

> Organisation

Katja Stoppenbrink (Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics, University of Münster) and **Thomas Meyer** (Department of Philosophy, University of Münster)

Registration is required due to limited capacity. Please send your registration inquiry to **casb@wwu.de** by **13 April 2018** latest.

> Venue


Centre for Advanced Study in BioethicsGeiststraße 24–26 · Room GE 1.32
48151 Münster

> Contact

Centre for Advanced Study in Bioethics Geiststraße 24–26 48151 Münster Germany

Phone: +49 251 83-23561 Fax: +49 251 83-23571

casb@wwu.de



mages showing Río Sucio (Costa Rica) by: gerwinfilius, leaflanguages – flickr.com





> Causation & Responsibility

On the 'standard account of individual responsibility' attribution of responsibility both in moral philosophy and in law is based upon an epistemic condition and a causal requirement: We ask whether an agent has intentionally - or at least knowingly - caused wrongful harm. Both, control and causation, pose a number of problems, and in our practices of responsibility attributions we depart from these requirements in a number of ways. To capture cases in which an agent's control is doubtful or deficient we might ask if the agent was coerced or if (s)he could and should have known the outcome of his or her deeds. As to the causal condition. some legal scholars contend that the requirement of so-called factual causation exhausts the causal aspect of the inquiry for outcome-responsibility. They argue that the further requirements for responsibility, namely the attribution of harm via "harm within the risks" analysis, foreseeability or remoteness of harm, the no-worse-off requirement etc. have nothing to do with causation but are purely normative value judgements. Others argue that normative considerations for the attribution of harm still evaluate the causal chain and are built upon a causal analysis. The factual or normative 'nature' of causation itself is at issue here.

Further questions arise with non-causal liabilities: Are there situations where individuals ought to be legally liable and such liability can only be justified on non-causal grounds?

These and other intriguing problems are to be addressed at this workshop. There will be contributions by distinguished academics and by junior researchers, by moral philosophers and by legal scholars from both the Common Law, namely Sandy Steel and Richard W. Wright, and the Civil Law traditions, i.a. Thomas Gutmann, Reinhard Merkel and Ingeborg Puppe.

> Programme

	Thursday, 19 April 2018
10:45	Welcome
	Section I: Conditions of Responsibility
11:00 – 12:30	Coercion and Responsibility Thomas Gutmann (Münster)
	Lunch
13:30 – 15:00	Which Ability for Responsibility? Katja Stoppenbrink (Münster)
15:30 – 17:00	Non-causal Responsibility for Outcomes Sandy Steel (Oxford)
17:30 – 19:00	Limitations on Legal Responsibility for Wrongfully Caused Harm Richard Wright (Chicago)
	Friday, 20 April 2018
	Friday, 20 April 2018 Section II: Problems of Causation in the Law
9:30 – 11:00	
9:30 – 11:00 11:30 – 13:00	Section II: Problems of Causation in the Law Criminal Responsibility Among Multiple Negligent Actors and the Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals, Illustrated by the Love Parade Case
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