre(\Lambda_4) = \emptyset$. Since $pre(\Lambda_4) = \emptyset$ and $pre(\Lambda_3) = \emptyset$. From $c_2 = \mathbf{spawn}(c_4)$, we get by semantics rule SP that $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle \mathbf{stop}, lkst, mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$ is derivable.

For the induction step, let n>1 be the height of the derivation. Derivations of $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\wedge \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ with a height of n>1 are only possible with the rules AN1, AN2, SQ1, and SQ2. Hence, $c_1=c_1''@\overrightarrow{d}_1$, or $c_1=c_1''; c_1'''$. We distinguish these two cases.

Case $(c_1 = c_1''@\overrightarrow{d}_1)$: From the assumption of this case, we get by the rule TAN2 that $c_{s1} = c_{s1}''@\overrightarrow{d}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1''\}\Lambda_1'': c_{s1}''$. Thus, we get from $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ that $c_{s2} = c_{s1}''@\overrightarrow{d}_1 \upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$. Hence, the last typing rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1'\{c_2\}\Lambda_2': c_{s2}$ must be TAN2. From this rule we get that $c_2 = c_2''@\overrightarrow{d}_2$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2''\}\Lambda_2'': c_{s2}''$ with $c_{s1}'' = c_{s2}''$.

From $c_1 = c_1'' @ \overrightarrow{d}_1$ we get by the rules AN1 and AN2 that

 $\langle c_1'', lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_\perp \rangle} \langle c_1''', lkst', mdst_1'', mem_1' \rangle$. Since $c_{s1}'' = c_{s2}''$, we get from the induction hypothesis that there is $c_2''', c_4 \in Com, mdst_2, mdst_2'' \in MdSt, mem_2' \in Mem$, and Λ_3 such that

 $\langle c_2'', lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle c_2''', lkst', mdst_2'', mem_2' \rangle, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_3\{c_3\}\Lambda_3 : c_{s3}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_3\{c_4\}\Lambda_3 : c_{s4}, c_{s3} = c_{s4}, \text{ and } pre(\Lambda_3) = \emptyset.$

It remains to show that there is $c_2' \in Com$, $mdst_2' \in MdSt$, such that

 $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$. This follows directly from $c_2 = c_2'' @ \overrightarrow{d}_2$ and

 $\langle c_2'', lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle c_2''', lkst', mdst_2'', mem_2' \rangle$ by the rules AN1 and AN2.

Case $(c_1 = c_1''; c_1''')$: From the assumption of this case, we get by the rule TsQ2 that $c_{s1} = c_{s1}''; c_{s1}'''$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_1\{c_1''\}\Lambda_1'': c_{s1}''$. Hence, the last typing rule in the derivation of $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2\}\Lambda_2': c_{s2}$ must be TsQ2. From this rule we get that $c_2 = c_2''; c_2'''$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_2\{c_2''\}\Lambda_2'': c_{s2}''$ with $c_{s1}'' = c_{s2}''$.

From $c_1 = c_1''; c_1'''$ we get by the rules SQ1 and SQ2 that

 $\langle c_1'', lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_\perp \rangle} \langle c_1''', lkst', mdst_1'', mem_1' \rangle$. Thus, we get from $c_{s1} = c_{s2}$ that $c_{s2} = c_{s1}'', c_{s1}'''$. Since $c_{s1}'' = c_{s2}''$, we get from the induction hypothesis that there is $c_2''', c_4 \in Com, mdst_2, mdst_2'' \in MdSt, mem_2' \in Mem$, and Λ_3 such that

 $\langle c_2'', lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle c_2''', lkst', mdst_2'', mem_2' \rangle, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_3\{c_3\}\Lambda_3 : c_{s3}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda_3\{c_4\}\Lambda_3 : c_{s4}, c_{s3} = c_{s4}, \text{ and } pre(\Lambda_3) = \emptyset.$

It remains to show that there is $c_2' \in Com$, $mdst_2' \in MdSt$, such that

 $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle} \langle c'_2, lkst', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$. This follows directly from $c_2 = c''_2; c'''_2$ and

 $\langle c_2'', lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_+ \rangle} \langle c_2''', lkst', mdst_2'', mem_2' \rangle$ by the rules SQ1 and SQ2.

We define an equivalence on memories that requires equivalence on **low**-variables and variables for which we make a noread assumption.

Definition 10. Let $lev: Var \to Lev$ be a domain assignment and $mdst \in MdSt$ be a mode state. Two memories $mem, mem' \in Mem$ are low-equal modulo modes (denoted by: $mem = \frac{lev, mdst}{low}$), if and only if the following condition is satisfied:

```
- \forall x \in Var.lev(x) = \mathbf{low} \land x \notin mdst(A-NR) \implies mem(x) = mem'(x).
```

Two memories are related by $=_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,mdst}$ if they agree on all variables of the security level **low** for which no no-read assumption is currently made.

Similar to [10, 18] we define a compositional security property in two steps. First, we define a closure condition for binary relations that captures updates of an environment, i.e. other threads, that respect assumptions of a given thread. Second, we define a bisimulation on local configurations that defines our notion of security for individual threads in arbitrary environments that respect the assumptions of this thread.

Definition 11. A binary relation $\mathcal{R}_{lev} \subseteq LCnf \times LCnf$ with lev: $Var \to Lev$ is closed under globally consistent changes if for all $c_1, c_2 \in Com$, $lkst_1, lkst_2 \in LkSt$, $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in MdSt$, and $mem_1, mem_2 \in Mem$ with

```
\langle c_1, lkst_1, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev} \langle c_2, lkst_2, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle)
```

the following three conditions are satisfied

```
1. \forall x \in Var.(lev(x) = \mathbf{high} \land x \notin mdst_1(A-NW)

\Rightarrow \forall v_1, v_2 \in Val.

\langle c_1, lkst_1, mdst_1, mem_1[x \mapsto v_1] \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev} \langle c_2, lkst_2, mdst_2, mem_2[x \mapsto v_2] \rangle),

2. \forall x \in Var.(lev(x) = \mathbf{low} \land x \notin mdst_1(A-NW)

\Rightarrow \forall v, \in Val.

\langle c_1, lkst_1, mdst_1, mem_1[x \mapsto v] \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev} \langle c_2, lkst_2, mdst_2, mem_2[x \mapsto v] \rangle).
```

The definition of the closure condition captures updates of **high** variables (first item) and **low** variables (second item) by other threads similar to the closure conditions in [10, 18]. Note that our definition of the closure condition only considers the mode state in the first local configuration. In the context in which we will use the closure condition we will explicitly ensure that the mode states of both local configurations are compatible (i.e. mode states agree on the assumptions).

We now define a bisimulation relation that characterizes secure information flow modulo modes.

Definition 12. A symmetric binary relation $\mathcal{R}_{lev} \subseteq LCnf \times LCnf$ with lev: $Var \rightarrow Lev$ is a strong low bisimulation modulo modes if it is closed under globally consistent changes, and if for all $c_1, c_2 \in Com$, $lkst_1, lkst_2 \in LkSt$, $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in MdSt$, and $mem_1, mem_2 \in Mem$ with

$$\langle c_1, lkst_1, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev} \langle c_2, lkst_2, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$$

 $the\ following\ conditions\ are\ satisfied$

```
1. lkst_1 = lkst_2, mdst_1 = \{A-NR,A-NW\} mdst_2, mem_1 = \frac{lev,mdst_1}{low} mem_2,
```

- 2. for all $c_1' \in Com$, $lkst_1' \in LkSt$, $mdst_1' \in MdSt$, $mem_1' \in Mem$, and $\alpha_1 \in Eve$ with $\langle c_1, lkst_1, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst_1', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$ there are $c_2' \in Com$, $lkst_2' \in LkSt$, $mdst_2' \in MdSt$, $mem_2' \in Mem$, and $\alpha_2 \in Eve$ such that the following conditions are satisfied:
 - (a) $\langle c_2, lkst_2, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_2', lkst_2', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$,
 - (b) $\langle c'_1, lkst'_1, mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev} \langle c'_2, lkst'_2, mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$, and
 - (c) if there is $c_3 \in Com \ such \ that \ \alpha_1 = \nearrow_{\langle c_3,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp}\rangle}$, then there is $c_4 \in Com \ such \ that \ \alpha_2 = \nearrow_{\langle c_4,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp}\rangle} \ and$

$$\langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev} \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle$$
.

The relation \sim_{lev} is the union of all strong low bisimulations modulo modes.

We now show that our type system is sound with respect to our bisimulation-based security property.

Lemma 13. If $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'$ is derivable, then

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$$

holds for all lkst \in LkSt, $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in MdSt$, and $mem_1, mem_2 \in Mem$ with $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ and $mem_1(x) =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda} mem_2(x)$.

Proof. We prove Theorem 5 in three steps. In the first step, we construct a family of binary relations on local configurations $\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'}$ that is parameterized by a partial type environments. In the second step, we show that

$$\langle c, \mathit{lkst}, \mathit{mdst}_1, \mathit{mem}_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}^{\mathit{\Lambda'}}_{\mathit{lev}} \mathit{lev} \langle c, \mathit{lkst}, \mathit{mdst}_2, \mathit{mem}_2 \rangle$$

holds. In the third step, we show that the union of all relations $\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'}$ in the family is a strong low bisimulation modulo modes. Since \sim_{lev} is the union of all strong low bisimulation modulo modes, this suffices to show that

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_1 \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_2 \rangle$$

holds.

Before we start, note that whenever $mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ holds, then

- $mdst_1 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ holds if and only if $mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ holds, and - $x \in mdst_1(md)$ holds iff $x \in mdst_2(md)$ holds for $md \in \{A-NR, A-NW\}$.

Hence, we only need to check for these properties in one of two mode states when the two mode states fulfill $mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$.

Step 1: Constructing the family of relations. We define

$$\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{A'} = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} (\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle, \\ \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle) \end{pmatrix}, \begin{vmatrix} \exists A. \\ \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda' : c_{s1} \land \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda' : c_{s2} \\ \land c_{s1} = c_{s2} \land mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda) \\ \land mdst_1 = _{\{A-NR, A-NW\}} mdst_2 \\ \land mem_1 = _{\mathbf{low}}^{lev, \Lambda} mem_2 \end{vmatrix} \right\}$$

 $\textit{Step 2: Showing that } \langle c, \textit{lkst}, \textit{mdst}_1, \textit{mem}_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}^{\textit{A'}}_{\textit{lev}} \textit{lev} \langle c, \textit{lkst}, \textit{mdst}_2, \textit{mem}_2 \rangle \textit{ holds}.$ By the assumption $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ of the theorem we get directly that

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'} \langle c, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$$

holds for all $lkst \in LkSt$, $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in MdSt$, and $mem_1, mem_2 \in Mem$ with $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$, and $mem_1(x) =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda} mem_2(x)$.

Step 3: Showing that $\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'}$ is a strong low bisimulation modulo modes. It is clear from the definition that the family of relations $\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'}$ is symmetric, because all conditions are symmetric.

We show that $\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{A'}$ is closed under globally consistent changes. Hence, let $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{A'} \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mdst_2, mdst_3 \rangle$ According to the definition of "closed under globally consistent changes" (Definition 11), we must show that for all $x \in Var$ with $x \notin mdst_1(A-NW)$ the following two conditions hold:

- 1. If $lev(x) = \mathbf{low}$, then $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1[x \mapsto v] \rangle \mathcal{R}^{\Lambda_1, \Lambda_2}_{lev} \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2[x \mapsto v] \rangle$ holds for all $v \in Val$, and
- 2. If $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$, then $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1[x \mapsto v_1] \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda_1} \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2[x \mapsto v_2] \rangle$ holds for

Let Λ be a partial type environment that has the properties required in the defini-

tion of $\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{A'}$, i.e. $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2$. We must show that the memories are still related by $= \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ after the modification of the variables. For condition (1) this is immediate, because the variables are set to equal values on both sides of the relation.

For condition (2), we know that lev(x) = high. Hence, $\Lambda_{lev}\langle x \rangle = low$ only if

Since $mdst_1 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$, this would mean that $x \in mdst(A-NW)$. This contradicts the assumption that $x \notin mdst(A-NW)$. Hence, $mem_1[x \mapsto v_1] = \frac{lev, \Lambda_1'}{low} mem_2[x \mapsto v_1]$ v_2] also holds for condition (2).

Now we show that whenever $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'} \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$, then $mem_1 = \frac{lev, mdst_1}{low} mem_2$. Let Λ be a partial type environment with the properties stated in the definition of $\mathcal{R}^{\Lambda'}_{lev}$, i.e. $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low}$ mem_2 . To show that $mem_1 = \frac{lev, mdst_1}{low}$ mem_2 holds, assume lev(x) = low and $x \notin lev$ $mdst_1(A-NR)$. Since $mdst_1 \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$ according to the definition of $\mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'}$, we have $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$. Hence, $\Lambda'_{1lev}\langle x \rangle = \mathbf{low}$ and, thus, $mem_1(x) = mem_2(x)$ follows directly from $mem_1 = \frac{lev_1, \Lambda}{low} mem_2$.

We finally show that whenever $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'} \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$ and $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_1', mem_1' \rangle$, then there is $c_2' \in Com, mdst_2'$, $\alpha' \in Eve$, and $mem_2' \in Mem$ such that the following three conditions hold:

- 1. $\langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c'_2, lkst', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$, 2. $\langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}^{A'}_{lev} \langle c'_2, lkst', mdst'_2, mem'_2 \rangle$, and
- 3. if there is $c_3 \in Com$ such that $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}$, then there is Λ'' and $c_4 \in Com$ such that $\alpha' = \nearrow_{\langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}$ and

$$\langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{A''} \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle$$
.

From $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}^{A'}_{lev} \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$, we know by the definition of $\mathcal{R}^{A'}_{lev}$ that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda': c_{s1}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2}, c_{s1} = c_{s2}, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\{\text{A-NR,A-NW}\}} mdst_2$, and $mem_1 = \frac{lev, \Lambda}{low} mem_2$.

Assume that $\langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_1, lkst', mdst'_1, mem'_1 \rangle$.

From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda': c_{s1}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda': c_{s2}, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2, mem_1 =_{low}^{lev, \Lambda} mem_2, c_{s1} = c_{s2}, \text{ and } \langle c_1, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c_1', lkst', mdst_2', mem_1' \rangle$ we get by Lemma 11 that there is $mdst_2' \in MdSt, \alpha' \in Eve, c_2', c_{s1}', c_{s2}' \in Com, mem_2' \in Mem, \text{ and } \Lambda'' \text{ such that } \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c_2', lkst', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_1'\}\Lambda': c_{s1}', \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2'\}\Lambda': c_{s2}', c_{s1}' = c_{s2}', mdst_1', mdst_2' \in comp(lev, \Lambda''), mdst_1' =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2', \text{ and } mem_1' =_{low}^{lev, \Lambda''} mem_2'.$

 $\begin{aligned} & \textit{mem}_2 \in \textit{Mem}, \text{ and } \Lambda \quad \text{Such that } \langle c_2, \textit{ust}, \textit{must}_2, \textit{mem}_2 \rangle & \langle c_2, \textit{ust}, \textit{must}_2, \textit{mem}_2 \rangle, \\ & \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_1'\} \Lambda' : c_{s1}', \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_2'\} \Lambda' : c_{s2}', c_{s1}' = c_{s2}', \textit{mdst}_1', \textit{mdst}_2' \in \textit{comp}(\textit{lev}, \Lambda''), \\ & \textit{mdst}_1' =_{\{\mathsf{A-NR}, \mathsf{A-NW}\}} \textit{mdst}_2', \text{ and } \textit{mem}_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda''}{low} \textit{mem}_2'. \\ & \text{From } \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_1'\} \Lambda' : c_{s1}', \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda'' \{c_2'\} \Lambda' : c_{s2}', c_{s1}' = c_{s2}', \textit{mdst}_1', \textit{mdst}_2' \in \textit{comp}(\textit{lev}, \Lambda''), \\ & \textit{mdst}_1' =_{\{\mathsf{A-NR}, \mathsf{A-NW}\}} \textit{mdst}_2', \text{ and } \textit{mem}_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda''}{low} \textit{mem}_2', \text{ we get by the definition of } \mathcal{R}^{\Lambda'}_{lev} \\ & \text{that } \langle c_1', \textit{lkst}', \textit{mdst}_1', \textit{mem}_1' \rangle \mathcal{R}^{\Lambda'}_{lev} \langle c_2', \textit{lkst}', \textit{mdst}_2', \textit{mem}_2' \rangle. \end{aligned}$

Hence, the first and the second condition are fulfilled. It remains to show that the third condition, i.e. if there is $c_3 \in Com$ such that $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c_3,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp}\rangle}$, then there is $c_4 \in Com$ and Λ''' such that $\alpha' = \nearrow_{\langle c_4,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp}\rangle}$ and

$$\langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{A'''} \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle$$
.

Hence, assume that there is $c_3 \in Com$ such that $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}$. By Lemma 12 we get that there is $c_2', c_4 \in Com, lkst'' \in LkSt, mdst_2' \in MdSt, mem_2' \in Mem$, and Λ''' such that $\alpha' = \nearrow_{\langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}, \langle c_2, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\nearrow_{\langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle}} \langle c_2', lkst'', mdst_2', mem_2' \rangle$. $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''' \{c_3'\} \Lambda''' : c_{s3}, \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''' \{c_4'\} \Lambda''' : c_{s4}, c_{s3} = c_{s4}, \text{ and } pre(\Lambda''') = \emptyset$. From $pre(\Lambda''') = \emptyset$ we get that $mdst_{\perp} \in comp(lev, \Lambda''')$. From $mem_1' = mem_1'$ we get that $mem_1' = \frac{lev, \Lambda'''}{low} mem_1'$. Thus,

$$\langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle \mathcal{R}_{lev}^{\Lambda'''} \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_1 \rangle$$

holds.

We now show that every program that is typeable with the type system from the body of the article is also typeable with the type system from the appendix.

Lemma 14. If $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ is derivable, then $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ is also derivable.

Proof. We prove Lemma 14 by induction on the derivation of $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$. We distinguish the cases of the last rule applied in the derivation of $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$.

Case (TSK):

From the typing rule TSK we get that $c = c' = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$. From $c = c' = \mathbf{skip}$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$ we get by the typing rule TSK2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'$.

From the typing rule TAH we get that c = x := e, $c' = \mathbf{skip}$, $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$, $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$. From c = x := e, $c' = \mathbf{skip}$, $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$, $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$ we get by the typing rule TAH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'$. Case (TAL):

From the typing rule TAL we get that c = x := e, c' = x := e, lev(x) = low, $\vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e : low$, $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$. From c = x := e, c' = x := e, lev(x) = low, $\vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e : low$, $x \notin pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$ we get by the typing rule TAL2 that $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda \{c\}\Lambda' : c'$.

Case (TFL):

From the typing rule TFL we get that c = x := e, c' = x := e, $\vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e : \mathbf{low} \ x \in pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda' = \Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]$. From $\Lambda' = \Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}]$ we get that $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$. From c = x := e, c' = x := e, $\vdash_{lev,\Lambda} e : \mathbf{low} \ x \in pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda[x \mapsto \mathbf{low}] \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ we get by the typing rule TFL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'$.

Case (TFH):

From the typing rule TFH we get that $c=x{:=}e,\ c'=\mathbf{skip},\ x\in pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda'=\Lambda[x\mapsto\mathbf{high}]$. From $\Lambda'=\Lambda[x\mapsto\mathbf{high}]$ we get that $\Lambda[x\mapsto\mathbf{high}]\sqsubseteq\Lambda'$. From $c=x{:=}e,\ c'=x{:=}e,\ x\in pre(\Lambda)$ and $\Lambda[x\mapsto\mathbf{high}]\sqsubseteq\Lambda'$ we get by the typing rule TFH2 that $\Vdash_{lev}\Lambda\{c\}\Lambda':c'$

Case (TLO):

From the typing rule TLO we get that $c = c' = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$. From $c = c' = \mathbf{lock}(l)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$ we get by the typing rule TLO2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'$.

Case (TUL):

From the typing rule TUL we get that $c = c' = \mathbf{unlock}(l)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$. From $c = c' = \mathbf{unlock}(l)$ and $\Lambda = \Lambda'$ we get by the typing rule TUL2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'$. Case (TSP):

From the typing rule TSP we get that $c = \mathbf{spawn}(c'')$, $c' = \mathbf{spawn}(c''')$, $\vdash_{lev} c'' : c'''$ and $\Lambda' = \Lambda$. From $\vdash_{lev} c'' : c'''$ we get by the typing rule TTH that $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c''\}\Lambda'' : c'''$ with $pre(\Lambda'') = \emptyset$. From $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c''\}\Lambda'' : c'''$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c''\}\Lambda'' : c'''$. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c''\}\Lambda'' : c'''$ and $pre(\Lambda'') = \emptyset$ we ge by the typing rule TTH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} c'' : c'''$. From $c = \mathbf{spawn}(c'')$, $c' = \mathbf{spawn}(c''')$, $\Vdash_{lev} c'' : c'''$ and $\Lambda' = \Lambda$ we get by the typing rule TSP2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'$.

Case (TWL):

From the typing rule TWL we get that $c = \mathbf{while}\ e\ \mathbf{do}\ c''\ \mathbf{od},\ c = \mathbf{while}\ e\ \mathbf{do}\ c'''\ \mathbf{od},\ \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda',\ \Lambda'' \sqsubseteq \Lambda',\ \vdash_{lev,\Lambda'}\ e : \mathbf{low},\ \mathrm{and}\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda'\{c''\}\Lambda'':\ c'''.\ From\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda'\{c''\}\Lambda'':\ c'''.\ From\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda'\{c''\}\Lambda'':\ c'''.\ From\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda'\{c''\}\Lambda'':\ c'''.\ From\ c = \mathbf{while}\ e\ \mathbf{do}\ c'''\ \mathbf{od},\ c = \mathbf{while}\ e\ \mathbf{do}\ c'''\ \mathbf{od},\ \Lambda \sqsubseteq \Lambda',\ \vdash_{lev,\Lambda'}\ e : \mathbf{low},\ \mathrm{and}\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda'\{c''\}\Lambda':\ c'''.\ We get\ by\ the\ typing\ rule\ TWL2\ that\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda':\ c'.$

Case (TIL):

From the typing rule TIL we get that $c = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_2 \ \mathbf{fi}, \ c' = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c'_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c'_2 \ \mathbf{fi},$ $\vdash_{lev,\Lambda} \ e : \mathbf{low}, \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'' : c'_1, \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda''' : c'_2, \ \text{and} \ \Lambda' = \Lambda'' \ \sqcup \Lambda'''. \ \text{From}$ $\Lambda' = \Lambda'' \ \sqcup \Lambda''' \ \text{we get} \ \Lambda'' \ \sqsubseteq \Lambda' \ \text{and} \ \Lambda''' \ \sqsubseteq \Lambda' \ \text{From} \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'' : c'_1 \ \text{and}$ $\vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda''' : c'_2, \ \text{we get} \ \text{by the induction hypothesis that} \ \Vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'' : c'_1 \ \text{and}$ $\vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda''' : c'_2. \ \text{From} \ \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'' : c'_1, \ \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda''' : c'_2, \ \Lambda'' \ \sqsubseteq \Lambda'$ and $\Lambda''' \ \sqsubseteq \Lambda' \ \text{we get} \ \text{by Lemma 6 that} \ \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda' : c'_1 \ \text{and} \ \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda' : c'_2.$ From $c = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c_2 \ \mathbf{fi}, \ c' = \mathbf{if} \ e \ \mathbf{then} \ c'_1 \ \mathbf{else} \ c'_2 \ \mathbf{fi} \ \vdash_{lev,\Lambda} \ e : \mathbf{low},$ $\vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda' : c'_1 \ \text{and} \ \vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda' : c'_2 \ \text{we get} \ \text{by the typing rule TIL2 that}$ $\vdash_{lev} \ \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda' : c'.$

Case (TIH):

From the typing rule TIH we get that $c = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c_1\ \mathbf{else}\ c_2\ \mathbf{fi},\ c' = \mathbf{if}\ e\ \mathbf{then}\ c'_1\ \mathbf{else}\ c'_2\ \mathbf{fi},$ $c'_1 = c'_2,\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'':\ c'_1,\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda''':\ c'_2,\ \mathrm{and}\ \Lambda' = \Lambda''\ \sqcup\ \Lambda'''.$ From $\Lambda' = \Lambda'''\ \sqcup\ \Lambda'''$ we get $\Lambda'''\ \sqsubseteq\ \Lambda''$ and $\Lambda''''\ \sqsubseteq\ \Lambda''$. From $\vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'':\ c'_1\ \mathrm{and}\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda''':\ c'_2,\ \mathrm{we}\ \mathrm{get}\ \mathrm{by}\ \mathrm{the}\ \mathrm{induction}\ \mathrm{hypothesis}\ \mathrm{that}\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'':\ c'_1\ \mathrm{and}\ \vdash_{lev}\ \Lambda\{c_2\}\Lambda''':\ c'_2,\ \Lambda''\ \sqsubseteq\ \Lambda''\ \mathrm{and}\ \Lambda''''\ \sqsubseteq\ \Lambda''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda''''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''\ \mathrm{col}\ \Lambda'''$

Case (TSQ):

From the typing rule TSQ we get that $c=c_1; c_2, c'=c'_1; c'_2, \vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'': c'_1$ and $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2\}\Lambda': c'_2$. From $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'': c'_1$ and $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2\}\Lambda': c'_2$. we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'': c'_1$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2\}\Lambda': c'_2$. From $c=c_1; c_2, c'=c'_1; c'_2 \Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda'': c'_1$ and $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda''\{c_2\}\Lambda': c'_2$. we get by the typing rule TSQ2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$.

Case (TAN):

From the typing rule TAN we get that $c=c_1@\overrightarrow{a}, c=c_1'@\overrightarrow{a}', \vdash_{lev}\Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda':c_1', \Lambda'=\Lambda''\oplus_{lev}\overrightarrow{a}, \forall x.\Lambda''_{lev}\langle x\rangle\sqsubseteq\Lambda'_{lev}\langle x\rangle$ and $\overrightarrow{a}'=\overrightarrow{a}\upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$. From $\vdash_{lev}\Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda':c_1'$ we get by the induction hypothesis that $\Vdash_{lev}\Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda':c_1'$. From $c=c_1@\overrightarrow{a}, c=c_1'@\overrightarrow{a}', \vdash_{lev}\Lambda\{c_1\}\Lambda':c_1', \Lambda'=\Lambda''\oplus_{lev}\overrightarrow{a}, \forall x.\Lambda''_{lev}\langle x\rangle\sqsubseteq\Lambda'_{lev}\langle x\rangle$ and $\overrightarrow{a}'=\overrightarrow{a}\upharpoonright_{\text{A-NR,A-NW}}$ we get by the typing rule TAN2 that $\vdash_{lev}\Lambda\{c\}\Lambda':c_1'$.

Theorem 5. If $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ is derivable, then

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$$

holds for all lkst \in LkSt, $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in MdSt$, and $mem_1, mem_2 \in Mem$ with $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ and $mem_1(x) =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,\Lambda} mem_2(x)$.

Proof. Let lev, Λ , Λ' , c, and c' be arbitrary such that $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ is derivable. From $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ we get by Lemma 14 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ is derivable. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda': c'$ we get by Lemma 13 that

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$$

holds for all $lkst \in LkSt$, $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in MdSt$, and $mem_1, mem_2 \in Mem$ with $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2$ and $mem_1(x) =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev, \Lambda} mem_2(x)$.

9.4 Soundness of the Combined Analyses

In this subsection, we prove the soundess of our combined analysis. This includes the proof for the security type system with respect to termination-sensitive noninterference (Theorem 3), as well as the concrete combination of our analyses (Corollary 1). The following table lists the dependencies between lemmas and theorems in this subsection.

Lemma/Theorem	Depends on lemmas/theorems
Lemma 15	none
Lemma 16	Lemma 15
Lemma 17	Lemma 16, Lemma 11, Lemma 13
Theorem 3	Lemma 17, Lemma 14
Corollary 1	Theorems 1, 2, 3

Definition 13. A command c does not read variable x, if for all c', lkst, lkst', mdst, mdst', mem, mem', and α with $\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle$ one of the following two conditions is satisfied:

- $\forall Val. \langle c, lkst, mdst, mem[x \mapsto v] \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem'[x \mapsto v] \rangle, or$
- $\forall Val. \langle c, lkst, mdst, mem[x \mapsto v] \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem' \rangle.$

Note that in a local configuration $\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem \rangle$ the command c does not read any variable for which it provides a no-read guarantee, because the conditions in the definition of "does not read" and "provide its no-read guarantees" coincide.

First we prove that a command that does not read some variables is not influenced by said variables.

Lemma 15. Let $\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_1 \rangle$, $\langle c', lkst', mdst', mem'_1 \rangle \in LCnf$ be local configurations, $\alpha \in Eve$ be an event, $x_1, \ldots, x_k \in Var$ be variables, and $mem_2 \in Mem$ be a memory.

If c does not read x_i for all $i \in \{1, ..., k\}$, $\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\sim} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem'_1 \rangle$, $mem_1(x) = mem_2(x)$ for all $x \in Var \setminus \{x_1, ..., x_k\}$, then there is a memory $mem'_2 \in Mem$ such that $\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\sim} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem'_2 \rangle$ and $mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x)$ for all $x \in Var \setminus \{x_1, ..., x_k\}$.

Moreover, if $mem_1(x) \neq mem_1'(x)$ or $mem_2(x) \neq mem_2'(x)$ hold for $x \in \{x_1, \dots, x_k\}$, then $mem_1'(x) = mem_2'(x)$.

Proof. We prove this lemma by induction on the number of variables k. Let firstly k = 0. In this case, we have $mem_1 = mem_2$ and we conclude by setting $mem'_2 = mem'_1$.

Now let k > 0. Let $mem_3 = mem_2[x_k \mapsto mem_1(x_k)]$. This means, mem_3 and mem_1 differ only in the variables in $\{x_1, \ldots, x_{k-1}\}$. Hence, we get from the induction hypothesis that there is mem_3' with

$$\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_3 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem_3' \rangle$$

and mem'_1 and mem'_3 only differ in the variables in $\{x_1, \ldots, x_{k-1}\}$ for which $mem_1(x) = mem'_1(x)$ or $mem_3(x) = mem'_3(x)$. By construction of mem_3 there is v such that $mem_3 = mem_2[x_k \mapsto v]$. Since c does not read x_k one of the following conditions holds:

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-\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem'_3[x_k \mapsto v] \rangle-\langle c, lkst, mdst, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c', lkst', mdst', mem'_3 \rangle
```

In the first case, we define $mem'_2 = mem'_3[x_k \mapsto v]$, and in the second case, we define $mem'_2 = mem'_3$. Hence, mem'_2 and mem'_3 differ at most in x_k . Moreover, if $mem_2(x_k) \neq mem'_2(x_k)$, then $mem'_2(x_k) \neq v$. Hence, it must be the second case, thus, $mem'_2(x_k) = mem'_3(x_k)$. Finally, if $mem_3(x_k) \neq mem'_3(x_k)$, we can turn around the reasoning and consider $mem_3 = mem_2[x_k \mapsto v']$ to conclude.

Hence, mem'_1 and mem'_2 differ only on the variables in $\{x_1, \ldots, x_k\}$ and they do not differ on those variables in $\{x_1, \ldots, x_k\}$ that have been written in one of the execution steps.

We now show that for two global configurations in which each pair of configurations is related by our bisimulation, all steps of the first configuration can be matched by the second thread, and in the resulting global configurations each pair of configurations is again related by our bisimulation relation.

Lemma 16. Let $gcnf_1 = \langle [(c_{1,1}, lkst_1, mdst_{1,1}), \dots, (c_{1,n}, lkst_n, mdst_{1,n})], mem_1 \rangle$ and $gcnf_2 = \langle [(c_{2,1}, lkst_1, mdst_{2,1}), \dots, (c_{2,n}, lkst_n, mdst_{2,n})], mem_2 \rangle$ be two global configurations that use modes globally sound, provide sound guarantees, and that satisfy $\forall i, j.i \neq j \implies lkst_i \cap lkst_j = \emptyset$.

If there is a global configuration

$$gcnf'_1 = \langle [(c'_{1,1}, lkst'_1, mdst'_{1,1}), \dots, (c'_{1,m}, lkst'_m, mdst_{1,m})'], mem'_1 \rangle$$

such that $gcnf_1 \rightarrow gcnf'_1$ and there exist $mem_{1,i}, mem_{2,i} \in Mem$ for all $i \in \{1, ..., n\}$ with

 $-\langle c_{1,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{1,i}, mem_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_{2,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{2,i}, mem_{2,i} \rangle$, and - $mem_{1,i}(x) = mem_1(x)$ and $mem_{2,i}(x) = mem_2(x)$ hold for all x with $(lev(x) = \mathbf{high}) \lor mem_1(x) = mem_2(x) \lor x \notin \bigcup_{i \in \{1, \dots, n\}} mdst_{1,i}(A-NR),$

then there exist $gcnf'_2, c'_{2,1}, \ldots, c'_{2,m}, mdst'_{2,1}, \ldots, mdst'_{2,m}, and mem'_2$ with $gcnf'_2 = \langle [(c'_{2,1}, lkst'_1, mdst'_{2,1}), \dots, (c'_{2,m}, lkst'_m, mdst'_{2,m})], mem'_2 \rangle$ such that

- 1. $gcnf_2 \rightarrow gcnf'_2$, and
- 2. for all $i \in \{1, ..., m\}$ there are $mem'_{1,i}, mem'_{2,i} \in Mem$ with

 - $\begin{array}{l} \langle c'_{1,i}, lkst'_i, mdst'_{1,i}, mem'_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c'_{2,i}, lkst'_i, mdst'_{2,i}, mem'_{2,i} \rangle, \ and \\ \ mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem_1(x) \ and \ mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem_2(x) \ hold \ for \ all \ x \ with \ (lev(x) = mem_2(x) \ hold \ for \ all \ x \ wi$ $\mathbf{high}) \vee mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x) \vee x \notin \bigcup_{i \in \{1, ..., m\}} mdst'_{1,i}(A-NR), \ and$
- 3. $\forall i, j.i \neq j \implies lkst'_i \cap lkst'_i = \emptyset$.

Proof. We prove this lemma in two steps. In the first step, we construct a global configuration $gcnf'_2$ such that conclusion (1) and (3) from the lemma is satisfied, i.e. $gcnf_2 \rightarrow gcnf'_2$. In the second step, we prove that the global configuration $gcnf'_2$ also satisfies conclusion (2) of this lemma.

Step 1 (Constructing $gcnf'_2$). We show that the execution step $gcnf_1 \rightarrow gcnf'_1$ can be matched by an execution step in $gcnf_2$. From $gcnf_1 woheadrightarrow <math>gcnf_1'$,

$$gcnf_1 = \langle [(c_{1,1}, lkst_1, mdst_{1,1}), \dots, (c_{1,n}, lkst_n, mdst_{1,n})], mem_1 \rangle$$

and $gcnf_1' = \langle [(c_{1,1}', lkst_1', mdst_{1,1}'), \dots, (c_{1,m}', lkst_m', mdst_{1,m})'], mem_1' \rangle$ we get by the definition of the global transition system that either m = n or m = n + 1 and there is some $j, j' \in \{1, ..., n\}$ and $\alpha \in Eve$ with n - j' = j

- $\begin{array}{ll} \text{(A)} & \langle c_{1,j}, \mathit{lkst}_j, \mathit{mdst}_{1,j}, \mathit{mem}_1 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_{1,m-j'}, \mathit{lkst}'_{m-j'}, \mathit{mdst}'_{1,m-j'}, \mathit{mem}'_1 \rangle \\ \text{(B)} & (c_{1,i}, \mathit{lkst}_i, \mathit{mdst}_{1,i}) = (c'_{1,i}, \mathit{lkst}'_i, \mathit{mdst}'_{1,i}) \text{ for all } i < j \end{array}$
- (C) $(c_{1,n-i}, lkst_{n-i}, mdst_{1,n-i}) = (c'_{1,m-i}, lkst'_{m-i}, mdst'_{1,m-i})$ for all i < j'
- (D) if m = n + 1, then $(c'_{1,j}, lkst'_j, mdst'_{1,j}) = (c_3, \emptyset, mdst_\perp)$ and $\alpha = \nearrow_{(c_3,\emptyset, mdst_\perp)}$

By assumption of this lemma there are $mem_{1,j}, mem_{2,j} \in Mem$ such that for all $x \in Var$ we have

- (E) $\langle c_{1,j}, lkst_j, mdst_{1,j}, mem_{1,j} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_{2,j}, lkst_j, mdst_{2,j}, mem_{2,j} \rangle$, and
- (F) $\lceil (lev(x) = high) \lor mem_1(x) = mem_2(x) \lor x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, ..., n\} \setminus \{j\}} mdst_{1,k}(A-NR) \rceil$ $\implies mem_{1,j}(x) = mem_1(x)$, and
- (G) $[(lev(x) = \mathbf{high}) \lor mem_1(x) = mem_2(x) \lor x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus \{j\}} mdst_{1,k}(A-NR)]$ $\implies mem_{2,j}(x) = mem_2(x).$

From (E) we get by definition of strong low bisimulation modulo modes that

(H)
$$mem_{1,j} =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev, mdst_{1,j}} mem_{2,j}$$
.

Due to (F), $mem_{1,j}$ and mem_1 differ only in variables x with $lev(x) = \mathbf{low}$, $mem_1(x) \neq mem_2(x)$, and $x \in mdst_{1,k}(\mathsf{A-NR})$ for some $k \neq j$. As by the assumption of this lemma, $gcnf_1$ uses modes globally sound, we have $x \in mdst_{1,j}(\mathsf{G-NR})$ for these variables. Moreover, by assumption of this lemma, $gcnf_1$ provides its guarantees and, hence, $c_{1,j}$ does not read the variables whose values differ in mem_1 and $mem_{1,j}$. We may hence apply Lemma 15 for the transition in (A) and the memory $mem_{1,m-j'}$ with

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{(I)} & \langle c_{1,j}, \mathit{lkst}_j, \mathit{mdst}_{1,j}, \mathit{mem}_{1,j} \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha} \langle c'_{1,m-j'}, \mathit{lkst}'_{m-j'}, \mathit{mdst}'_{1,m-j'}, \mathit{mem}'_{1,m-j'} \rangle \\ \text{(J)} & [(\mathit{lev}(x) = \mathbf{high}) \vee \mathit{mem}_1(x) = \mathit{mem}_2(x) \vee x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus \{j\}} \mathit{mdst}_{1,k}(\mathsf{A-NR})] \\ & \Longrightarrow \mathit{mem}'_{1,m-j'}(x) = \mathit{mem}'_1(x) \text{ for all } x \in \mathit{Var}. \end{array}$$

From (E) we get due to (I) that there is $mdst_{2,m-j'}, c'_{2,m-j'}, \alpha' \in Eve, mem'_{2,m-j'} \in Mem$ with

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \text{(K)} & \langle c_{2,j}, lkst_{j}, mdst_{2,j}, mem_{2,j} \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \langle c'_{2,m-j'}, lkst'_{m-j'}, mdst'_{2,m-j'}, mem'_{2,m-j'} \rangle \\ \text{(L)} & \langle c'_{1,m-j'}, lkst'_{m-j'}, mdst'_{1,m-j'}, mem'_{1,m-j'} \rangle \\ & & \sim_{lev} \\ & \langle c'_{2,m-j'}, lkst'_{m-j'}, mdst'_{2,m-j'}, mem'_{2,m-j'} \rangle \end{array}$$

(M) if $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c_3,\emptyset,mdst_\perp\rangle}$, then there is c_4 such that $\alpha = \nearrow_{\langle c_4,\emptyset,mdst_\perp\rangle}$ and $\langle c'_{1,j}, lkst'_j, mdst'_{1,j}, mem'_{1,j}\rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c'_{2,j}, lkst'_j, mdst'_{2,j}, mem'_{2,j}\rangle$ with $c'_{1,j} = c_3, c'_{2,j} = c_4, lkst'_j = \emptyset, mdst'_{1,j} = mdst'_{2,j} = mdst_\perp$, and $mem'_{2,j} = mem'_{1,j} = mem'_{1,m-j'}$.

From (L) we get by the definition of strong low bisimulation modulo modes that

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{(N)} & mdst_{1,m-j'} =_{\{\text{A-NR,A-NW}\}} & mdst_{2,m-j'}, \text{ and} \\ \text{(O)} & mem'_{1,m-j'} =_{\mathbf{low}}^{lev,mdst_{1,m-j'}} & mem'_{2,m-j'}. \end{array}$

Due to (G), we may exploit globally sound use of modes and providing sound guarantees as before to apply Lemma 15 (as before) for the transition in (K) and the memory mem_2 . This yields a memory mem_2' such that

$$\begin{array}{ll} (\mathrm{P}) \ \ \langle c_{2,j}, lkst_j, mdst_{2,j}, mem_2 \rangle \xrightarrow{\alpha'} \ \langle c_{2,m-j'}', lkst_{m-j'}', mdst_{2,m-j'}', mem_2' \rangle \\ (\mathrm{Q}) \ \ [(lev(x) = \mathbf{high}) \lor mem_1(x) = mem_2(x) \lor x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, n\} \setminus \{j\}} mdst_{1,k}(\mathsf{A-NR})] \\ \Longrightarrow \ mem_{2,j}'(x) = mem_2'(x) \ \ \text{for all} \ \ x \in \mathit{Var}. \end{array}$$

That means, we have now constructed $c_{2,m-j'}$, $mdst_{2,m-j'}$ and mem'_2 . It remains to construct $c'_{2,i}$, $lkst'_i$ and $mdst'_{2,i}$ for $i \neq (m-j')$. To this end, we define

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{(R)} & c'_{2,i} = c_{2,i}, \; lkst'_i = lkst_i, \; \text{and} \; \; mdst'_{2,i} = mdst_{2,i} \; \text{for} \; i < j \\ \text{(S)} & c'_{2,m-i} = c_{2,m-i}, \; lkst'_{m-i} = lkst_{m-i}, \; \text{and} \; \; mdst'_{2,m-i} = mdst_{2,m-i} \; \text{for} \; i < j'. \end{array}$$

Now assume that m=n and $\alpha \neq l$, then we get by the definition of the global transition system that $gcnf_2 \twoheadrightarrow gcnf_2'$ with $gcnf_2' = \langle [(c'_{2,1}, lkst'_1, mdst'_{2,1}), \ldots, (c'_{2,m}, lkst'_m, mdst'_{2,m})], mem'_2 \rangle$. Since $\alpha \neq l$, we get from the definition of the local transition system (Figure 2) that $lkst_{m-j'} \subseteq lkst_j$. Hence, $\forall i, k.i \neq k \implies lkst'_i \cap lkst'_k$ follows directly from $\forall i, k.i \neq k \implies lkst_i \cap lkst_k$.

Now assume that m=n and $\alpha=l$, then we get from $gcnf_1 \twoheadrightarrow gcnf_1'$ by the definition of the global transition system that

 $l \notin locks([(c_{1,1}, lkst_1, mdst_{1,1}), \ldots, c_{1,n}, lkst_n, mdst_{1,n}]). \text{ From this we get by the definition of the global transition system that } gcnf_2 \rightarrow gcnf_2' \text{ with } gcnf_2' = \langle [(c_{2,1}', lkst_1', mdst_{2,1}'), \ldots, (c_{2,m}', lkst_m', mdst_{2,m}')], n \text{ Since } \alpha = l, \text{ we get from the definition of the local transition system (Figure 2) that } lkst_{m-j'} = lkst_j \cup \{l\}. \text{ Since } l \notin locks([(c_{1,1}, lkst_1, mdst_{1,1}), \ldots, c_{1,n}, lkst_n, mdst_{1,n}]) \text{ we get from } lkst_{m-j'} = lkst_j \cup \{l\} \text{ and } lkst_i' = lkst_i \text{ for all } i < j \text{ and } lkst_{m-i}' = lkst_{n-i} \text{ for all } i < j' \text{ and } \forall i, k.i \neq k \implies lkst_i \cap lkst_k \text{ that } \forall i, k.i \neq k \implies lkst_i' \cap lkst_k'.$

Now assume that m=n+1. We further define $c'_{2,j}=c_4$, $lkst'_j=\emptyset$, and $mdst'_{2,j}=mdst_{\perp}$ and get from the definition of the global transition system that $gcnf_2 \twoheadrightarrow gcnf'_2$ with

 $gcnf_2' = \langle [(c_{2,1}', lkst_1', mdst_{2,1}'), \ldots, (c_{2,m}', lkst_m', mdst_{2,m}')], mem_2' \rangle$. In this case, we have $\alpha = \nearrow \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle$ and $\alpha = \nearrow \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp} \rangle$. Hence, we get by the definition of the local transition system (Figure 2) that $lkst_j = lkst_{m-j'}'$. From $lkst_i = lkst_i'$ for all i < j and $lkst_{n-i} = lkst_{m-i}'$ for all i < j' and $lkst_j = lkst_{m-j'}'$ and $lkst_j' = \emptyset$ and $\forall i, k.i \neq k \implies lkst_i' \cap lkst_k'$ that $\forall i, k.i \neq k \implies lkst_i' \cap lkst_k'$ holds.

Step 2 (Showing that $gcnf'_2$ satisfies conclusion (2)). In this step, we show that for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ there are memories $mem'_{1,i}, mem'_{2,i} \in Mem$ with $mem'_1(x) = mem'_{1,i}(x)$ and $mem'_2(x) = mem'_{2,i}(x)$ for all x with $(lev(x) = \mathbf{high}) \vee mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x) \vee x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \ldots, m\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR)$, and $\langle c'_{1,i}, lkst'_i, mdst'_{1,i}, mem'_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c'_{2,i}, lkst'_i, mdst'_{1,i}, mem'_{2,i} \rangle$.

We distinguish four cases i < j, i = m - j', i > m - j', and i = j where $(j \text{ is the index of of the command performing the execution step, and <math>j' = n - j$ is the index counted from the end of the command performing the execution step as exhibited in Step 1).

Case (i=m-j'): The memories $mem'_{1,m-j'}$ and $mem'_{2,m-j'}$ have already been constructed in Step 1. In (L), we have already established that

$$\begin{split} \langle c'_{1,m-j'}, lkst'_{m-j'}, mdst'_{1,m-j'}, mem'_{1,m-j'} \rangle \\ \sim_{lev} \\ \langle c'_{2,m-j'}, lkst'_{m-j'}, mdst'_{2,m-j'}, mem'_{2,m-j'} \rangle. \end{split}$$

It remains to show that for all x with $(lev(x) = \mathbf{high}) \lor mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x) \lor x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,m\} \backslash \{m-j'\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-\mathsf{NR}),$ we have $mem'_1(x) = mem'_{1,m-j'}(x)$ and $mem'_2(x) = mem'_{2,m-j'}(x)$.

Assume first that $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$. Then $mem'_1(x) = mem'_{1,i}(x)$ and $mem'_2(x) = mem'_{2,i}(x)$ follow directly from (J) and (Q).

Assume now that $x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,m\} \setminus \{m-j'\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR)$. For all $k \neq (m-j')$ and $k \neq j$ we have $mdst_{1,k} = mdst'_{1,k}$ according to (B) and (C). If m = n+1 (and hence $m-j' \neq j$), we have $mdst'_j = mdst_{\perp}$ according to (D). Hence, $\bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,m\} \setminus \{m-j'\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR) = \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,n\} \setminus \{j\}} mdst_{1,k}(A-NR)$. Thus, $mem'_1(x) = mem'_{1,i}(x)$ and $mem'_2(x) = mem'_{2,i}(x)$ follow directly from (J) and (Q).

Assume finally that $mem_1'(x) = mem_2'(x)$. If $mem_1(x) = mem_2(x)$ also holds, then $mem_1'(x) = mem_{1,i}'(x)$ and $mem_2'(x) = mem_{2,i}'(x)$ follow directly from (J) and (Q). Hence, assume that $mem_1(x) \neq mem_2(x)$. This means, that the execution step from (A) or (I) has modified x. Since both execution steps have been obtained with Lemma 15, we get that x is modified to the same value in $mem_{1,m-j'}$ and mem_1 respectively $mem_{2,m-j'}$ and mem_2 . This concludes this case.

Case (i < j): We define the memories $mem'_{1,i}$ and $mem'_{2,i}$ as follows for all $x \in Var$:

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(T) If lev(x) = \mathbf{high} or mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x) or x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst'_{1,k}(\mathsf{A-NR}), then mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem'_1(x) and mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem'_2(x).
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(U) Otherwise, i.e. $lev(x) = \mathbf{low}, \ mem'_1(x) \neq mem'_2(x), \ \text{and} \ x \in \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst'_{1,k}(\text{A-NR}), \ mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem_{1,i}(x) \ \text{and} \ mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem_{2,i}(x).$

We first show that $mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem'_1(x)$ and $mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem'_2(x)$ hold for all all x with $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$ or $mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x)$ or $x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst'_{1,k}(\mathsf{A-NR})$. From the properties assumed for x we get by (T) that $mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem'_1$ and $mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem'_2$ hold directly.

We now show that $\langle c'_{1,i}, lkst'_i, mdst'_{1,i}, mem'_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c'_{2,i}, lkst'_i, mdst'_{2,i}, mem'_{2,i} \rangle$. Since i < j, we have $c'_{1,i} = c_{1,i}$, $c'_{2,i} = c_{2,i}$, $lkst'_i = lkst_i$, $mdst'_{1,i} = mdst_{1,i}$, and $mdst'_{2,i} = mdst_{2,i}$. Hence, we need to show that

 $\langle c_{1,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{1,i}, mem'_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_{2,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{2,i}, mem'_{2,i} \rangle$. According to the assumptions of this Lemma, we have

 $\langle c_{1,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{1,i}, mem_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_{2,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{2,i}, mem_{2,i} \rangle$. Since \sim_{lev} is closed under globally consistent changes, it suffices to show that $mem'_{1,i}$ and $mem'_{2,i}$ can be obtained from $mem_{1,i}$ and $mem_{2,i}$, respectively, using the closure condition for globally consistent changes.

Note that due to the definition in (T) and (U), $mem'_{1,i}(x) \neq mem_{1,i}(x)$ or $mem'_{2,i}(x) \neq mem_{2,i}(x)$ only hold if $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$ or $mem'_{1}(x) = mem'_{2}(x)$ or $x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR)$. We further only need to consider cases in which one of the three conditions holds. Moreover, due to (T) we have $mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem_{1}(x)$ and $mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem_{2}(x)$ in these cases.

First, consider a variable x with $x \notin mdst_{1,i}(\mathsf{A-NW})$. If $lev(x) = \mathbf{high}$, then the new values of x can be set by global consistent changes, because global consistent changes allow modifying \mathbf{high} variables to arbitrary values. If $lev(x) = \mathbf{low}$, we get by the assumptions from the previous paragraph that $mem_1'(x) = mem_2'(x)$ or $x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst_{1,k}'(\mathsf{A-NR})$. If $x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst_{1,k}'(\mathsf{A-NR})$, this means in particular that $x \notin mdst_{1,j}'(\mathsf{A-NR})$. Hence, by (O) we get that $mem_{1,m-j'}'(x) = mem_{2,m-j'}'(x)$, and hence by (J) and (Q) we get $mem_1'(x) = mem_2'(x)$. Since global consistent changes allows modifying these variables to identical values, we can conclude this case.

Now consider a variable x with $x \in mdst_{1,i}(A-NW)$. This means in particular, that $x \in mdst_{2,i}(A-NW)$ also holds due to $mdst_{1,i} =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_{2,i}$. From the assumption that the global configurations $gcnf_1$ and $gcnf_2$ use modes globally sound, we get that $x \in mdst_{1,j}(G-NW)$ and $x \in mdst_{2,j}(G-NW)$. Since $gcnf_1$ and $gcnf_2$ also provide sound guarantees, $c_{1,j}$ and $c_{2,j}$ do not write x. Hence, due to the definition of "does not write", we get $mem_1(x) = mem_1'(x)$ and $mem_2(x) = mem_2'(x)$.

Assume now that $mem_1(x) = mem_{1,j}(x)$, and $mem_2(x) = mem_{2,j}(x)$. Then $mem'_{1,m-j'}(x) = mem_{1,j}(x)$ and $mem_{2,m-j'}(x) = mem_{2,j}(x)$, due to the fact that x is not written (established in the previous paragraph).

Assume now contrarily that $mem_1(x) \neq mem_{1,j}(x)$, or $mem_2(x) \neq mem_{2,j}(x)$. Then we have from the assumptions of this Lemma that $lev(x) = \mathbf{low}$, $mem_1(x) \neq mem_2(x)$, and $x \in \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,n\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst_{1,k}(A-NR)$. If $mem_1'(x) = mem_2'(x)$, this would contradict that $c_{1,j}$ and $c_{2,j}$ do not write x (established two paragraphs before). Hence, assume $mem_1'(x) \neq mem_2'(x)$. Due to the assumption above this implies that $x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst_{1,k}(A-NR)$. However, since $x \in \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,n\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst_{1,k}(A-NR)$

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and all mode states except for the mode state mdst_i and possibly the new mode
     state mdst'_i do not change during the execution step, and if there is a new mode
     state mdst'_i, then mdst'_i = mdst_{\perp}, we get that x \in mdst_{1,i}(A-NR) and x \notin mdst_{1,i}(A-NR)
     mdst_{1,m-j'} (A-NR). This contradicts that mem_{1,j} = \frac{lev, mdst_{1,j}}{low} mem_{2,j} and mem'_{1,m-j'} = \frac{lev, mdst_{1,j}}{low} mem'_{2,m-j'} while c_{1,j} and c_{2,j} do not write x. Hence, we know that mem_{1,i}(x) = \frac{lev, mdst_{1,j}}{low}
     mem'_1(x) and mem_{2,i}(x) = mem'_2(x) for all variables with x \in mdst'_{1,i}(A-NW)
     and, hence, we must not apply any changes.
Case (i > m - j'): This case is analogous to the case i < j, but with different index-
     ing, i.e. whenever one encounters an i for a symbol without a prime one uses n-j
     and whenever one encounters an i for a symbol with a prime one uses m-j'.
Case (i = j): If m = n, then this case (i = j) coincides with the case i = m - j'.
     Hence assume that m = n + 1.
     We define the memories mem_{1,j}' and mem_{2,j}' as follows for all x \in \mathit{Var}: (V) If lev(x) = \mathbf{high} or mem_1'(x) = mem_2'(x) or
           x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1,\dots,m\} \setminus \{j\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR), then
           mem'_{1,j}(x) = mem'_{1}(x) and mem'_{2,j}(x) = mem'_{2}(x).
     (W) Otherwise, i.e. lev(x) = low, mem'_1(x) \neq mem'_2(x), and
     \begin{array}{l} x\in\bigcup_{k\in\{1,...,m\}\backslash\{j\}} mdst'_{1,k}(\text{A-NR}),\\ mem'_{1,j}(x)=mem'_{2,j}(x)=mem'_{1,m-j'}(x).\\ \text{We first show that } mem'_{1,j}(x)=mem'_{1}(x) \text{ and } mem'_{2,j}(x)=mem'_{2}(x) \text{ hold for all } \end{array}
     all x with lev(x) = \mathbf{high} or mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x) or x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1, \dots, m\} \setminus \{j\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR).
     From the properties assumed for x we get by (V) that mem'_{1,j}(x) = mem'_1(x) and
     mem'_{2,j}(x) = mem'_2(x) hold directly.
     We now show that \langle c'_{1,j}, lkst'_j, mdst'_{1,j}, mem'_{1,j} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c'_{2,j}, lkst'_j, mdst'_{2,j}, mem'_{2,j} \rangle. Since i = j and m = n + 1, we have c'_{1,j} = c_3, c'_{2,j} = c_4, lkst'_j = \emptyset, and mdst'_{1,j} = 0
     mdst'_{2,j} = mdst_{\perp}. Hence, we need to show that \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_{1,j} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_{2,j} \rangle.
     According to (M) we have
     \langle c_3, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_{1,m-j'} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_4, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem'_{2,m-j'} \rangle Since \sim_{lev} is closed un-
     der globally consistent changes, it suffices to show that mem'_{1,j} and mem'_{2,j} can
     be obtained from mem'_{1,m-j'}.
     Note that due to the definition in (V) and (W), mem'_{1,j}(x) \neq mem'_{1,m-j'}(x) or
     mem'_{2,j}(x) \neq mem'_{1,m-j'}(x) can only hold if lev(x) = \mathbf{high} or mem'_1(x) = x'_2(x)
     or x \notin \bigcup_{k \in \{1,...,m\} \setminus \{i\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR). We further only need to consider cases in
     which one of the three conditions holds. Moreover, due to (V) we have mem'_{1,j}(x) =
     mem'_1(x) and mem'_{2,j}(x) = mem'_2(x) in these cases.
     Since mdst'_{1,j} = mdst_{\perp} there are no variables x with x \in mdst'_{1,j}(A-NW), and
     we only need to consider variables x with x \notin mdst'_{1,j}(A-NW). Hence, assume
     x \notin mdst'_{1,j}(A-NW) holds for x. If lev(x) = high, then the new values of x
     can be set by global consistent changes, because global consistent changes al-
     low modifying high variables to arbitrary values. If lev(x) = low, we get by
     the assumptions from the previous paragraph that mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x) or x \notin
     \bigcup_{k\in\{1,\ldots,m\}\setminus\{j\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR). If x\notin\bigcup_{k\in\{1,\ldots,m\}\setminus\{i\}} mdst'_{1,k}(A-NR), this means
     in particular that x \notin mdst'_{1,j}(A-NR). Hence, by (O) we get that mem'_{1,m-j'}(x) =
     mem'_{2,m-j'}(x), and hence by (J) and (Q) we get mem'_1(x) = mem'_2(x). Since
     global consistent changes allows modifying these variables to identical values, we
     can conclude this case.
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Lemma 17. If c_p ensures a sound use of modes and $\Vdash_{lev} c_p : c'$ is derivable, then c_p is secure for lev.

Proof. Let lev and $c, c' \in Com$ be arbitrary such that c ensures a sound use of mdoes and $\vdash_{lev} c : c'$.

We now must show

Hence, let $\overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 \in CCnf^*$ and $mem_1, mem_2, mem'_1 \in Mem$ be arbitrary such that $trm(\overrightarrow{ccnf}_1), mem_1 = \stackrel{lev}{low} mem_2$, and $\langle [(c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})], mem_1 \rangle \rightarrow * \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}, mem'_1 \rangle$. Hence, we know that there is a k such that $\langle [(c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})], mem_1 \rangle \rightarrow *_k \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}, mem'_1 \rangle$. We now show that k inductive applications of Lemma 16 establish the desired result.

From $\Vdash_{lev} c: c'$ we get by the rule TTH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda: c'$ with $pre(\Lambda) = \emptyset$. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c\}\Lambda: c'$ we get by Lemma 13 that $\langle c, lkst, mdst_1, mem_1 \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c, lkst, mdst_2, mem_2 \rangle$ holds for all $lkst \in LkSt, mdst_1, mdst_2 \in MdSt,$ and $mem_1, mem_2 \in Mem$ with $mdst_1, mdst_2 \in comp(lev, \Lambda), mdst_1 =_{\{A-NR,A-NW\}} mdst_2,$ and $mem_1(x) = mem_2(x)$ for all x with $lev_{\Lambda}\langle x \rangle = \mathbf{low}$.

From $pre(\Lambda) = \emptyset$ we get by the definition of $mdst_{\perp}$ and $comp(lev, \Lambda)$ that $mdst_{\perp} \in comp(lev, \Lambda)$.

From $pre(\Lambda) = \emptyset$ we get that $mem_1 = \frac{lev}{low}$ mem_2 implies that $mem_1(x) = mem_2(x)$ for all x with $lev_{\Lambda}\langle x \rangle = low$.

Hence, we have $\langle c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem_1 \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}, mem_2 \rangle$ for all $mem_1 = ^{lev}_{low}$ mem_2 .

Furthermore, since the lock state is \emptyset , the global configurations $\langle [c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}], mem_1 \rangle$ and $\langle [c, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp}], mem_2 \rangle$ satisfies $\forall i, j.i \neq j \implies lkst_i \cap lkst_j = \emptyset$.

Since sound use of modes is invariant under execution steps in our semantics, and the postconditions of Lemma 16 again establish the preconditions of Lemma 16 for the subsequent global configurations, we can apply Lemma 16 k times inductively to obtain that there is $\overrightarrow{ccnf}_2 \in CCnf^*$ and mem'_2 such that $\langle [(c,\emptyset,mdst_{\perp})],mem_2\rangle \twoheadrightarrow_k \langle \overrightarrow{ccnf}_2,mem'_2\rangle$.

It remains to show that $trm(\overrightarrow{ccnf}_2)$, and $mem'_1 = _{low}^{lev} mem'_2$.

From the inductive application of Lemma 16, we also get that there is $c_{1,1},\ldots,c_{1,m},c_{2,1},\ldots,c_{2,m}\in Com$ and $lkst_1,\ldots,lkst_m\in LkSt$ and

 $\begin{array}{l} - \langle c_{1,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{1,i}, mem'_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_{2,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{2,i}, mem'_{2,i} \rangle, \text{ and} \\ - mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem'_{1}(x) \text{ and } mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem'_{2}(x) \text{ hold for all } x \text{ with } (lev(x) = \mathbf{high}) \vee mem_{1}(x) = mem_{2}(x) \vee x \notin \bigcup_{j \in \{1, \dots, n\}} mdst_{1,j}(\mathsf{A}\text{-}\mathsf{NR}) \end{array}$

From $trm(\overrightarrow{ccnf}_1)$ and $\overrightarrow{ccnf}_1 = [(c_{1,1}, lkst_1, mdst_{1,1}), \ldots, (c_{1,m}, lkst_m, mdst_{1,m})]$ we get that $c_{1,i} = \mathbf{stop}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$. From $\langle c_{1,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{1,i}, mem'_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_{2,i}, lkst_i, mdst_{2,i}, mem'_{2,i} \rangle$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$, we get that $c_{2,i} = \mathbf{stop}$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$. Hence, we get from $\overrightarrow{ccnf}_2 = [(c_{2,1}, lkst_1, mdst_{2,1}), \ldots, (c_{2,m}, lkst_{2,m}, mdst_m)]$ by the definition of trm that $trm(\overrightarrow{ccnf}_2)$.

From the typing rules TSP2 and TTH2, we know that the command of each thread is typeable with partial type environments that have an empty preimage. As we have seen in Lemma 11, this means that all resulting mode state must be compatible with the partial type environment with empty preimage. Thus, $x \notin mdst_{1,i}(A-NR)$ holds for all x with lev(x) = low. Hence, we get from $mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem'_{1}(x)$ and $mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem'_{2}(x)$ hold for all x with $(lev(x) = high) \lor mem_{1}(x) = mem'_{1}(x) \lor x \notin \bigcup_{j \in \{1,...,n\}} mdst_{1,j}(A-NR)$, that $mem'_{1,i}(x) = mem'_{1}(x)$ and $mem'_{2,i}(x) = mem'_{2}(x)$ hold for all x with lev(x) = low. From this combined with $\langle c_{1,i}, lkst_{i}, mdst_{1,i}, mem'_{1,i} \rangle \sim_{lev} \langle c_{2,i}, lkst_{i}, mdst_{2,i}, mem'_{2,i} \rangle$ for all $i \in \{1, \ldots, m\}$ we get by the definition of $\sim_{lev}, = \frac{lev}{low}$, and $= \frac{lev, mdst}{low}$ that $mem'_{1} = \frac{lev}{low}$ mem'_{2} .

We are now ready to prove the soundness of our security type system with respect to termination-sensitive noninterference (Theorem 3).

Proof. Let lev, c_p , c' be arbitrary such that c_p ensures a sound use of modes and $\vdash_{lev} c_p : c'$ is derivable.

From $\vdash_{lev} c_p : c'$ we get by the typing rule TTH that $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_p\}\Lambda : c'$ with $pre(\Lambda) = \emptyset$. From $\vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_p\}\Lambda : c'$ we get by Lemma 14 that $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_p\}\Lambda : c'$. From $\Vdash_{lev} \Lambda\{c_p\}\Lambda : c'$ and $pre(\Lambda) = \emptyset$ we ge by the typing rule TTH2 that $\Vdash_{lev} c_p : c'$.

From the fact that c_p ensures a sound use of modes and $\Vdash_{lev} c_p : c'$ we get by Lemma 17 that c_p is secure for lev.

The following is the proof of Corollary 1.

Proof. Corollary 1 follows directly from the soundness result for the security type system (Theorem 3), and the soundness result for the guarantee inference (Theorem 2), and the soundness result for the DPN analysis (Theorem 1).

9.5 Proof for example analysis

The following is the proof sketch for our example analysis 4. Proof (sketch). The judgment $\emptyset \vdash \emptyset$, \emptyset {skip; c_{s2} } \emptyset , \emptyset : c'_{s2} with

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c'_{s2} = \\ \text{skip}@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset)]; \\ \text{spawn}(\\ \text{skip}@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset)]; \\ \text{lock}(l)@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\{o1\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\{o2\})]; \\ o2:=o1@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\{o1\}), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\{o2\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\{o2\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\})]; \\ o1:=o2@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\{o2\}), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset)]; \\ \text{unlock}(l)@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset)]; \\ \\ |\text{lock}(l)@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\{s1\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\{o2\})]@[\text{acq}(\text{A-NR},\{o1\})]; \\ o1:=s1@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\{s1\}), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\{s2\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\{s2\})]; \\ s2:=o1@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\{s2\}), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\{s2\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\})]; \\ o1:=0@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\{o1\}), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\})]; \\ \text{unlock}(l)@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset)]; \\ \text{unlock}(l)@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\{o1\}), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset)]; \\ \text{unlock}(l)@[\text{acq}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{acq}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NR},\emptyset), \text{rel}(\text{G-NW},\emptyset)]; \\ \text{unlock}(l)@[\text{acq}(
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is derivable with the rules ISQ, ISK, ISP, ILO, IAS, IUL, and IAN.

The judgment $lev \vdash c'_{s2} : c''_{s2}$ is derivable with the rules TTH, TSQ, TAN, TSK, TSP, TLO, TEX, TAL, TUL, TFH, TAH, and TFL.

For $ccnf = (c'_{s2}, \emptyset, mdst_{\perp})$ and the DPN \mathcal{M}_{ccnf} , we observe that the set of reachable DPN configurations starting from ccnf# has at most two concurrent control states, one for each thread. Furthermore, we observe that the spawned thread has only one control state that might be in conflict (as defined by the automaton \mathcal{A}_{ccnf}) with a control configuration of the spawning thread, namely, $(c_{conflict}, lkst_{conflict}, mdst_{conflict})$ with

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\begin{split} &c_{conflict} = \\ &o2\!:=\!o1@[\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR},\{o1\}),\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW},\{o2\}),\mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR},\{o2\}),\mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW},\{o1\})];\\ &o1\!:=\!o2@[\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR},\{o2\}),\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW},\{o1\}),\mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR},\emptyset),\mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW},\emptyset)];\\ &\mathbf{unlock}(l)@[\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR},\emptyset),\mathsf{acq}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW},\emptyset),\mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NR},\emptyset),\mathsf{rel}(\mathsf{G}\text{-}\mathsf{NW},\emptyset)] \end{split}
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and $lkst_{conflict} = \{l\}$ and $mdst_{conflict}(\mathsf{G-NR}) = x \setminus \{(o1)\}$. However, all control states with a mode state $mdst'_{conflict}$ such that $o1 \in mdst'_{conflict}(\mathsf{A-NR})$ also have a lock state $lkst'_{conflict}$ with $l \in lkst'_{conflict}$. Since $l \in lkst_{conflict}$ and $l \in lkst'_{conflict}$ no DPN configuration is reachable from ccnf# that contains the two control states that are in conflict due to consistent use of locks in the DPN.